Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs contended that the BLM violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and its own regulations, 43 C.F.R. 3809 et seq., by permitting Denison to restart mining operations at the Arizona 1 Mine in 2009, after a 17-year hiatus, under a plan of operations that BLM approved in 1988. The court concluded that the prior panel did not intend that its brief affirmation of a preliminary injunction denial become law of the case; BLM's decision to allow Denison to resume mining under the 1988 plan of operations was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; because the 1988 plan had been approved, BLM's obligation under NEPA had been fulfilled and therefore, BLM did not unlawfully withhold required agency action; BLM's update of the reclamation bond should not be set aside as not in accordance with law or without observance of procedure required by law as plaintiffs contended; BLM's invocation of the categorical exclusion was not arbitrary and capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Center for Biological Diversity, et al v. Salazar, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering and thirty counts of money laundering. On appeal, defendant challenged the portion of his sentence that imposed forfeiture and restitution. Defendant argued that, because the FBI was essentially a part of the DOJ, the two entities were functionally the same. Thus, he argued, requiring him to pay forfeiture to the DOJ and restitution to the FBI would result in an impermissible double recovery for the government. The court concluded that the two payments represented different types of funds: punitive and compensatory. They were different in nature, kind, and purpose. Therefore, it was irrelevant as to what extent the FBI and DOJ were distinct entities and the district court did not clearly err when it did not offset defendant's forfeiture amount. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of his application for adjustment of status and its denial of his motion to reopen based on new evidence. The BIA concluded that petitioner was ineligible for adjustment of status because of a 1997 conviction for possession of marijuana for sale in violation of California Health & Safety Code section 11359. Petitioner contended that the conviction was actually for simple possession of marijuana in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11357, and that, as a result, he was eligible for relief. The court concluded that petitioner failed to establish that the state court changed his 1997 drug conviction from possession of marijuana for sale under section 11359 to simple possession of marijuana under section 11357. Because petitioner remained inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182 notwithstanding the state court's expungement of his section 11359 offense, he was ineligible for adjustment of status. Accordingly, the court denied the petitions for review. View "Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against officials from the California State Prison, alleging constitutional violations relating to his six-day placement on contraband watch. Plaintiff was placed on contraband watch after three unlabeled bottles found in his prison cell tested positive for methamphetamine. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment in part but denied summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's Eighth Amendment and due process claims against Defendant Mandeville and Rosario. The court held that both Defendant Mandeville and Rosario were entitled to qualified immunity because the law at the time plaintiff was on contraband watch did not clearly establish that their actions were unconstitutional. View "Chappell v. Mandeville, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, conspiracy to distribute cocaine, possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute, and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. On appeal, defendant raised numerous claims. The court held that the district court was correct in ruling that Dixon v. United States applied to defendant's public authority defense and subsequently affirmed the district court with respect to all alleged errors regarding defendant's assertion of the public authority defense. The district court did not deprive defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it prevented him from arguing an incorrect burden of proof to the jury during his closing argument. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying certain discovery requests as overbroad and immaterial; however, the record was unclear as to what, if anything, would have been produced if those requests had been granted and what effect, if any, the production would have had on the outcome of defendant's trial. Accordingly, the court vacated defendant's conviction and remanded for further proceedings. The court agreed with defendant that his sentencing hearing contained several procedural violations. If defendant's conviction is reinstated, his sentence must be vacated and he must be resentenced. View "United States v. Doe" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from a conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. At issue was whether a witness's testimony in disguise at trial violated the Confrontation Clause. The witness was a confidential informant and his disguise would protect his identity in light of the inherent dangers of the particular case and the public nature of the courtroom. The court held that in this case, the disguise in the form of a wig and mustache did not violate the Confrontation Clause. Even if the testimony violated defendant's due process rights, such error was harmless. View "United States v. Jesus-Casteneda" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Prius owners, brought a putative class action suit against Toyota, alleging that they experienced defects in their anti-lock brake systems (ABS), resulting in increased stopping distances. On appeal, Toyota sought review of the district court's denial of their motion to compel arbitration. The court concluded that Toyota could not compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims. The district court had the authority to decide whether Toyota, a nonsignatory to the Purchase Agreement, could compel arbitration. The court discerned no reason that plaintiffs should be equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kramer, et al v. Toyota Motor Corp., et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico and lawful permanent resident of the United States, petitioned for review of the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's order of removal. Petitioner had pled guilty to false imprisonment in violation of California Penal Code 210.5 and the IJ held that petitioner's conviction qualified as a crime of violence. The court concluded that California Penal Code 210.5 was categorically a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. 16(b) and was therefore an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The court otherwise lacked jurisdiction to review petitioner's final order of removal. Accordingly, the court denied the petition in part and dismissed in part. View "Barragan-Lopez, et al v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, investors in Bernard Madoff's Ponzi scheme, brought a Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2674 et seq., action against the SEC and the Government. On appeal, the court held that the district court correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction within the "discretionary function" exception to the United State's waiver of sovereign immunity in section 2680(a) of the FTCA. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and adopted parts of the district court's opinion as its own. The court also held that the additional allegations made in the Second Amended Complaint were insufficient to overcome the discretionary function exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' request for additional discovery. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Dichter-Mad Family Partners, et al v. USA" on Justia Law

Mattel filed suit against MGA, claiming that MGA infringed Mattel's copyrights by producing Bratz dolls. On appeal, Mattel challenged the jury's verdict that Mattel misappropriated MGA's trade secrets and the district court's award of attorneys fees and costs to MGA under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 505. The court held that MGA's claim of trade-secret misappropriation was not logically related to Mattel's counterclaim and therefore, the court reversed the district court's holding that MGA's counterclaim-in-reply was compulsory. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees and costs under the Act, the court affirmed that award. View "Mattel, Inc., et al v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., et al" on Justia Law