Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Bangladesh, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's determination that petitioner was ineligible for withholding of removal and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) because his conviction for resisting arrest constituted a particularly serious crime. The court held that it had jurisdiction over petitioner's challenges, which were premised on constitutional and legal considerations, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(C). Because the BIA had not adequately explained its reasons for designating petitioner's conviction a particularly serious crime, the court granted the petition with respect to the particularly serious crime determination and remanded to the BIA for an appropriate explanation. As to petitioner's CAT claim for deferral of removal, the court denied the petition. View " Alphonsus v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 1153, which provided for federal jurisdiction over certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The court held that the Tribal Enrollment Certificate was insufficient to establish that defendant was an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction under section 1153 because the government introduced no evidence that defendant's bloodline was derived from a federally recognized tribe. Because the court held that the government introduced insufficient evidence under the first prong of the United States v. Bruce test, the court need not consider whether the Tribal Enrollment Certificate alone was sufficient to carry the government's burden as to the second prong. Accordingly, the court reversed defendant's convictions under section 1153 in counts 2 through 9 of the indictment. Defendant's conviction for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 was unaffected by the court's disposition. View "United States v. Zepeda" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that defendants, correctional officers at the prison where he was incarcerated at the time of the alleged occurrence, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by spraying him with an excessive quantity of pepper spray. Plaintiff also alleged that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were disregarded when the officers denied him a vegetarian breakfast. The court held that the district court failed to draw all inferences in plaintiff's favor when resolving the issue of qualified immunity in a summary judgment and therefore, the court reversed and remanded on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the Equal Protection challenge where plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to whether the officers intentionally refused to provide him with a religious breakfast tray while providing the same to other inmates who were similarly situated. View "Furnace v. Sullivan, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a California resident, brought a putative class action against ADT in California Superior Court, alleging that ADT recorded his telephone conversation with an ADT representative without his consent in violation of Section 632 of California's invasion of privacy law, Cal. Penal Code 632. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on diversity grounds. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's pleadings failed to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. The court remanded, however, in order to give plaintiff an opportunity to seek to amend his complaint to successfully plead a cause of action under the federal standards set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. View "Faulkner v. ADT Security Services, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to reentry as a removed alien without a plea agreement. The district court included a crime of violence sentencing enhancement based on its conclusion that defendant's prior Washington State third-degree rape conviction qualified as a forcible sex offense under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. Defendant appealed his sentence. The court held that because the Guidelines were amended in 2008 to include as a forcible sex offense any sex offense involving the absence of the victim's consent, the district court did not err in entering the enhancement in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gallegos-Galindo" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to third degree rape under Oregon law in December 1999. In 2002, he pleaded guilty for failing to register as a sex offender and voluntarily left the country some time later. After being indicted in 2010 for illegally reentering the country after having been previously removed, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his 2004 order of removal was invalid because the IJ incorrectly determined that his Oregon statutory rape conviction was an aggravated felony and, as a result, erroneously informed him that he was not eligible for voluntary departure. The court concluded that defendant's underlying removal proceeding was consistent with due process because he was correctly informed that he was ineligible for discretionary relief from removal under the applicable law at the time of his removal hearing. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal of the indictment against defendant and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Vidal-Mendoza" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought innocent spouse relief, claiming that she did not understand the nature of her husband's business and claiming ignorance of his fraudulent actions regarding his tax liabilities. At issue was how the Tax Court should review appeals for equitable innocent spouse relief from joint and several liability for unpaid taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6015(f). The court joined the Eleventh Circuit and held that the Tax Court properly considered new evidence outside the administrative record. The court also concluded that the Tax Court correctly applied a de novo standard of review in determining the taxpayer's eligibility for equitable relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Tax Court's judgment. View "Wilson v. CIR" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for failing to appear in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3146 and subsequently appealed his sentence of 27 months' imprisonment. At issue was which subsection of 18 U.S.C. 3146(b)(1)(A) established the appropriate maximum prison term in this circumstance. The court joined the First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that it determined the applicable maximum by looking to the underlying criminal offense, rather than to an intervening violation of supervised release. Because the underlying offense, unlawful possession of a mail key, was punishable by a prison term of five years or more, the five-year maximum prison term found in subsection (ii) applied in this circumstance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Jensen" on Justia Law

After defendant allegedly traveled to Mexico and engaged in illicit sexual conduct involving a minor, the government indicted defendant on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 2423(c) and, because he was under a state-law duty to register as a sex offender, one count of violating section 2260A. The court held that the section 2260A count against defendant did not violate ex post facto principles. Even accepting defendant's argument that the state laws applied the registration requirement to him retroactively, the additional punishment under section 2260A was not for his earlier crimes. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of that count and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Hardeman" on Justia Law

Respondents appealed the district court's grant of habeas corpus to petitioner pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder with a deadly weapon and robbery with a deadly weapon. The district court granted habeas relief, concluding that the Kazalyn instruction for first degree murder given in petitioner's case violated her due process rights and that the improper instruction did not constitute harmless error. The court held that, in light of Nika v. State, petitioner's claim that the Kazalyn instruction violated her due process rights because it did not provide a distinct definition for deliberation failed. Byford v. State, which narrowed the scope of conduct that could qualify as first degree murder by expanding and separating definitions of premeditation, deliberation, and willfulness, should be applied to petitioner's conviction, which was not final at the time Byford was decided. The court held that the erroneous instructions constituted harmless error. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider petitioner's other claims in her petition which were not addressed by the district court. View "Babb v. Lozowsky, et al" on Justia Law