Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In the four cases giving rise to these eleven consolidated appeals, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Director of the California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS), appealed the district court's grant of preliminary injunctions to plaintiffs, various providers and beneficiaries of California's Medicaid program (Medi-Cal). At issue was the implementation of Medi-Cal reimbursement rate reductions. The court held that Orthopaedic Hospital v. Belshe did not control the outcome in these cases because it did not consider the key issue here - the Secretary's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(30)(A); the Secretary's approval of California's requested reimbursement rates were entitled to Chevron deference; and the Secretary's approval complied with the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. The court further held that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits on their Supremacy Clause claims against the Director because the Secretary had reasonably determined that the State's reimbursement rates complied with section 30(A). The court finally held that none of the plaintiffs had a viable takings claim because Medicaid, as a voluntary program, did not create property rights. View "Managed Pharmacy Care, et al v. Sebelius, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the servicer of their home loan, violated the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2605, because it did not respond adequately to three letters in which they challenged the monthly payment due on their loan. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss the claim because a servicer must receive a valid "qualified written request" to incur the duty to respond under section 2605, and it determined that the letters were not qualified written requests that triggered the statutory duty. Because plaintiffs' letters to defendant challenged the terms of their loans and requested modification of various loan and mortgage documents, they were not qualified written requests relating to the servicing of plaintiffs' loan. Because section 2605 did not require a servicer to respond to such requests, the district court correctly dismissed plaintiffs' claim and the court affirmed the judgment. View "Medrano, et al v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus challenging his California conviction of second degree murder. The district court denied the petition but the court raised a certificate of appealability regarding whether there was a sufficient factual basis to support petitioner's no contest plea and whether his plea was knowing and voluntary. Because petitioner did not enter an Alford plea, the state court was under no obligation, under the federal Constitution, to find a factual basis. Petitioner provided no other reason to find his plea unknowing or involuntary. Accordingly, the court held that petitioner was not entitled to habeas relief. View "Loftis v. Almager" on Justia Law

Defendant feigned multiple acts of biological terrorism by mailing hundreds of packets of powder labeled "Anthrax" - which were actually full of sugar - in an effort to drum up publicity for a self-published book on the dangers of Anthrax. Defendant was convicted on two counts of mailing threatening communications ("threat" counts), 18 U.S.C. 876(c), and three counts of communicating false or misleading information regarding the presence of a biological weapon ("hoax" counts), 18 U.S.C. 1038(a). The court concluded that defendant's mailings to Starbucks and McDonald's constituted true threats and fell outside of the First Amendment's protection and his convictions under section 876(c) did not violate the Constitution; defendant's hoax speech was not protected under the First Amendment; defendant's mailings to Starbucks and McDonald's managers were addressed to natural persons, so there was sufficient evidence for a jury to convict him under section 876(c); and the issues defendant raised regarding jury instructions and prosecutorial misconduct were unpersuasive. The court held, however, that the district court procedurally erred when calculating the applicable Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Keyser" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of willful infliction of corporal injury to his spouse. Defendant contended that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses when the trial judge precluded his counsel from asking defendant's wife whether she was afraid to deviate from her initial incriminating statement to the police because of threats allegedly made against her by the prosecutor. The court held that clearly established federal law, as set forth by the Supreme Court, indicated that the trial court committed constitutional error by denying petitioner the right to meaningful cross-examination of the prosecution's leading witness. The California Court of Appeal's conclusion that the trial court's curtailment did not reach constitutional magnitude was objectively unreasonable, and had a substantial injurious effect on petitioner's verdict. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court denying habeas corpus and remanded for issuance of the writ. View "Ortiz v. Yates" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for being a deported alien found in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326 and subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. At issue on appeal was whether the district court violated the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 (JSSA) or the Constitution in compiling its 2009 master jury wheel. The court held that, although the district court departed from the requirements of the JSSA in several respects, the court found no reversible error in the underlying conviction. Despite the court's conclusion, the court cautioned the district court to take note of the statutory violations the court identified and amend the district court's practice in the future. Because no JSSA violation warranted relief and there was no constitutional violation, the court affirmed the conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Hernandez-Estrada" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea for conspiracy to carry a concealed dangerous weapon on an aircraft, in violation of 49 U.S.C. 46505(e), and for aiding and abetting the carrying of a concealed dangerous weapon on an aircraft, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 2 and 49 U.S.C. 46505(b)(1). At issue was whether 49 U.S.C. 46505 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant, an airport employee, who sneaks a pocketknife past a security checkpoint and then gives it to a passenger who takes it aboard an airplane. The court concluded that 49 U.S.C. 46505 gave adequate notice to defendant that a pocketknife with a blade of slightly less than two-and-a-half inches was prohibited aboard an aircraft. Accordingly, the court held that the statute was not constitutionally vague as applied and affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that defendants, officers of the Honolulu Police Department, used excessive force in arresting him. The officers moved for summary judgment, arguing that their conduct was reasonable and, in any event, that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that the evidence gave rise to genuine issues of fact that were material to determining whether defendants used excessive force in breaking the car window and pulling plaintiff through it. Therefore, the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to defendants. The court also held that the trial court's jury instruction enforced an erroneous partial grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and, as such, constituted reversible error. View "Coles v. Eagle, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to knowing and unlawful possession of a firearm and the district court sentenced him to five years of supervised release subject to special conditions. At issue on appeal was whether the district court could require a sexual offender assessment as a condition of a supervised release when defendant had two decades-old prior sexual offense convictions involving weapons, when the current offense also involved a weapon, and when defendant's prior completion of sexual offender treatment could not be confirmed. The court concluded that it could require such an assessment and affirmed the condition imposed. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested and charged with violating 8 U.S.C. 1325, a misdemeanor illegal entry by an alien. The next day, defendant was brought before a magistrate judge in federal court in Arizona for a guilty plea proceeding that was part of Operation Streamline, which was "a procedure for taking of pleas en masse." On appeal, defendant contended that his plea violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(2). The court has several times before held that certain aspects of group plea proceedings violated various provisions of Rule 11, and the court followed those precedents and again concluded that there was Rule 11 error. However, in United States v. Escamilla-Rojas, the court held that the error was harmless. The court reached the same conclusion here where defendant voluntarily chose to enter the plea and his substantial rights were not affected. View "United States v. Aguilar-Vera" on Justia Law