Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiffs, nine homeless individuals living in the "Skid Row" district of Los Angeles, charged that the City violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by seizing and immediately destroying their unabandoned personal possessions, temporarily left on public sidewalks while plaintiffs attended to necessary tasks such as eating, showering, and using restrooms. Finding a strong likelihood of success on the merits, the district court enjoined the City from confiscating and summarily destroying unabandoned property in Skid Row. On appeal, the City argued that the district court applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating plaintiffs' claims. The court concluded that the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments protected homeless persons from government seizure and summary destruction of their unabandoned, but momentarily unattended, personal property. Accordingly, the court denied the City's appeal. View "Lavan, et al. v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff was removed from the Costa Mesa City Council meeting for an alleged violation of Costa Mesa Municipal Code 2-61, which made it a misdemeanor for members of the public who speak at City Council meetings to engage in "disorderly, insolent, or disruptive behavior." On appeal, plaintiff challenged, among other things, the district court's dismissal of his First Amendment facial challenge to the ordinance. Because section 2-61 failed to limit proscribed activity to only actual disturbances, the court reversed the district court's constitutionality ruling and found the statute facially invalid. However, the word "insolent" was easily removed from the ordinance without detriment to the purpose of section 2-61 and it need not be wholly invalidated since it was properly applied to plaintiff's disruptive behavior. The court affirmed the remainder of the district court's determinations. View "Acosta v. City of Costa Mesa, et al." on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that he was not eligible for waiver of inadmissibility because he was convicted of an aggravated felony. The court concluded that the crime of sexual battery under California law was categorically broader than the federal generic crime of "sexual abuse of a minor" because the California crime could be committed against a victim of any age, while the federal generic offense required proof that the victim was a minor. The court also concluded that none of the evidence the court was permitted to consider under the modified categorical approach established that petitioner's victim was a minor. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded the matter to the BIA. View "Sanchez-Avalos, et al. v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a state prisoner, allegedly engaged in a romantic, but not sexual, relationship with a female prison guard. Plaintiff alleged that both during and after the relationship, the guard perpetrated sexual acts on him without his consent. He filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging constitutional violations of the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim and failure to protect claim, and his First Amendment retaliation claim. The court held that plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim and reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. The court affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment on the remaining claims at issue. View "Wood v. Beauclair, et al." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS) provider, wished to provide wireless service in and around Pahrump, Nevada. Plaintiff sought digital interconnection with the facilities and equipment of defendant, the incumbent local exchange carrier (LEC) in the area. After the parties' efforts to negotiate an interconnection agreement failed, plaintiff brought suit alleging that defendant violated the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, by refusing to negotiate in good faith and by failing to provide digital interconnection with symmetrical pricing on an interim basis during negotiations, as required by the FCC regulations. The court held that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's good faith claim because it did not exhaust its administrative remedies under the court's prudential exhaustion requirement. The court also held that the interim arrangement and symmetrical pricing requirements applied only when the competing carrier did not have an existing interconnection arrangement with the incumbent LEC that provided for the transport and termination of telecommunications traffic. Because plaintiff had such an arrangement with defendant at all relevant times, defendant had no obligation to provide plaintiff an interim arrangement with symmetrical rates. The court remanded, however, to permit the district court to consider what, if any, relief was available to plaintiff under 47 C.F.R. 51.717. View "Autotel v. Nevada Bell Telephone Co." on Justia Law

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Defendant and his co-defendant were charged with the murder of a United States correctional officer. The Government filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. This was an interlocutory appeal of the district court's order denying defendant's motion to seal his pretrial competency proceedings and related filings. The court concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to either the collateral order doctrine or a petition for a writ of mandamus. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

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USAP brought suit against Parts Geek and various individuals alleging, among other things, copyright infringement in certain e-commerce software. The district court granted summary judgment against USAP on its claim of copyright infringement because it concluded that USAP did not own the allegedly infringed copyright. Because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether USAP owned a copyright in all or part of the software at issue, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. v. Parts Geek, LLC, et al." on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a Philippine citizen, petitioned for review of a BIA decision declaring him ineligible for relief under former section 212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 212(c), on the ground that he had served a "term of imprisonment" of over five years for conviction of an aggravated felony. Petitioner contended that the BIA improperly included in his "term of imprisonment" the entire period that he spent in psychiatric pre-trial civil confinement pending a determination of his competence to stand trial. Because the court could not confidently approximate how much time petitioner would have actually served in prison had he never spent time in pre-trial psychiatric confinement, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for a determination of the amount of constructive good time credit to which he was entitled for the period of his civil confinement. View "Corpuz v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

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In this putative class action, plaintiff alleged that HSBC and Best Buy (collectively, defendants) defrauded California customers by offering credit cards without adequately disclosing that cardholders would be subject to an annual fee. At issue was whether the district court erred when it considered extrinsic evidence in deciding defendants' motion to dismiss, and whether dismissal was proper under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the district court properly incorporated the disclosure documents at issue and the court affirmed its order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. View "Davis v. HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., et al." on Justia Law

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Debtors proposed a three-year Chapter 13 plan of reorganization. The Trustee objected and argued that a five-year plan was required. At issue was whether, under 11 U.S.C. 1325(b), a debtor with no "projected disposable income" could confirm a plan that was shorter in duration than the "applicable commitment period" found in section 1325(b). The court concluded that the Trustee raised legitimate policy considerations as to why a mandated plan length might be desirable even though debtors have no projected disposable income. However, the court concluded that the bankruptcy court erred in disregarding the controlling precedent in Maney v. Kagenveama where Ninth Circuit precedent plainly allowed debtors to confirm a shorter plan under the facts of this case. View "Flores, et al. v. Danielson" on Justia Law