Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and kidnapping. Defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district court denied the appeal. On remand to the district court from a prior decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Defendant contended his counsel was ineffective for presenting evidence at his sentencing hearing that he had suffered four head injuries and that these injuries affected his mental functions at the time of the murder. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to submit this additional evidence. View "Scott v. Ryan" on Justia Law

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) granted Petitioner's asylum application in 1996. In 2003, the INS ceased to exist, and its functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. One of the Department's agencies is the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). In 2004, the USCIS sent Petitioner a termination notice informing him that his asylum status had been terminated by the USCIS and that he was placed in removal proceedings. Petitioner moved to terminate the removal proceedings on the ground that his asylum status had not properly been terminated. The immigration judge (IJ) concluded she lacked jurisdiction to review an asylum officer's termination of asylum status and ordered Petitioner removed to India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's petition for review of the BIA's orders of removal, holding (1) asylum status can only terminate through the Attorney General; and (2) the regulations pursuant to which the Department of Homeland Security terminates asylum status are ultra vires because the governing statute confers that authority exclusively on the the Attorney General. Remanded. View "Nijar v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant, Law Offices of Sidney Mickell, sent a debt collection letter addressed to Plaintiff, Catherine Evon, in "care of" her employer. Evon filed a class action lawsuit alleging (1) Mickell's act of sending letters "care of" the class members' employers violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's prohibition on communication with third parties, and (2) the contents of the letter violated the Act's prohibition against false, deceptive, or misleading misrepresentations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (1) held Mickell's act of sending "care of" letters constituted a per se violation of the Act, and reversed the district court's denial of Evon's class certification motion on that issue; and (2) held that the contents of the letter did not violate the Act, and therefore affirmed the district court's denial of Evon's class certification motion in that regard. Remanded. View "Evon v. Law Offices of Sidney Mickell" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over the proceeds of a life insurance policy. At issue was whether the federal interpleader remedy shields a negligent stakeholder from tort liability for its creation of a conflict over entitlement to the interpleaded funds. After analyzing the Supreme Court's reasoning in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that it did not, and that a claimant may seek to recover all damages directly and proximately caused by the negligent stakeholder's conduct. In so holding, the Court reversed the district court and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee v. W. Coast Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Several Alaskan native villages (Villages) claimed they possessed non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing rights in areas of the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) in the Gulf of Alaska. The Secretary of Commerce promulgated regulations limiting access to the halibut and sablefish fisheries. The Villages claimed that the regulations failed to account for the Villages' non-exclusive aboriginal hunting and fishing rights, without Congress's consent in violation of the federal common law and the Indian Non-Intercourse Act. The district court dismissed their complaint. The Supreme Court remanded to the district court for the purpose of determining what aboriginal rights, if any, the Villages had on the OCS. The district court held that the Villages had no nonexclusive right to hunt and fish in the OCS. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) based on the uncontested factual findings of the district court, the court did not err in concluding that the Villages failed to establish an entitlement to non-exclusive aboriginal rights on the OCS; and (2) because the Villages had not established aboriginal rights on the OCS, the Court had no occasion to consider whether there was a conflict with the federal paramountcy doctrine or whether the Secretary's actions violated the Indian Non-Intercourse Act. View "Native Village of Eyak v. Blank " on Justia Law

This case involved an experimental forest thinning, fuels reduction, and research project (the Project) in the Deschutes National Forest in central Oregon. The Project allowed logging and controlled burning on 2,500 acres of the Pringle Falls Experimental Forest. The League of Wilderness Defenders-Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project (the League) filed suit against the U.S. Forest Service and Service officials, alleging that the agency's environmental impact statement (EIS) for the Project failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The district court granted summary judgment to the Service, relying in part on the fact that the Project involved research in an experimental forest. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the EIS was adequately supported by scientific data and took a hard look at the significant impacts of the Project, and therefore, the EIS complied with NEPA. View "League of Wilderness Defenders v. USFS" on Justia Law

The Department of Health and Human Services denied Medicare coverage of the BIO-1000, a piece of durable medical equipment used to treat osteoarthritis of the knee. In four decisions, the Medicare appeals counsel, the highest level of agency adjudication, ruled that the BIO-1000 had not been shown to be reasonable and necessary for the treatment at issue. The supplier of the device challenged those decisions. The district court granted summary judgment for the BIO-1000 supplier. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's judgment and joined the Fourth Circuit in holding that the appeals council's coverage denials for the BIO-1000 were not arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence, as (1) the appeals council adequately explained its reasons for denying coverage; and (2) the coverage denials were supported by substantial evidence. Remanded. View "Int'l Rehab. Scis. v. Sebelius" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) who suffered from multiple sclerosis and systemic lupus, filed an administrative complaint based on alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The complaint was adjudicated by an ALJ, who denied relief in part. Plaintiff then filed an optional administrative appeal with the EEOC. Plaintiff withdrew her appeal without waiting 180 days as specified in 29 C.F.R. 1614.407(d) and filed suit in district court based on the same claims she asserted in her administrative complaint. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding that under Rivera v. USPS, it lacked jurisdiction because Plaintiff had not waited 180 days after filing her administrative appeal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that based on Bankston v. White and on post-Rivera regulation, Bullock had exhausted her administrative remedies. Remanded. View "Bullock v. Berrien" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. This case was the second time Defendant sought habeas review in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's first habeas petition. The State of Arizona subsequently issued a death warrant and set August 8, 2012 as Cook's execution date. Here Defendant asserted that his pretrial was ineffective and that his postconviction relief (PCR) counsel was ineffective. Defendant argued that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Martinez v. Ryan required the district court to excuse his procedural default because of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) in his state PCR proceedings. Defendant also asked the Court to stay his execution so he could further pursue his underlying pretrial IAC claim. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed the district court's decision to deny Defendant's Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) motion for relief for judgment under Martinez, holding that Martinez does not apply to this case; and (2) denied Defendant's motion for a stay of execution, as Defendant's pretrial IAC claim lacked merit. View "Cook v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were United States citizens or legal permanent residents who had good reason to believe they were on the Terrorist Screening Center's (TSC) no-fly list (List). They initially submitted grievances through the redress program run by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), but the government refused to confirm or deny their inclusion on the List. Rather than continuing to pursue their administrative grievances with the TSA, Plaintiffs filed this action against the directors of the TSC and FBI and the attorney general, challenging the TSA's grievance procedures. The district court dismissed the case, holding that TSA was a necessary party to the litigation but that TSA could not feasibly be joined in the district court due to 49 U.S.C. 46110, which grants federal courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review TSA's final orders. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) section 46110 does not strip the district court of federal question jurisdiction over substantive challenges to the inclusion of one's name on the List; and (2) the district court's determination that TSA was a necessary party was not an abuse of discretion, but the court erred in holding that joinder of TSA was infeasible in light of section 46110. View "Latif v. Holder" on Justia Law