Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs were United States citizens or legal permanent residents who had good reason to believe they were on the Terrorist Screening Center's (TSC) no-fly list (List). They initially submitted grievances through the redress program run by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), but the government refused to confirm or deny their inclusion on the List. Rather than continuing to pursue their administrative grievances with the TSA, Plaintiffs filed this action against the directors of the TSC and FBI and the attorney general, challenging the TSA's grievance procedures. The district court dismissed the case, holding that TSA was a necessary party to the litigation but that TSA could not feasibly be joined in the district court due to 49 U.S.C. 46110, which grants federal courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to review TSA's final orders. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) section 46110 does not strip the district court of federal question jurisdiction over substantive challenges to the inclusion of one's name on the List; and (2) the district court's determination that TSA was a necessary party was not an abuse of discretion, but the court erred in holding that joinder of TSA was infeasible in light of section 46110. View "Latif v. Holder" on Justia Law

Two environmental groups (Petitioners) petitioned for review of a final rulemaking by the EPA that approved a revision to a California state plan to implement national ambient air quality standards for air pollutants. The revision required the South Coast Air Quality Management District to transfer credits to a soon-to-be-completed power plant named Sentinel. Petitioners alleged that the EPA committed procedural errors during the rulemaking process and that the substance of the revised state plan violated the Clean Air Act. Petitioners and the EPA agreed this case should be remanded because the EPA's final rule was invalid, so the only dispute was whether vacatur was appropriate. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded without vacatur so the construction of the power plant could proceed without delay, as the power supply would otherwise be interrupted and the plant's operation was not authorized to commence without a new and valid EPA rule in place. View "Ca. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA" on Justia Law

Defendant Rufino Valdes-Vega appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress cocaine found in his truck. Defendant contended that the stop of his truck by border patrol agents seventy miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border violated the Fourth Amendment, and consequently, the cocaine found in his truck must be suppressed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the district court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the totality of the circumstances in this case did not provide border patrol agents with reasonable suspicion to believe that Defendant was smuggling drugs or aliens. View "United States v. Valdes-Vega" on Justia Law

The district court presided over four class action cases. Two insurance companies (collectively, Defendants) were the defendants in the two underlying cases. Allianz Life Insurance Company (Allianz) was a defendant in the other cases. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs opposed and attached a declaration by Dr. Craig McCann to support their theories. When Defendants moved to exclude the opinion, the court appointed an expert witness, Dr. Zvi Bodie, to evaluate Dr. McCann's opinion. The district court ordered Dr. Bodie's report sealed until it determined whether the report was admissible. In its case, Allianz filed a motion for summary judgment and a Daubert motion to exclude Dr. McCann. Defendants settled with the plaintiffs before the district court ruled on the Daubert or summary judgment motions. Allianz subsequently intervened in the underlying cases and requested the unsealing of Dr. Bodie's report. The district court denied its motion, ruling that the presumption in favor of public access to judicial records did not apply to the records at issue because they were attached to a non-dispositive Daubert motion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded with directions to grant the motion, because the records at issue were filed in connection with pending summary judgment motions. View "Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N.A." on Justia Law

Deborah Benge, a former employee of Pacific Ship Repair and Fabrication, filed a disability claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act seeking compensation for her work-related injury. The ALJ found that Benge's disability at the time was permanent. The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (OWCP) made partial permanent disability payments to Benge until Benge underwent surgery. An ALJ subsequently determined that Benge's nine-month total disability immediately following the surgery was temporary in nature. This determination absolved the OWCP from making disability payments during this time period. Instead, Pacific was liable for the payments. The Department of Labor's Benefits Review Board affirmed the ALJ, concluding that even if a disability is declared permanent, it may be later re-characterized as temporary when the underlying condition worsens and re-stabilizes following a surgical procedure. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the Longshore Act, a prior finding of partial permanent disability does not preclude a later finding of temporary disability for the same underlying injury during a period of recovery following surgery; and (2) because Benge's partial disability could be re-characterized as a temporary total disability in accord with changed circumstances, Pacific was responsible for the temporary total disability payments. View "Pac. Ship Repair & Fabrication, Inc. v. Office of Worker Comp. Programs" on Justia Law

Marc and Claire Headley were two former ministers of the Church of Scientology International. Marc sued the Church and Claire sued the Church and the Religious Technology Center under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (Act), making claims of forced labor and that the Church and Center psychologically coerced them to provide labor. Specifically, they contended that the Church and Center violated the Act by causing them to believe that they could not leave the ministry or that they would face serious harm in doing so. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding (1) Marc's allegations of instances of physical force against him did not raise a triable issue of material fact on his forced-labor claim; and (2) Marc's and Claire's claims of psychologically coerced labor were barred by the ministerial exception. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Headleys did not establish a genuine issue of fact regarding whether they were victims of forced-labor violations; and (2) the record did not allow the conclusion that the Church or Center violated the Act. View "Headley v. Church of Scientology Int'l" on Justia Law

Gregory Haynes was the counsel for the plaintiff in the underlying action. The district court (1) determined that Haynes continued pursuit of plaintiff's claims after it was clear the claims were frivolous and in bad faith, and (2) determined that the defendants had incurred excess costs and fees of over $360,000 due to Haynes' misconduct. The court imposed sanctions on Haynes in this amount pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1927, declining to consider Haynes's assertion that he could not possibly pay such an award. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) a district court may reduce a section 1927 sanctions award in light of an attorney's inability to pay; and (2) because the district court appeared to believe it was without discretion to reduce the sanctions award on this ground and accordingly failed to consider whether to exercise that discretion, the case was remanded. View "Haynes v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to mail fraud and money laundering. Based on the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the district court imposed a prison sentence longer than the one proposed by the parties in the plea agreement and also in excess of the range recommended by the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant appealed his sentence, claiming both procedural error and substantive unreasonableness. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) though it imposed a sentence outside of the Guidelines range, the district court did not err by failing to provide prior notice under Fed. R. Crim P. 32(h), as this notice was not required when varying a sentence based on section 3553(a) factors; and (2) the district court did not impermissibly rely on Defendant's inability to pay restitution by considering the financial impact his crimes had on his victims. View "United States v. Rangel" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of drug-related crimes involving the distribution of methamphetmaine, cocaine, and marijuana. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a series of electronic surveillance orders authorizing interception of communications over cellular phones associated with him and his alleged co-conspirators. Defendant contended that these orders by their terms authorized more than standard intercepts, permitting more intrusive roving intercepts without meeting the statutory prerequisites of 18 U.S.C. 2518. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) if the government seeks authorization for the use of new technology to convert cellular phones into roving bugs, it must specifically request that authority, the court must scrutinize the need for such surveillance, and the authorization orders must be clear and unambiguous; but (2) in this case, the district court did not err in finding that the orders were intended only to authorize standard interception techniques and that the government did not do otherwise. View "United States v. Oliva" on Justia Law

M.P., a student with disabilities, appealed the district court's ruling that the Anchorage School District (ASD) did not deny him a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) because the failure to develop an updated Individualized Education Program (IEP) was mostly attributable to his "parents' litigious approach." The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) mandates that public educational agencies review and revise annually an eligible child's IEP. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the district court relied on an improper basis when it declined to consider whether the ASD complied with the IDEA's substantive requirements; (2) the ASD deprived M.P. of a substantively adequate FAPE by relying on an outdated IEP to measure M.P.'s academic and functional performance and provide educational benefits to M.P.; and (3) M.P.'s parents were entitled to reimbursement for private tutoring expenses incurred in 2008 and review of the propriety of private tutoring expenses incurred in 2009. Remanded. View "Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P." on Justia Law