Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An armed fugitive fleeing law enforcement entered a print shop owned by the plaintiff, forcibly removed him, and barricaded himself inside. After a thirteen-hour standoff, Los Angeles Police Department SWAT officers used dozens of tear gas canisters to subdue the fugitive, causing significant damage to the shop and its contents. The parties agreed that the officers’ actions were authorized, reasonable, and lawful. The plaintiff alleged that the damages, which exceeded $60,000, were caused exclusively by the police.The plaintiff initially sought compensation from the United States Marshals Service, which denied the claim and referred him to the City of Los Angeles. After the City did not respond to his claims or his attorney’s letter, the plaintiff filed a federal lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. The City moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Takings Clause does not require compensation for property destroyed by police acting reasonably in an emergency. The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the City’s initial motion but later granted summary judgment for the City, finding that the destruction was a valid exercise of police power and not a compensable taking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the government’s destruction of private property, when necessary and reasonable for public safety, is exempt from the Takings Clause. The court relied on historical understanding and longstanding precedent, concluding that such actions fall outside the scope of the Takings Clause. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment. View "PENA V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

An Oregon nonprofit organization, whose board members are guided by sincerely held religious beliefs, challenged a state law requiring most employers to provide insurance coverage for abortion and contraceptive services. The organization’s governing documents and public statements reflect a commitment to traditional Judeo-Christian ethics, including opposition to abortion based on religious grounds. Although the law contains exemptions for certain religious employers, the organization does not qualify for any of these exceptions, a point not disputed by the state. The organization sought relief, arguing that being compelled to provide such coverage violates its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied the organization’s request for a preliminary injunction and dismissed its complaint. The district court found there was doubt as to whether the organization’s opposition to abortion was genuinely religious in nature. It further concluded that the law was neutral and generally applicable, subject only to rational basis review, which it satisfied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and vacated the denial of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that the organization’s beliefs are religious and sincerely held, and that the district court erred by not accepting these allegations as true at the motion to dismiss stage. The appellate court remanded the case for the district court to reconsider, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. v. Wisconsin Labor & Industry Review Commission, whether the selective denial of a religious exemption to the organization violates the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit expressed no opinion on the ultimate constitutional question, leaving it for the district court to address in the first instance. View "OREGON RIGHT TO LIFE V. STOLFI" on Justia Law

A group of grocery retailers and public interest organizations challenged federal regulations that established a national uniform disclosure standard for foods containing genetically modified ingredients. Congress had directed the Secretary of Agriculture to create this standard, which was delegated to the Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). The AMS’s regulations, effective January 1, 2022, required certain foods to disclose if they were “bioengineered” or contained “bioengineered” ingredients, but generally excluded highly refined foods where genetically modified material was undetectable. Plaintiffs argued that this exclusion, the mandated use of the term “bioengineered” instead of more familiar terms like “GMO,” and the allowance of QR code and text-message disclosure options were unlawful or arbitrary under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs only on their challenge to the QR code and text-message disclosure options, remanding those provisions to the AMS without vacating them. The court denied summary judgment on all other claims, which the Ninth Circuit construed as a final judgment granting summary judgment to the AMS and intervenor-defendants on the remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had standing and that the AMS committed legal error by generally excluding highly refined foods from the definition of “bioengineered foods.” The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on this issue, remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment to the plaintiffs, and directed the district court to determine whether any regulatory provisions should be vacated. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the claim that the use of “bioengineered” was arbitrary and capricious, finding the agency’s choice reasonable. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by not vacating the two disclosure-format regulations and directed prospective vacatur after further input from the parties. The judgment was otherwise affirmed. View "NATURAL GROCERS V. ROLLINS" on Justia Law

A same-sex married couple, one a U.S. citizen residing in California and the other a Saudi citizen, spent part of each year living together in Saudi Arabia, where homosexuality is punishable by death. In 2021, after U.S. travel restrictions eased, they booked tickets with a German airline to fly from Saudi Arabia to San Francisco. The airline, which operates extensively in California, required them to confirm their marital status for entry into the U.S. During check-in in Riyadh, a senior airline employee publicly disclosed and questioned their relationship, and copies of their marriage certificate and passports were sent electronically to airline headquarters despite their concerns about Saudi government surveillance. After the trip, the Saudi government updated one plaintiff’s official status to “married,” and he feared returning to Saudi Arabia due to potential severe penalties. The couple alleged that the airline’s actions led to significant personal, financial, and health consequences.The couple filed suit in California state court against the airline and its U.S. subsidiary, alleging breach of contract and several torts. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, asserting diversity and federal question jurisdiction. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit initially remanded for clarification of the subsidiary’s citizenship, after which the district court allowed amendment of the removal notice to reflect the correct citizenship.Upon renewed review, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had both specific personal jurisdiction over the defendants and subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity. The court found that the airline purposefully availed itself of California’s market, the claims arose from the airline’s California-related activities, and exercising jurisdiction was reasonable. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "DOE V. DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT" on Justia Law

North Mountain Foothills Apartments (NMFA), a company managing a large apartment complex in Phoenix, Arizona, hired Jasper Press as a maintenance technician during a period of increased workload due to a heatwave. Press discussed his compensation and the poor conditions at the complex with several coworkers. Management became aware that other employees knew about Press’s pay and housing benefits, leading to a meeting where Press was reprimanded for these discussions and told not to talk about pest issues with residents. The day after this meeting, Press was terminated, allegedly for failing to complete work orders. Press filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging unfair labor practices.An administrative law judge held an evidentiary hearing and found that NMFA violated Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act by interrogating Press about his wage discussions, issuing overly broad directives restricting such discussions, threatening reprisals, and discharging Press for engaging in protected activities. The NLRB adopted these findings and ordered remedies including reinstatement and back pay for Press. NMFA appealed, raising for the first time constitutional challenges to the NLRB’s structure and process, and also contested the Board’s factual findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to consider NMFA’s unexhausted constitutional claims because such structural challenges are not suited to agency resolution. The court rejected NMFA’s Article II removal protection challenge for lack of demonstrated harm, found no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial in NLRB proceedings, and held that the combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions within the NLRB does not violate due process. On the merits, the court found substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s finding that Press was discharged for protected activity and granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order. View "NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD V. NORTH MOUNTAIN FOOTHILLS APARTMENTS, LLC" on Justia Law

Ryan VanDyke was subject to a civil protection order and a no-contact order in Idaho after persistently harassing a woman, violating both probation conditions for a prior telephone-harassment conviction and earlier court-ordered protections. In October 2022, after being charged with felony stalking for continued unwanted contact and harassment, a state court issued a no-contact order that explicitly prohibited VanDyke from using, attempting to use, or threatening physical force against the victim. In May 2023, while still under these orders, VanDyke entered a courthouse carrying a loaded revolver.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho dismissed the federal indictment against VanDyke, which charged him with illegal firearm possession under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii). The district court found that, as applied to VanDyke, this statute did not fit within the historical tradition of firearm regulation required by the Second Amendment, and therefore held the statute unconstitutional in this context.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case following the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024). The Ninth Circuit held that § 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) is constitutional as applied to VanDyke. The court reasoned that there is a historical tradition of both individualized and categorical disarmament of persons deemed dangerous, including those subject to judicial findings of threat or facing serious criminal charges. The court found that the procedures and justifications for VanDyke’s disarmament were analogous to those recognized in Rahimi and related precedent. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the indictment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. VANDYKE" on Justia Law

A man with a prosthetic leg and wheelchair mobility visited a 7-Eleven store in California and encountered physical barriers that made access from the parking lot to the store entrance difficult. Specifically, the van-accessible parking was occupied, forcing him to park elsewhere and navigate a curb ramp with an excessive and uneven slope, which caused him difficulty and fatigue. After making a purchase, he filed suit against 7-Eleven under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, alleging discrimination due to the store’s failure to remove architectural barriers where removal was readily achievable.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California held a bench trial. The court found that, during his visits, the plaintiff personally encountered several violations of the ADA Accessibility Guidelines related to the route from accessible parking to the store entrance. After the lawsuit was filed, 7-Eleven voluntarily remodeled the parking lot and entryway to comply with ADA standards, which mooted the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief under the ADA. However, the court determined that a violation of the ADA also constituted a violation of the Unruh Act and awarded the plaintiff $4,000 in statutory damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that Title III of the ADA requires removal of architectural barriers where such removal is readily achievable, and that the defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving removal is not readily achievable. The court found that 7-Eleven’s voluntary remediation demonstrated that removal was readily achievable. The court also held that a plaintiff who personally encounters an ADA violation while transacting with a business has standing under the Unruh Act, regardless of litigation motive or intent to be a customer. The case was remanded for issues related to the substitution of the plaintiff’s successors. View "GILBERT V. 7-ELEVEN, INC." on Justia Law

A company based in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), which provides computer and networking services, entered into a contract with a California-based distributor of Microsoft products. The CNMI company sought to purchase Microsoft software to fulfill a government contract. After a series of communications and assurances that the software would meet the CNMI government’s specifications, the CNMI company paid over $800,000 to the distributor, which then delivered the software directly to the CNMI government. The software did not conform to the required specifications, leading the government to cancel its contract with the CNMI company and request a refund. The CNMI company, in turn, sought a refund from the distributor, which offered a partial refund minus a cancellation fee. The CNMI company objected and filed suit alleging fraud, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the California distributor. The district court relied on a then-binding Ninth Circuit panel decision, which was later vacated and replaced by an en banc decision. The district court did not address whether the claims arose out of the distributor’s contacts with the CNMI or whether exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the CNMI company alleged sufficient facts to establish specific personal jurisdiction over the California distributor. The court found that the distributor purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the CNMI and purposefully directed its actions toward the CNMI. The court also concluded that the claims arose out of the distributor’s contacts with the CNMI and that exercising jurisdiction would not be unfair or unjust. View "SUPERTECH, INC. V. MY CHOICE SOFTWARE, LLC" on Justia Law

Isaac Contreras, a criminally committed patient at the Arizona State Hospital, was confined in an isolation cell for 665 days under the hospital’s “Administrative Separation” policy after a series of behavioral incidents. Emmanuel Walker, acting as Contreras’s guardian, filed suit in Arizona Superior Court against the State of Arizona and several officials, alleging that Contreras’s confinement violated his rights under both state and federal law. The complaint included two federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and five state law claims, including one under Arizona Revised Statutes § 36-516, which protects the rights of seriously mentally ill persons.After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona based on federal question jurisdiction, the State moved for judgment on the pleadings on the § 36-516 claim. The district court granted the motion, dismissing that claim, and did not enter partial judgment under Rule 54(b). To expedite appellate review of this dismissal, the parties jointly stipulated to dismiss all remaining claims, both state and federal, with prejudice. The district court then dismissed the entire case, and Walker appealed the dismissal of the state law claim.While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, which held that if a plaintiff eliminates all federal claims after removal, the federal court loses jurisdiction and must remand the case to state court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a joint stipulation of dismissal functions the same as an amendment for jurisdictional purposes. The court concluded that the district court lost jurisdiction before entering final judgment and was required to remand the remaining state law claim to the Arizona Superior Court. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court with instructions to reopen and remand the state law claim. View "WALKER V. STATE OF ARIZONA" on Justia Law

A lawful permanent resident of the United States, who is a Canadian citizen, pleaded guilty in 2003 to one count of health care fraud after participating in a scheme involving fraudulent prescriptions and false Medicaid/Medi-Cal billing. The conviction, which involved a loss exceeding $10,000, rendered him removable from the United States. He claimed that his attorneys gave him incorrect or incomplete advice regarding the immigration consequences of his plea. Despite being informed by both the sentencing judge in 2003 and a U.S. immigration official in 2007 that his conviction could lead to removal, he did not seek to vacate his conviction until many years later.After removal proceedings began in 2008, the defendant waited until 2016 to file his first petition for a writ of coram nobis in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the petition due to unreasonable delay, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed that denial in 2020, finding the delay between 2014 and 2016 unjustified. The first petition focused on the conduct of the attorney who represented him at sentencing.In 2021, the defendant filed a second coram nobis petition in the same district court, this time alleging ineffective assistance by three different attorneys, including the one who handled his first petition. The district court denied the second petition, finding it barred by laches due to prejudicial delay, as key witnesses had died and evidence had been lost. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the government was prejudiced by the delay and that the defendant failed to show reasonable diligence in seeking relief, given that he was on notice of the immigration consequences years earlier. View "USA V. KROYTOR" on Justia Law