Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) in a case brought by two utilities, Southern California Edison Company and Southern California Gas Company. The utilities claimed they were entitled to compensation under the Takings Clause or under state law for having to relocate their equipment from public streets to allow for the construction of a streetcar line.The court held that the utilities did not have a property interest under California law in maintaining their facilities at their specific locations in the face of OCTA’s efforts to construct a streetcar line. The California Supreme Court recognized in a previous case that a public utility accepts franchise rights in public streets subject to an implied obligation to relocate its facilities therein at its own expense when necessary to make way for a proper governmental use of the streets.The court rejected the utilities’ argument that constructing rail lines is per se a proprietary activity, not a governmental one. California common law has traditionally required utilities to bear relocation costs when governments construct subways, and there is no reason why above-ground rail lines should be treated differently.Finally, the court rejected the utilities’ supplemental state-law claim that California Public Utilities Code section 40162 places the costs of relocation on OCTA. That provision says nothing about imposing the costs of relocation on OCTA. Thus, section 40162 does not apply to OCTA’s project. View "SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY V. ORANGE COUNTY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, Melchor Orozco-Orozco, was appealing his conviction for being a previously removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Orozco had previously been removed from the U.S. following a conviction for carjacking under California Penal Code § 215, which had been classified as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).The appellate court examined whether this classification was correct. It found that the California Supreme Court had determined that a person could commit carjacking under § 215 without the intent to steal required by a generic theft offense. This court held that Orozco's carjacking conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the INA because § 215 was not a categorical match for a “theft offense.”The appellate court reversed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment in accordance with 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) and sent the case back to the lower court for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's order denying Orozco's motion to dismiss his indictment on equal protection grounds. View "USA V. OROZCO-OROZCO" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Adan Ortiz, worked for two companies, GXO Logistics Supply Chain, Inc., and Randstad Inhouse Services, LLC, both of which were his former employers. Ortiz's role involved handling goods in a California warehouse facility operated by GXO. The goods, primarily Adidas products, were received from mostly international locations and stored at the warehouse for several days to a few weeks before being shipped to customers and retailers in various states.Ortiz filed a class action lawsuit against his former employers alleging various violations of California labor law. The defendants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in Ortiz's employment contract. Ortiz opposed this on the grounds that the agreement could not be enforced under federal or state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the district court's order denying the appellants' motion to compel arbitration. It concluded that Ortiz belonged to a class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce and was therefore exempted from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). The court reasoned that although Ortiz's duties were performed entirely within one state's borders, his role facilitated the continued travel of goods through an interstate supply chain, making him a necessary part of the flow of goods in interstate commerce. The court also rejected the argument that an employee must necessarily be employed by a transportation industry company to qualify for the transportation worker exemption. View "ORTIZ V. RANDSTAD INHOUSE SERVICES, LLC" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a federal habeas corpus petition by Raymond Anthony Lewis, who was sentenced to death in 1991 after a California jury convicted him of the first-degree murder of Sandra Simms. Lewis argued that the state trial court's admission of his juvenile confession to a prior murder was unconstitutional and that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present evidence of his innocence of the prior murder. The court concluded that the California Supreme Court's affirmance of the trial court's admission of Lewis's juvenile confession was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law and that Lewis's trial counsel’s litigation of the evidence of the prior murder did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.Lewis also contended that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to investigate, develop, and present certain mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of the trial. The court found that Lewis failed to show that his trial counsel’s performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard. His counsel made reasonable strategic decisions to ask for the jury’s mercy and to appeal to any lingering doubt the jurors may have had about Lewis’s guilt. The court also concluded that much of the evidence Lewis argued his trial counsel was ineffective in not introducing would have been cumulative of evidence his counsel did introduce.Lewis also raised uncertified claims on appeal, but the court denied a certificate of appealability on these claims. View "LEWIS V. ANDES" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard an appeal by Cathay Pacific Airways Limited, from a district court's decision denying its motion to compel arbitration in a class action lawsuit. The plaintiffs, Winifredo and Macaria Herrera, alleged that Cathay Pacific breached their contract by failing to issue a refund following flight cancellations for tickets they purchased through a third-party booking website, ASAP Tickets.The court ruled that when a non-signatory, in this case Cathay Pacific, seeks to enforce an arbitration provision, an order denying a motion to compel arbitration based on the doctrine of equitable estoppel is reviewed de novo. Applying California contract law, the court held that the plaintiffs' allegations that Cathay Pacific breached its General Conditions of Carriage were intimately intertwined with ASAP’s alleged conduct under its Terms and Conditions. Thus, it was appropriate to enforce the arbitration clause contained in ASAP’s Terms and Conditions.Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Cathay Pacific’s motion to compel arbitration and remanded with instructions to either dismiss or stay the action pending arbitration of the plaintiffs’ breach-of-contract claim. View "HERRERA V. CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the asylum petition of a Zambian woman, Milly Kalulu. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously dismissed her appeal of a removal order. Kalulu, who identifies as a lesbian, claimed past persecution in Zambia on account of her sexual orientation.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the BIA that substantial evidence supported the agency’s adverse credibility determination, meaning that the agency was justified in not believing Kalulu’s testimony. The court found that Kalulu had been inconsistent in her testimony regarding when she made plans to remain in the United States and her alleged fear of future persecution if she returned to Zambia. Her demeanor during the removal hearing also contributed to the adverse credibility determination.However, the Ninth Circuit identified errors in the agency’s evaluation of the documents Kalulu provided as evidence to support her claims of past persecution. The court found that the agency had misread some of these documents and had improperly discounted their evidentiary value based on these misreadings.The court therefore granted Kalulu's petition for a review of the BIA's decision and instructed the agency to reconsider whether the documents, when properly read, independently prove Kalulu’s claims of past persecution. The court made no determination as to whether these documents do provide such proof or whether Kalulu merits any of the relief for which she applied. View "KALULU V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

The case involved an appeal by Philip James Layfield against his convictions for wire fraud, mail fraud, and various tax offenses. Layfield argued that the 21-day period it took the U.S. Marshals Service to transport him from the District of New Jersey, where he was arrested, to the Central District of California (CDCA), where he was indicted, violated the Speedy Trial Act and required the court to overturn his convictions. The argument centered on a provision of the Speedy Trial Act that mandates trial commencement within seventy days from the date a defendant appears before a judicial officer of the court where the charge is pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Layfield's argument, affirming his convictions. The court ruled that the 21-day delay between Layfield's detention in New Jersey and his first appearance before a judge in the CDCA was immaterial to the Speedy Trial Act analysis. The court held that a plain reading of the relevant section of the Speedy Trial Act dictates that the 21-day delay did not trigger a Speedy Trial Act violation. The court also rejected Layfield's argument that a different provision became relevant because he was detained. The court held that this provision applies to prisoners traveling between jurisdictions for court proceedings once the seventy-day clock has started, not to a pre-indictment or pre-appearance transfer. View "USA V. LAYFIELD" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of absolute and qualified immunity to two County of San Bernardino social workers, Gloria Vazquez and Mirta Johnson. The plaintiffs, Sydney Rieman and her minor child K.B., alleged that the social workers violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to provide them notice of a juvenile detention hearing and by providing false information to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing.The court held that the social workers were not entitled to absolute immunity for their actions and omissions, such as providing false information to the Juvenile Court and failing to give notice of the detention hearing. These actions were not similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute. Absolute immunity did not apply to the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants failed to give them notice of the detention hearing as such notice was mandatory.The court also held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for failing to provide notice of the hearing. Ms. Rieman had a due process right to such notice and that right was clearly established. The court stated that it was clear at the time that parents could not be summarily deprived of the care and custody of their children without notice and a hearing, except when the children were in imminent danger.Finally, the court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity for their misrepresentation to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing. The court concluded that a reasonable social worker in the defendants' shoes would have understood, based on prior decisional law, that providing incomplete and false information to the Juvenile Court about Ms. Rieman’s whereabouts to convince the court that the social workers had satisfied the due process notice requirement constituted judicial deception. View "RIEMAN V. VASQUEZ" on Justia Law

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Edgar Hernandez Lemus and Junior Almendarez Martinez for conspiracy, aiding and abetting the receipt of the proceeds of extortion, and receiving the proceeds of extortion. The defendants, involved in a scheme to kidnap Mexican nationals seeking illegal entry into the United States and extort their families, argued that they could only be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 880 if they knew the money they received was obtained from extortion.The court, however, held that § 880 only requires knowledge that the proceeds were “unlawfully obtained,” not specifically from extortion. The court noted that if Congress had intended for specific knowledge of the money's origin from extortion to be necessary, it would have included such language in the statute. The court also rejected the defendants' arguments that the court's interpretation of § 880 rendered the statute vague, stating that the defendants' conduct clearly fell within the proscription of the law.The court remanded the case for recalculation of the restitution amount, but otherwise affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "USA V. LEMUS" on Justia Law

This case concerns an employment discrimination action filed by Alyssa Jones against her former employer, Riot Hospitality Group and its owner-operator Ryan Hibbert. During discovery, Riot Hospitality Group discovered that Jones had deleted text messages exchanged with her coworkers and had also coordinated with witnesses to delete messages. In response, the District Court for the District of Arizona ordered Jones and other parties to hand over their phones for forensic analysis.However, Jones and her attorney failed to comply with multiple court orders to produce the relevant messages. Subsequently, Riot Hospitality Group filed a motion for terminating sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2), citing intentional spoliation of electronically stored information (ESI) by Jones.The court found ample evidence that Jones intentionally deleted relevant text messages and collaborated with witnesses to do the same. It concluded that Jones' actions impaired Riot Hospitality Group's ability to proceed with the trial and interfered with the rightful decision of the case. The court therefore dismissed the case with prejudice under Rule 37(e)(2) due to intentional spoliation of ESI by the plaintiff.The court's decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found no abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the case or the district court's consideration of an expert report on the deletion of ESI.The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Jones and others to hand over their phones for forensic search, and in awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Riot Hospitality Group. View "JONES V. RIOT HOSPITALITY GROUP LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law