Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of building engineers and craftsmen represented by a union worked at several stores operated by a large retail company. After the company and the union failed to reach agreement on a new collective bargaining agreement, the union members voted to reject the company’s final offer and began a strike. The company’s final offer expired, and after three months on strike, the union ended the strike and made an unconditional offer for its members to return to work. The company then locked out the union members who reported for work, stating it would not reinstate them until a new agreement was in place. The union filed a charge with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held a hearing and found that the company violated Sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act by locking out employees without providing a timely, clear, and complete offer setting forth the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. The ALJ recommended reinstatement and make-whole relief for affected employees. The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings, modifying the remedy to include compensation for any direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms resulting from the lockout.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed petitions from both the union and the company, as well as the NLRB’s application for enforcement. The court held that it had jurisdiction, found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB’s conclusion that the lockout was unlawful, and determined that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in fashioning remedies. The court enforced the NLRB’s order, holding that the company’s lockout violated the Act because employees were not clearly and fully informed of the conditions for reinstatement, and that the NLRB’s make-whole relief, as ordered, was within its authority. The court denied both the union’s and the company’s petitions for review and granted enforcement of the NLRB’s order. View "MACY'S INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" on Justia Law

A man with a prior felony conviction used another person’s identity to purchase a firearm and later used fraudulent identification to obtain a U.S. passport, which he used for international travel. He was indicted and ultimately pleaded guilty to making a false statement during a firearms transaction, making a false statement in a passport application, and aggravated identity theft. As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his sentence if it was within or below the guideline range calculated by the court.After entering his plea but before sentencing, the defendant requested a psychological evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 to determine his mental competency, specifically asking that the examiner’s report be filed with the court. The evaluation was conducted by a Bureau of Prisons examiner, who informed the defendant that the results would be shared with the court. The report was included in the presentence report. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Montana, the defendant objected to the use of the evaluation, arguing it violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The district court overruled his objections, including those to a sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice and to certain supervised release conditions, and imposed a sentence within the guideline range.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant argued that the district court’s consideration of his psychological evaluation at sentencing violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Smith does not extend to voluntary psychological evaluations requested by the defendant and that the district court did not violate his right against self-incrimination. The court also held that the defendant’s waiver of appeal barred his remaining challenges to the sentence. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

A prisoner at Kern Valley State Prison was involved in a disputed physical altercation with two correctional officers. The prisoner alleged that the officers used excessive force against him, while the officers claimed the prisoner initiated the altercation. After the incident, the prisoner was found guilty at a prison disciplinary hearing and later filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations. Over a year after the incident, the state charged the prisoner with battery and resisting an executive officer. The prisoner ultimately entered a nolo contendere plea to the resisting charge, expressing concern that the plea might affect his civil case.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California initially denied the officers’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the prisoner’s nolo plea was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a). However, after a change in presiding judge, the court reconsidered and granted the officers’ motion, holding that the nolo plea could be considered and that the prisoner’s civil suit was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, because success in the civil suit would necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal conviction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that, in a § 1983 action where the Heck bar is at issue, a plaintiff’s nolo contendere plea is inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 410(a) to show that the plaintiff committed the charged crime. The court concluded that neither the plea nor statements made during the plea proceedings should have been admitted against the plaintiff in the civil case. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "KING V. VILLEGAS" on Justia Law

A Nigerian citizen sought relief from removal in the United States, claiming he faced persecution in Nigeria due to his ethnicity and membership in a separatist political organization. He described several violent incidents involving Nigerian police, including arrests, assaults, and threats to his life. After leaving Nigeria, he entered the United States on a visitor visa and subsequently married a U.S. citizen, later applying for adjustment of status based on that marriage. However, both he and his spouse admitted to immigration authorities that the marriage was fraudulent and entered into for immigration purposes, with the petitioner paying his spouse for the arrangement.The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services denied his adjustment application and a subsequent petition under the Violence Against Women Act, finding insufficient evidence of a bona fide marriage. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, charging him with overstaying his visa and committing marriage fraud. During removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge, the petitioner denied the marriage was fraudulent and claimed his prior admission was coerced. The Immigration Judge found him not credible, primarily due to the marriage fraud and his inconsistent statements, and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the adverse credibility finding and denial of relief, remanding only for further analysis of his fear of future persecution, which was again rejected after additional evidence was submitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the adverse credibility determination based on the petitioner’s deliberate deception of immigration authorities, even though the fraud was not directly related to his persecution claim. The court clarified that such intentional deception can, by itself, support an adverse credibility finding under the totality of the circumstances, and the record did not compel a contrary conclusion. The denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and the motion to remand was affirmed. View "ANI V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona, initially claiming exemptions for real property and a recreational vehicle under Arizona’s homestead law. The trustee objected, and the debtor amended his schedule to claim the same exemptions under Washington law. After the trustee objected again and the bankruptcy court sustained both objections, the debtor amended his schedule a second time, this time electing federal exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d), specifically claiming a homestead exemption for the real property and a wildcard exemption for the recreational vehicle.The bankruptcy court granted the debtor’s federal homestead exemption for the real property and the wildcard exemption for the recreational vehicle, even though the debtor had listed the RV under the homestead exemption rather than the wildcard exemption. The trustee appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, which reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision. The district court held that claim preclusion barred the debtor from asserting federal exemptions after his state law exemptions were denied and that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to grant the wildcard exemption for the RV because the debtor had not specifically claimed it.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that claim preclusion did not bar the debtor from amending his schedule to claim federal exemptions after the bankruptcy court ruled that state exemptions were unavailable, because bankruptcy procedure prohibits simultaneous claims of state and federal exemptions. The court also held that the bankruptcy court did not exceed its authority by granting the wildcard exemption for the RV, as the debtor’s claim was sufficient under the federal statutory scheme. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate its decision and remand to the bankruptcy court. View "WARFIELD V. NANCE" on Justia Law

Ajay Thakore, a resident of La Jolla, California, and owner of Gopher Media LLC, a digital marketing agency, became involved in a dispute with Andrew Melone and American Pizza Manufacturing (APM), a local “take-n-bake” restaurant. The conflict began after the City of San Diego converted parking spaces outside APM to 15-minute zones. Thakore, who frequented nearby businesses and allegedly had a financial stake in a competitor, was accused of parking for extended periods and initiating contentious exchanges. Thakore and Gopher Media sued Melone and APM in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, alleging harassment, discrimination, and unfair competition. Melone and APM counterclaimed, alleging defamation, trade libel, and unfair business practices, including claims that Thakore and Gopher Media orchestrated negative online reviews and made false statements on social media.In response to the countercomplaint, Thakore and Gopher Media filed a motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16), arguing that the alleged conduct constituted protected speech on a public issue. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied the anti-SLAPP motion. Thakore and Gopher Media then sought an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, challenging the denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reviewed whether it had jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion under the collateral order doctrine. The court held that such denials do not resolve issues completely separate from the merits and are not effectively unreviewable after final judgment. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit overruled its prior decision in Batzel v. Smith, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remanded the case. View "GOPHER MEDIA LLC V. MELONE" on Justia Law

A group of more than 80 former at-will employees of a nonprofit healthcare system in Washington were terminated after refusing to comply with a COVID-19 vaccination mandate issued by their employer, which was in response to an August 2021 proclamation by the state’s governor requiring healthcare workers to be vaccinated. The employees alleged that, at the time, only an “investigational” vaccine authorized for emergency use was available, and they claimed their rights were violated when they were penalized for refusing it. They also argued they were not adequately informed of their right to refuse the vaccine.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington first dismissed all claims against the governor, then dismissed the federal claims against the healthcare system, and denied the employees’ motions for leave to amend and reconsideration. The district court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims against the healthcare system.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that none of the employees’ statutory or non-constitutional claims, which were based on various federal statutes, regulations, agreements, and international treaties, alleged specific and definite rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court also found that the employees’ constitutional claims failed: the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim was foreclosed by Jacobson v. Massachusetts and Health Freedom Defense Fund, Inc. v. Carvalho; the procedural due process claim failed because at-will employment is not a constitutionally protected property interest; and the equal protection claim failed because the mandate survived rational-basis review. The court further held that amendment of the federal claims would be futile and upheld the district court’s dismissal of the state law claims against the governor and its decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against the healthcare system. View "Curtis v. Inslee" on Justia Law

Two parents, both with ties to France and the United States, became embroiled in a contentious custody dispute over their twin children, who hold dual citizenship. After the parents’ relationship ended, the mother relocated with the children from France to Oregon. Both parents then initiated custody proceedings in their respective countries. The Oregon state court issued a restraining order preventing the father from removing the children from Oregon, but after a French court granted him joint custody and restricted the children’s departure from France, the father took the children back to France. The Oregon court subsequently granted the mother sole custody, held the father in contempt, and issued a warrant for his arrest. The mother later returned to France, took the children back to Oregon without the father’s consent, and French authorities began investigating her actions.The father filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, seeking the return of the children to France. The mother moved to dismiss the petition, invoking the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine due to the father’s failure to resolve the Oregon arrest warrant and his absence from the state. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the petition, reasoning that the father’s conduct justified the harsh sanction of disentitlement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the fugitive-disentitlement doctrine must be narrowly applied in civil cases, and that the traditional justifications for the doctrine—enforceability, efficiency, dignity of the courts, deterrence, and abandonment—did not necessitate dismissal in this context. The court emphasized the importance of parental rights and the unique purposes of the Hague Convention. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for adjudication on the merits. View "PARIS V. BROWN" on Justia Law

Three former employees of a large convenience store chain alleged that they were denied the opportunity to apply for a promotion to West Coast regional director because of their age. All three had strong performance records and had expressed interest in advancement. When the position became available in early 2020, the company did not announce the vacancy or solicit applications, as it had done in the past. Instead, it selected a younger candidate, who had previously served as a regional director in another area, without giving the plaintiffs a chance to apply. At the time, the plaintiffs were in their mid-50s, while the selected candidate was 45.After the plaintiffs filed suit in California state court, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court granted summary judgment for the employer, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination because they had not applied for the position. The court also found that, even if a prima facie case existed, the employer had provided a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision, and the plaintiffs had not shown that this reason was pretextual.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that, when an employer does not announce a vacancy or solicit applications, plaintiffs are not required to show that they applied for the position to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. The court also clarified that, although a ten-year age difference is the usual threshold for a “substantial” age gap, plaintiffs can overcome a smaller gap by providing evidence that age was a significant factor in the employer’s decision. The court found that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence to create a triable issue of pretext and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "CALDRONE V. CIRCLE K STORES INC." on Justia Law

A group of borrowers in California brought a class action against Flagstar Bank, alleging that the bank failed to pay interest on their mortgage escrow accounts as required by California Civil Code § 2954.8(a). Flagstar did not pay interest on these accounts, arguing that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempted the California law, and therefore, it was not obligated to comply. The plaintiffs sought restitution for the unpaid interest.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s prior decision in Lusnak v. Bank of America, N.A., granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The court ordered Flagstar to pay restitution and prejudgment interest to the class. Flagstar appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Lusnak foreclosed Flagstar’s preemption argument. However, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to correct the class definition date and the judgment amount due to errors in the statute of limitations tolling and calculation of damages.On remand from the United States Supreme Court, following its decision in Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether it could overrule Lusnak in light of Cantero. The court held that Cantero did not render Lusnak “clearly irreconcilable” with Supreme Court precedent, and therefore, the panel lacked authority to overrule Lusnak. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the NBA does not preempt California’s interest-on-escrow law, but vacated and remanded the judgment and class certification order for modification of the class definition date and judgment amount. View "KIVETT V. FLAGSTAR BANK, FSB" on Justia Law