Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted in 1982 of first-degree murders. He was also convicted of one count of mutilation of human remains and one count of attempted murder and mayhem. The jury found a multiple murder special circumstance allegation and sentenced Petitioner to death. The California Supreme Court reversed Petitioner’s conviction for attempted murder and mayhem and affirmed Petitioner’s murder convictions and death sentence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition challenging his California conviction and capital sentence for six counts of first-degree murder. The panel held that Petitioner’s pre-AEDPA October 1992 pro se filing seeking appointment of counsel was not an “actual application” that sought “adjudication” on the merits and that AEDPA applied to the habeas petition filed by appointed counsel in April 1997. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Petitioner’s July 1982 pre-trial Faretta request to represent himself was equivocal was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the California Supreme Court’s decision that Clark’s August 1982 Faretta request was untimely was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court. The panel held that the district court properly concluded that the California Supreme Court’s opinion holding that Petitioner’s Marsden rights were not violated was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court View "DOUGLAS CLARK V. RON BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

Defendant entered an open guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2246(2) & 1152. The Presentence Investigation Report calculated the sentence using the 2004 version of the Guidelines, applied a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, and added a four-level enhancement because “the victim was abducted.” Defendant objected based on his claim that there was no significant change in locations during or prior to the offense.The evidence presented showed that Defendant grabbed the victim, put his hands over her mouth, and dragged her 35-40 feet into a cornfield, where he sexually assaulted her. Overruling Defendant's objection, the district court concluded that the forced movement of the victim from the roadside into the cornfield was sufficient to support the abduction enhancement. Defendant appealed.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Under the plain language of the text of Sec. 2A3.1(b)(5), the court found that Defendant “abducted” the victim when he forced her from the roadside where he encountered her into a nearby cornfield. View "USA V. JOSHUA SCHEU" on Justia Law

Defendant filed two appeals with the Ninth Circuit, which were consolidated in a single opinion. Regarding Defendant's felony child abuse case, the court held that the Major Crimes Act granted federal jurisdiction. Although there is no "felony child abuse" statute under federal law, the Major Crimes Act permits prosecutors to charge a defendant in "accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed. Here, Montana Code 45-5-212 provided a sufficient basis for the charge.Regarding Defendant's aggravated sexual abuse case, the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit, finding that USSG 1B1.1 provides different definitions of “serious bodily injury”—a Harm Definition and a Conduct Definition. Because Defendant made no argument that the district court failed to apply the Harm Definition or that the victim’s injuries resulting from the sexual abuse or from Defendant's other conduct surrounding the offense failed to meet the Harm Definition, Defendant failed to prove the district court erred. View "USA V. LUKE SCOTT, SR." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon. He was sentenced to 77 months in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant raised three challenges to the district court’s sentencing calculation under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant’s sentence. The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that the district court’s application of a Sentencing Guidelines enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing the firearm in connection with another felony violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey and Alleyne v. United States. The panel wrote that the determination of a sentencing enhancement based on a new offense can be made by a judge without a jury and by a standard of proof lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is no mandatory minimum sentence at play, and the enhancement still placed Defendant’s Guidelines range within the maximum possible sentence for the offense to which he pled guilty; and that Defendant received all the notice that is required for the enhancement.   The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence to support the district court’s finding that he used or possessed a firearm in connection with another felony offense under Montana law for purposes of applying the enhancement. The panel concluded that the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. View "USA V. JOHN BARLOW" on Justia Law

Early in the COVID-19 pandemic, the California Institution for Men (“CIM”) suffered a severe COVID-19 outbreak. In an attempt to protect CIM inmates, high-level officials in the California prison system transferred 122 inmates from CIM to San Quentin State Prison, where there were no known cases of the virus. The transfer sparked an outbreak of COVID-19 at San Quentin that infected over two-thousand inmates and ultimately killed over twenty-five inmates and one prison guard. The wife of one of the deceased inmates sued, claiming that the prison officials had violated her husband’s constitutional and statutory rights. The officials moved to dismiss, asserting that the claims were barred by various federal and state immunities, including immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act and qualified immunity. The district court held that the officials were not entitled to immunity at this stage of the proceedings, and the officials filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss on the basis of immunity under the PREP Act and qualified immunity in an action brought against California prison officials arising from the death of a San Quentin inmate from COVID-19; and (2) dismissed for lack of jurisdiction Defendants’ claims asserting immunity under state law. The panel held that Defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim, which adequately alleged that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the health and safety of San Quentin inmates, including Hampton. View "MICHAEL HAMPTON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

This is the latest proceeding in a long-running case regarding Indian fishing rights in certain waters in Washington State. This proceeding was instituted by three Indian tribes who sought a ruling that the recognized fishing rights of the Lummi Nation (“the Lummi”) under the 1974 decree do not extend to certain areas. The current dispute centers on a single line in the decree recognizing that “the usual and accustomed fishing places” in which the Lummi have fishing rights “include the marine areas of Northern Puget Sound from the Fraser River south to the present environs of Seattle, and particularly Bellingham Bay.” (“Final Decision I”). The question is whether the specific waters in dispute here—namely, the sheltered waters east of Whidbey Island and south of Fidalgo Island—fall within the Lummi’s historical fishing territory.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Tulalip Tribes, and Upper Skagit Indian Tribe; dismissed as moot a cross-appeal filed by the Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe and Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe (collectively, “S’Klallam”) from the district court’s grant of summary judgment; and dismissed as moot S’Klallam’s appeal of the district court’s denial of the S’Klallam’s motion for reconsideration. Applying the two-step inquiry, the panel concluded that the district court correctly held that the Swinomish, Tulalip, and Upper Skagit carried their burden to warrant a ruling, under Paragraph 25(a)(1) of the 1974 Decree, that Judge Boldt’s “determination of Lummi’s usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations” did not extend to the disputed waters at issue here. View "SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY., ET AL V. LUMMI NATION" on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of attempted illegal entry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1325 and attempted illegal reentry pursuant to 8 U.S.C. Section 1326. On appeal, he argued that the district court violated his rights to a fair trial and sentence.The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress a statement he made to a Border Patrol agent about coming to the United States to find work. Defendant argued that the statement, which he made while between border fences, should have been suppressed because he was “in custody” and was not given a Miranda warning prior to his admission. The panel held that the stop here met the requirements of Terry, and the agent’s question about Defendant’s purpose for being in the United States did not exceed the scope of allowable inquiry during such a stop. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 401 and 403, the testimony of Defendant’s only proposed witness, a Tijuana immigration attorney, whom Defendant intended to call as a lay witness to testify about the “factual situation in Tijuana in November 2019”. The panel wrote that neither the record nor the witness’s testimony could establish that Defendant knew of the long lines, and the district court’s concern about distracting the jury was reasonable. The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in formulating the jury instructions on the requisite intent for a Section 1326 conviction. View "USA V. JUAN CABRERA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, filed a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against several officers of the Tucson Police Department. Two officers (collectively, “Defendants”) are the only remaining defendants. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged First Amendment retaliation claims arising from Defendants’ investigation of two arsons that occurred at properties connected to the husband. Defendants appealed from the district court’s order denying without prejudice their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment as to the First Amendment claims. The panel concluded that Plaintiffs failed to show that Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established law. It was not clearly established that Plaintiff has a First Amendment right to remain silent when questioned by the police. Nor was it clearly established that a retaliatory investigation per se violates the First Amendment. Defendants were therefore entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment claims based on the husband's silence and Plaintiffs’ lawsuits and requests for public disclosures. View "GREG MOORE, ET AL V. SEAN GARNAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Supreme Court “heed[ed] the Constitution and returned the issue of abortion to the people’s elected representatives.” After Dobbs, Idaho, exercised that prerogative to enact abortion restrictions. In response, the federal government sued Idaho, claiming that a federal law unrelated to abortion preempts the will of the people of that state, through their elected representatives, to “protect fetal life,” as Dobbs described it.   The Ninth Circuit granted Idaho’s motion for a stay pending appeal. The court held that there is no preemption and the traditional stay factors favor granting the Legislature’s motion. The court explained that Dobbs triggered section 622, after which the federal government challenged Idaho’s law, arguing that it is preempted by the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 1395dd (EMTALA).  The court reasoned that each of the four Nken factors favors issuing a stay here. The Legislature has made a strong showing that EMTALA does not preempt section 622. EMTALA does not require abortions, and even if it did in some circumstances, that requirement would not directly conflict with section 622. The federal government will not be injured by the stay of an order preliminarily enjoining enforcement of a state law that does not conflict with its own. Idaho, on the other hand, will be irreparably injured absent a stay because the preliminary injunction directly harms its sovereignty. The balance of the equities and the public interest also favors judicial action ensuring Idaho’s right to enforce its legitimately enacted laws during the pendency of the State’s appeal. View "USA V. STATE OF IDAHO" on Justia Law

The district court appointed a receiver to claw back profits received by investors in a Ponzi scheme that was the subject of a Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement action. The receiver filed suit against certain investors, alleging fraudulent transfers from the receivership entities to the investors. The district court concluded that the receiver was bound by arbitration agreements signed by the receivership company, which was the instrument of the Ponzi scheme. The district court relied on Kirkland v. Rune.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration. The panel held that EPD did not control because it addressed whether a bankruptcy trustee, not a receiver, was bound by an arbitration agreement. Unlike under bankruptcy law, there was no explicit statute here establishing that the receiver was acting on behalf of the receivership entity’s creditors. The panel held that a receiver acts on behalf of the receivership entity, not defrauded creditors, and thus can be bound by an agreement signed by that entity. But here, even applying that rule, it was unclear whether the receiver was bound by the agreements at issue. The panel remanded for the district court to consider whether the defendant investors met their burden of establishing that the fraudulent transfer claims arose out of agreements with the receivership entity, whether the investors were parties to the agreements and any other remaining arbitrability issues. View "GEOFF WINKLER V. THOMAS MCCLOSKEY, JR., ET AL" on Justia Law