Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two nonprofit organizations and an individual challenged two provisions of Arizona’s 2023 Election Procedures Manual (EPM). The first provision, known as the Speech Provision, purported to summarize Arizona’s voter intimidation laws and included examples of prohibited conduct, such as using offensive language or engaging in behavior that could be seen as intimidating or harassing voters. The second, the Canvass Provision, described the Secretary of State’s duty to certify statewide election results by a statutory deadline, specifying that if a county failed to submit its official results on time, the Secretary must proceed without including that county’s votes.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that the Speech Provision violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by chilling protected political speech, and that the Canvass Provision unconstitutionally burdened the right to vote by threatening disenfranchisement if a county missed the certification deadline. The district court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge both provisions, denied a request to stay the case under Pullman abstention, and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of both the Speech and Canvass Provisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the Speech Provision, holding that the plaintiffs had standing because they intended to engage in political speech arguably covered by the provision and faced a credible risk of enforcement. The court found a likelihood of success on the merits, as the state did not contest the district court’s conclusion that the Speech Provision likely violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding of standing regarding the Canvass Provision, concluding that plaintiffs had not shown a substantial risk that any county would fail to certify its results and thus vacated the injunction as to that provision. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "AMERICAN ENCORE V. FONTES" on Justia Law

A man was arrested after he attempted to meet someone he believed to be a 12-year-old girl for sex, following extensive online and text communications. The “girl” was actually a fictional persona created by law enforcement as part of an undercover operation. After his arrest, officers obtained a warrant to search his residence, where they discovered a large quantity of child pornography on a hard drive. The defendant was charged with attempted coercion and enticement of a minor to engage in illegal sexual activity, as well as possession of child pornography.The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied the defendant’s pretrial motions to suppress the evidence seized from his residence, to sever the two charges in the indictment, and to exclude evidence of his uncharged interactions with a 17-year-old girl. The court found that the search warrant was supported by probable cause, that the charges were properly joined as offenses of similar character, and that the evidence regarding the 17-year-old was admissible to show intent. After a jury convicted the defendant on both counts, the district court sentenced him to 154 months’ imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. The court held that the search warrant was supported by probable cause to search for both enticement and child pornography, and that any omission in the warrant affidavit was immaterial. The court also held that the charges were properly joined under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8(a), and that the evidence of the defendant’s relationship with the 17-year-old was properly admitted under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. Finally, the court found that the sentence was substantively reasonable and did not result in unwarranted sentencing disparity. View "USA V. BOUDREAU" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and pled guilty to the charge. At sentencing, he received a prison term of 151 months, three years of supervised release, and was ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment. The district court specified that these monetary penalties were “due immediately,” but, recognizing the defendant’s indigency, also established a payment schedule: while incarcerated, he was to make nominal payments through the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, and during supervised release, he was to pay a percentage of his income, subject to a minimum monthly amount.After sentencing, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho entered judgment reflecting both the immediate due date and the payment schedule. The government sent a letter demanding immediate payment of the full amount and warning of a possible judgment lien. The defendant appealed, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) does not permit a court to make monetary penalties due immediately while also setting a payment schedule, contending that the statute requires the court to choose only one of these options.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo. The court held that the district court did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) by making the fine and special assessment due immediately while also providing a payment schedule. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the statute allows for the total amount to be due immediately, with a payment schedule reflecting the defendant’s ability to pay, and that this approach is consistent with its own precedent and that of other circuits. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. PATRICK" on Justia Law

A dispute arose between a woman and her daughter regarding the daughter’s alleged misuse of property held in an irrevocable trust for which she served as trustee. The mother initiated a lawsuit in Massachusetts state court, asserting several state-law claims against her daughter and her daughter’s then-husband. Subsequently, the daughter filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona, which triggered an automatic stay of the state court litigation. The bankruptcy court initially granted the mother’s motion for relief from the automatic stay and for permissive abstention, allowing the state court case to proceed. However, after delays in the state court proceedings, the daughter moved for relief from that order, and the bankruptcy court vacated its prior order and reimposed the automatic stay.After the bankruptcy court’s March 2021 order reimposing the stay, the mother filed adversary proceedings in bankruptcy court, which were consolidated and tried. The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the daughter on all claims and entered final judgment in July 2022. The mother then appealed the March 2021 order to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6) rather than Rule 60(b)(1). The district court concluded that the appeal was timely because it believed the March 2021 order was not immediately appealable, and it affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, under Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, the bankruptcy court’s March 2021 order was a final, appealable order because it definitively resolved a discrete dispute within the bankruptcy case. Since the mother did not appeal within the required fourteen days, her appeal was untimely, and the district court lacked jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "FANTASIA V. DIODATO" on Justia Law

Two former customers of an insurance company filed suit after their vehicles were declared total losses and the insurer paid out claims based on the vehicles’ “actual cash value” (ACV). The insurance policy defined ACV as the “market value, age, and condition of the vehicle at the time the loss occurs.” The insurer calculated market value using a system that included a “projected sold adjustment” (PSA), which reduced the list prices of comparable vehicles to reflect typical consumer negotiation. The plaintiffs alleged that the PSA always resulted in an artificially low valuation, breaching the policy’s requirement to pay true market value.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona found that the plaintiffs met the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). However, the court determined that individual questions about how each vehicle’s ACV was calculated predominated over common questions, as required by Rule 23(b)(3), and therefore denied class certification. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of class certification for abuse of discretion. The appellate court held that the PSA was not facially unlawful and that determining whether each class member was harmed would require individualized inquiries into each person’s vehicle valuation. Because liability and injury could not be established through common evidence, individual issues would predominate over common ones. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s order denying class certification, holding that class certification was inappropriate under Rule 23(b)(3) due to the predominance of individualized questions. View "AMBROSIO V. PROGRESSIVE PREFERRED INSURANCE COMPANY" on Justia Law

Parents and guardians of students enrolled in independent study programs at two California charter schools requested that the schools purchase and allow the use of sectarian curricular materials for instruction. The schools denied these requests, citing California laws that prohibit the teaching of sectarian or denominational doctrine in public schools, including charter schools. The plaintiffs argued that the independent study programs were essentially homeschooling and that the denial of their requests violated their rights under the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court found that charter schools are part of California’s public school system and are permitted to provide strictly secular education. It concluded that the plaintiffs were not being excluded from a generally available public benefit because of their religious exercise, as the case involved state-funded public schools rather than private schools. The court also held that a public school’s curriculum constitutes government speech, which is not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that, even assuming the funding and materials provided in independent study programs are a generally available public benefit, the programs are sufficiently public to allow California to require the use of secular curricula. The court further held that the curriculum decisions of public schools are government speech and thus not subject to the Free Speech Clause. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "WOOLARD V. THURMOND" on Justia Law

A technology company developed and copyrighted a facial motion capture software system used in film production. The company’s assets, including the software, were transferred among several affiliated entities, leading to a disputed sale to a visual effects contractor. The contractor, after acquiring the assets under contested circumstances, used the software in the production of a major motion picture for a film studio. The studio’s contract with the contractor gave it broad rights to supervise the contractor’s work, including the right to terminate the contract for copyright infringement. During production, representatives of the studio were present at all relevant sessions where the software was used, and evidence was presented that copyright notices appeared during these sessions.After the film’s release, the technology company sued the studio in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging vicarious and contributory copyright infringement. The district court granted summary judgment to the studio on the contributory infringement claim, finding insufficient evidence of the studio’s knowledge of infringement, but allowed the vicarious liability claim to proceed to trial. At trial, the jury found the studio vicariously liable, awarded actual damages, and returned an advisory verdict on profits. The district court later granted judgment as a matter of law for the studio, concluding there was insufficient evidence that the studio had the practical ability to supervise or control the contractor’s infringing conduct. The court also struck the plaintiff’s jury demand on the issue of disgorgement of profits, holding there was no statutory right to a jury trial for that remedy, and excluded certain expert testimony and evidence of an indemnification agreement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, holding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find the studio had the practical ability to supervise or control the contractor’s infringing conduct. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings striking the jury demand on disgorgement of profits, excluding the damages expert’s testimony, and excluding the indemnification agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "REARDEN, LLC V. WALT DISNEY PICTURES" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty in federal court to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At the time of sentencing, he had a prior Oregon felony conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, specifically under the “possession” subsection of the Oregon statute, with an added firearm enhancement. The key issue at sentencing was whether this prior conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines, which would increase the recommended sentence.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon determined that the prior Oregon conviction did qualify as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). This finding increased the defendant’s base offense level and resulted in a higher recommended sentencing range. The district court ultimately imposed a sentence of 46 months, which was below the enhanced guideline range but above what it would have been without the crime-of-violence enhancement. The defendant appealed, arguing that the district court’s analysis was incorrect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the Oregon statutes at issue do not require, as an element, the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. The court found that neither the underlying offense nor the firearm enhancement statute required such an element, and that the government’s arguments to the contrary were not supported by the statutory text or Oregon case law. As a result, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the prior conviction was not a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing without the crime-of-violence enhancement. View "USA V. KEAST" on Justia Law

A man was arrested after he used Instagram to offer his services as a pimp to someone he believed was a 16-year-old girl, who was actually an undercover officer. The officer, part of a human trafficking task force, had created a fake Instagram account with photos and hashtags suggesting prostitution. The man initiated contact, and their conversations led to a plan to meet in person, at which point he was arrested. He later admitted to attempting to lure a minor into prostitution. He was charged and convicted of attempted sex trafficking of a minor and attempted sexual enticement of a minor.Prior to trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the defendant, who is Black, sought discovery to support a claim of selective enforcement based on race discrimination. He argued that similar cases in the district involved only Black men, but his evidence was limited to six cases over ten years. The district court denied his motion for discovery, finding the sample size too small and not reflective of the broader work of the task force. The court also sentenced him to 144 months in prison, rejecting his argument that this sentence created an unwarranted disparity compared to other similar cases.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in denying discovery and in sentencing. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the discovery request, as the evidence presented was insufficient under the flexible standard for selective enforcement claims established in United States v. Sellers. The appellate court also found no procedural or substantive error in the sentence imposed, concluding that the district court properly considered the relevant sentencing factors. The judgment and sentence were affirmed. View "USA V. GREEN" on Justia Law

Lydia Galvez applied for Social Security disability insurance benefits, claiming disability from 2008 to 2018 due to various medical conditions. Her initial claim was denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in 2013, who found she could perform light work. After Galvez appealed, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington remanded the case in 2017 for further evaluation of her fibromyalgia diagnosis. On remand, the same ALJ, whose appointment had since been ratified, again denied benefits in 2019, incorporating parts of his earlier decision. Subsequent proceedings led to the assignment of a new ALJ, who held additional hearings, considered new evidence, and ultimately found Galvez not disabled for the period in question, though he found her disabled as of January 1, 2019 due to a new injury.After the new ALJ’s decision, Galvez again appealed to the district court, arguing that the decision was tainted by reliance on findings from the prior, improperly appointed ALJ, thus violating the Appointments Clause. The district court agreed, holding that the new ALJ’s decision was not independent because it incorporated portions of the earlier, tainted decision, and remanded the case for a new hearing before a different ALJ.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a new ALJ’s decision is not automatically tainted by an Appointments Clause violation simply because it incorporates or echoes portions of a prior, tainted decision. The key inquiry is whether the new ALJ provided an independent assessment. The Ninth Circuit found that the new ALJ conducted additional hearings, considered new evidence, and made independent findings, thus satisfying the requirement for a fresh, independent review. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for consideration of the merits of Galvez’s claim. View "GALVEZ V. BISIGNANO" on Justia Law