Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff’s claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) was dismissed for lack of standing. Thereafter, the district court considered and granted Malibu Road and Bungalow Lighting’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee provision. Plaintiff did not appeal the dismissal of his ADA claim for lack of standing, but he appeals the award of attorneys’ fees, arguing that his lawsuit was not frivolous. However, the issue before the court was not whether Plaintiff’s claim was frivolous and therefore justified an award of fees, but rather whether there is a basis to award attorneys’ fees under the ADA’s fee provision after the underlying claim has been dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.   The Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated. The panel held that because the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for lack of standing, it lacked jurisdiction to award fees under the Americans with Disabilities Act’s fee provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 12205 View "ANTONIO FERNANDEZ V. 23676-23726 MALIBU ROAD, LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

In 2006, a Nevada jury convicted Leeds of first-degree murder. Although Petitioner resided at the house where the murder occurred, the prosecution presented a felony-murder theory at trial, alleging that Petitioner committed the murder during the course of a burglary because he entered the home’s garage as he struggled with the victim. Petitioner’s trial counsel failed to argue that a person cannot burglarize his own home. The jury’s general verdict form did not specify whether the jury relied on the felony-murder theory or the State’s alternative theory of willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder to convict Petitioner of first-degree murder. Petitioner later sought state habeas relief, but his postconviction counsel failed to allege in the petition that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that Petitioner could not burglarize his own home. The claim was, therefore, procedurally defaulted under Nevada law. Petitioner then filed a habeas petition in federal district court, which the court ultimately granted. The State of Nevada appealed the grant of Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that Petitioner established a basis to excuse the procedural default of his claim because (1) Petitioner’s trial counsel IAC claim is substantial and therefore satisfies Martinez’s prejudice requirement; and (2) Petitioner’s postconviction counsel provided ineffective assistance under Strickland, meeting the Martinez cause requirement. The panel held that Petitioner is entitled to relief on the merits because (1) the trial counsel’s failure to raise the objectively important burglary argument constituted deficient performance, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. View "ROBERT LEEDS V. PERRY RUSSELL, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action in May 2018, alleging federal claims under Section 1981 and Section 1983 and state law claims against a building inspector Troy Seguirant, the City and County of Honolulu, and other defendants. Only Plaintiff’s Section 1981 claim against Seguirant is at issue in this appeal; the district court dismissed the Section 1983 claims against Seguirant with prejudice.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying qualified immunity on a claim under Section 1981, and remanding, the en banc court held that Section 1981 does not provide an implied cause of action against state actors. Joining other circuits and overruling Federation of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996), the en banc court held that Section 1981, as amended in 1991, establishes substantive rights that a state actor may violate but does not itself contain a remedy against a state actor for such violations. Thus, a plaintiff seeking to enforce rights secured by Section 1981 against a state actor must bring a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The en banc court remanded with instructions to allow the plaintiff to replead his Section 1981 claim as a Section 1983 claim. View "HITOSHI YOSHIKAWA V. TROY SEGUIRANT, ET AL" on Justia Law

This case is one of many arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff was hospitalized with a severe case of COVID-19 in the summer of 2020. She and her husband, Robert Kuciemba, claim he was exposed to the virus while working for Victory Woodworks and that he sickened Mrs. Kuciemba in their home. Plaintiffs sued Victory, alleging that the company’s actions “were a substantial factor in causing” Mrs. Kuciemba’s illness and that Victory is liable for negligently failing to protect its employees from the virus and flouting the public health regulations in place at the time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a diversity action. The panel certified two questions to the Supreme Court of California, which accepted certification and held that (1) California’s derivative injury doctrine—under which workers’ compensation benefits generally provide the exclusive remedy for third-party claims if the asserted claims are collateral to or derivative of the employee’s workplace injury—did not bar Mrs. Kuciemba’s tort claims against Victory; but (2) an employer does not owe a duty of care under California law to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to employees’ household members. Because Victory owed no duty of care to Mrs. Kuciemba, the panel affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the complaint. View "CORBY KUCIEMBA, ET AL V. VICTORY WOODWORKS, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a police officer at the Tripler Army Medical Center (TAMC) in Honolulu, Hawaii. Prior to his termination, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) office alleging sexual and race discrimination, retaliation, and a proposed and later a formal termination. After he was terminated, Plaintiff attempted to file a mixed case appeal with the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), seeking to appeal the Army’s termination decision based on the affirmative defense of sexual orientation discrimination. The MSPB upheld Plaintiff’s termination and he filed suit in district court. He alleged that he had been subjected to discrimination based on his sexual orientation (bisexual) and race (Caucasian), retaliated against for protected conduct, and ultimately terminated from his employment.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part and remanded. The panel held that the MSPB lacked jurisdiction to consider the pre-termination claims. Neither the text nor the structure of the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA) supports the theory that the MSPB has pendent jurisdiction to decide factually related claims of discrimination associated with personnel actions outside the list of “particularly serious” actions set forth in 5 U.S.C. 7512. The panel affirmed the district court’s (1) determination that Plaintiff failed to exhaust before the MSPB any other theories of discrimination for his termination besides sexual orientation; (2) grant of summary judgment to the Army on Plaintiff’s Title VII claim; and (3) grant of summary judgment to the Army on Plaintiff’s CSRA claim, finding that substantial evidence supported the MSPB’s finding that Plaintiff regularly had sex at TAMC during work hours. View "STEVEN CROWE V. CHRISTINE WORMUTH, ET AL" on Justia Law

Y.Y.G.M. SA, doing business as Brandy Melville, manufactures its own clothing, home goods, and other items. It owns several trademarks, including the Brandy Melville Heart Mark (Heart Mark) and the LA Lightning Mark (Lightning Mark). Redbubble owns and operates an online marketplace where artists can upload their artwork to be printed on various products and sold. After a jury found that Redbubble, Inc. had violated Brandy Melville’s trademarks, the district court granted partial judgment as a matter of law to Redbubble on one trademark claim. Both parties appealed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court’s judgment after a jury trial in an action brought under the Lanham Act against Red Bubble. Vacating the district court’s order granting in part and denying in part Redbubble’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, the panel held that a party is liable for contributory infringement when it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark infringement. A party meets this standard if it is willfully blind to infringement. Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that contributory trademark liability requires the defendant to have knowledge of specific infringers or instances of infringement. The panel held that, in granting judgment as a matter of law to Redbubble on the claim for contributory trademark counterfeiting as to the Heart Mark, the district court further erred by failing to evaluate the evidence of likelihood of confusion under the correct legal standard. View "Y.Y.G.M. SA V. REDBUBBLE, INC." on Justia Law

Discover Bank seeks to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate her claims that Discover Bank unlawfully discriminated against her based on citizenship and immigration status when it denied her application for a consolidation loan for her student loan. Discover Bank argues that two arbitration agreements—one Plaintiff made in connection with the student loan and one she made in connection with the application for the consolidation loan—require arbitration here. The district court declined to compel arbitration, finding that neither agreement required arbitration.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order declining to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate. The panel held that Discover Bank was judicially estopped from arguing that Perez did not opt out of the Discover Bank agreement. The panel determined that Discover Bank’s past position clearly contradicted its current position that the opt-out would only apply to Plaintiff’s future discrimination claims, Discover Bank persuaded the court to accept its previous position, and Discover Bank would derive an unfair advantage absent estoppel. Citing Revitch v. DIRECTV, LLC, 977 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2020), the panel further held that Perez and Discover Bank never formed an agreement to arbitrate her discrimination claims involving her application for a consolidation loan via the Citibank agreement. View "ILIANA PEREZ, ET AL V. DISCOVER BANK" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sought to expunge records that were created by several federal agencies as part of a surveillance program in 2018–2019, arguing that the collection and retention of these records violated their constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the government, holding that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to seek expungement.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the government. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ central argument that the government’s retention of illegally obtained information about them was per se an injury-in-fact. Under Supreme Court precedent, the retention of records alone does not constitute a concrete injury, and Plaintiffs must assert that such retention gives rise to a tangible harm or material risk of future tangible harm or bears a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the government’s retention of records allegedly obtained in violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights constituted a concrete and ongoing injury under that framework.   The evidence did not show that the government was using or will use the records to investigate plaintiffs or prevent them from crossing the border or that a third party will obtain the records and use them to Plaintiffs’ detriment. Plaintiffs had not shown that retention of the type of information contained in the records could give rise to a common law tort claim. Finally, plaintiffs failed to explain (or identify supporting authority) why retention of the records was an ongoing violation of their constitutional rights. View "NORA PHILLIPS, ET AL V. U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROT., ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant TA Operating LLC (TA) appeals the district court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration of employment-related claims brought by Plaintiff.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. The panel held that the district court erred in finding that the arbitration agreement’s delegation clause was unenforceable because it was substantively unconscionable. The district court properly considered whether an “unrelated” jury waiver provision made the delegation clause unconscionable. Here, though, the jury waiver provision applied only if the Agreement were determined to be unenforceable. As such, it could not support the conclusion that an agreement to arbitrate enforceability (i.e., the delegation clause) was unenforceable. View "KENNETH HOLLEY-GALLEGLY V. TA OPERATING, LLC" on Justia Law

This is a putative class action by three truck drivers against their employer, Domino’s Pizza. The court previously affirmed the district court’s denial of Domino’s motion to compel arbitration, holding that because the drivers were a “class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce,” their claims were exempted from the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) by 9 U.S.C. Section 1.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Domino Pizza’s motion to compel arbitration in a putative class action brought by three Domino truck drivers, alleging violations of California labor law. The panel stated that its prior decision squarely rested upon its reading of Rittmann v. Amazon.com, Inc., 971 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2020), which concerned Amazon delivery drivers. The panel found no clear conflict between Rittmann and Saxon and nothing in Saxon that undermined the panel’s prior reasoning that because the plaintiff drivers in this case, like the Amazon package delivery drivers in Rittmann, transport interstate goods for the last leg to their final destinations, they are engaged in interstate commerce under Section 1. View "EDMOND CARMONA, ET AL V. DOMINO'S PIZZA, LLC" on Justia Law