Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Following a federal trial, Plaintiff appealed the district court’s decisions to (1) instruct the jury that a Section 1983 claim could not be grounded in a Miranda violation alone and (2) exclude the testimony of Plaintiff’s coerced confessions expert. The Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of Plaintiff on the Miranda issue, but the Supreme Court reversed that decision. On remand, Plaintiff concedes that his Miranda claim is no longer viable but maintains that he is entitled to a new trial on his Fifth Amendment coercion claim because the district court improperly excluded his expert witness.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Defendants and remanded for a new trial on Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim that his confession was coerced. The panel held that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert witness’s testimony on coerced confessions because the testimony was relevant, false confessions are an issue beyond the common knowledge of the average layperson, and the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s confession went to the heart of his case. View "TERENCE TEKOH V. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that he was terminated from his position as Fire Chief for the City of Stockton based on his religion and, specifically, his attendance at a religious leadership event.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants in Plaintiff’s employment discrimination action under Title VII and California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act. The panel held that, in analyzing employment discrimination claims under Title VII and the California FEHA, the court may use the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, under which plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged actions. Finally, the burden returns to Plaintiff to show that the proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Alternatively, Plaintiff may prevail on summary judgment by showing direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination.   The court explained that Plaintiff was required to show that his religion was “a motivating factor” in Defendants’ decision to fire him with respect to his federal claims and that his religion was “a substantial motivating factor” with respect to his FEHA claims. The panel concluded that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient direct evidence of discriminatory animus in Defendants’ statements and the City’s notice of intent to remove him from City service. And Plaintiff also failed to present sufficient specific and substantial circumstantial evidence of religious animus by Defendants. View "RONALD HITTLE V. CITY OF STOCKTON, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this class action against the Plan’s administrator, AT&T Services, Inc., and the committee responsible for some of the Plan’s investment-related duties, the AT&T Benefit Plan Investment Committee (collectively, “AT&T”). Plaintiffs alleged that AT&T failed to investigate and evaluate all the compensation that the Plan’s recordkeeper, Fidelity Workplace Services, received from mutual funds through BrokerageLink, Fidelity’s brokerage account platform, and from Financial Engines Advisors, L.L.C. Plaintiffs alleged that (1) AT&T’s failure to consider this compensation rendered its contract with Fidelity a “prohibited transaction” under ERISA Section 406, (2) AT&T breached its fiduciary duty of prudence by failing to consider this compensation, and (3) AT&T breached its duty of candor by failing to disclose this compensation to the Department of Labor.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The panel reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the prohibited transaction claim. Relying on the statutory text, regulatory text, and the Department of Labor’s Employee Benefits Security Administration’s explanation for a regulatory amendment, the panel held that the broad scope of Section 406 encompasses arm’s-length transactions. The panel held that the broad scope of § 406 encompasses arm’s-length transactions. Disagreeing with other circuits, the panel concluded that AT&T, by amending its contract with Fidelity to incorporate the services of BrokerageLink and Financial Engines, caused the Plan to engage in a prohibited transaction. The panel remanded for the district court to consider whether AT&T met the requirements for an exemption from the prohibited transaction bar. View "ROBERT BUGIELSKI, ET AL V. AT&T SERVICES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant PeopleConnect, Inc., alleging that it violated his right of publicity by using his photo on its website, Classmates.com. PeopleConnect responded by seeking two forms of relief. First, it sought to compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims under section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Second, it sought to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint, arguing in relevant part that it was entitled to section 230 immunity under the Communications Decency Act. In a 26-page document labeled a single “order,” the district court denied both requests for relief. PeopleConnect filed an interlocutory appeal, attempting to challenge both denials by relying on the FAA as the basis for interlocutory appellate jurisdiction.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The panel determined that it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration. The panel held that two orders do not become one “order” for the purposes of § 16(a) solely by virtue of the fact that they appear in the same document. Notwithstanding its label as a single “order,” the document clearly contained multiple orders. Because Section 16(a) grants jurisdiction to review only an order denying a motion to compel arbitration, and because the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss was not part of such an order, the panel lacked jurisdiction to review it. View "JOHN BOSHEARS V. PEOPLECONNECT, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that Valeant fraudulently obtained two sets of patents related to a drug and asserted these patents to stifle competition from generic drugmakers. Plaintiff further alleged that Defendants defrauded the federal government by charging an artificially inflated price for the drug while falsely certifying that its price was fair and reasonable. Dismissing Plaintiff’s action under the False Claims Act’s public disclosure bar, the district court concluded that his allegations had already been publicly disclosed, including in inter partes patent review (“IPR”) before the Patent and Trademark Office.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that an IPR proceeding in which the Patent and Trademark Office invalidated Valeant’s “‘688” patent was not a channel (i) disclosure because the government was not a party to that proceeding, and it was not a channel (ii) disclosure because its primary function was not investigative. The panel held that, under United States ex rel. Silbersher v. Allergan, 46 F.4th 991 (9th Cir. 2022), the patent prosecution histories of Valeant’s patents were qualifying public disclosures under channel (ii). The panel assumed without deciding that a Law360 article and two published medical studies were channel (iii) disclosures. The panel held that the “substantially the same” prong of the public disclosure bar applies when the publicly disclosed facts are substantially similar to the relator’s allegations or transactions. None of the qualifying public disclosures made a direct claim that Valeant committed fraud, nor did they disclose a combination of facts sufficient to permit a reasonable inference of fraud. View "ZACHARY SILBERSHER, ET AL V. VALEANT PHARMACEUTICALS INT'L, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in California state court of one count of conspiracy to commit murder and one count of attempted murder on an aiding and abetting theory and sentenced to 56 years to life. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. The district court denied his first federal habeas petition on the merits and declined to grant a certificate of appealability (COA); this court also declined to grant a COA. The district court dismissed as second or successive Petitioner’s second federal habeas petition, and the Ninth Circuit court affirmed the dismissal.   In consolidated appeals, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgments dismissing, as second or successive under 28 U.S.C. Section 2244(b), Petitioner’s third and fourth federal habeas corpus petitions, and remanded. The panel held that Petitioner’s due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, and equal protection claims did not become ripe until his application for resentencing was denied, which occurred well after the district court denied his first and dismissed his second habeas petitions. Because Petitioner could not have raised these claims in his first or second petition, his failure to do so is not an abuse of the writ. Applying Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007), the panel concluded that the third and fourth habeas petitions were, accordingly, not second or successive under Section 2244(b). View "GREGORY BROWN V. M. ATCHLEY" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ernest Bock, LLC (“Bock”) initially obtained an $11.8 million judgment for breach of contract against Defendants in New Jersey state court. Bock then filed this federal suit in the District of Nevada, alleging that Defendants, assisted by other named Defendants, engaged in an elaborate series of allegedly improper asset transfers to insulate those assets from the New Jersey judgment. While the federal suit was pending, a New Jersey appellate court vacated the underlying judgment and remanded for further proceedings, including discovery, to determine whether Defendants were liable to Bock. The district court then stayed this case pursuant to Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States (Colorado River), 424 U.S. 800 (1976).   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order staying. The panel first concluded that Bock had standing to bring the suit because Bock raised a question of fact as to whether it was injured by the defendants’ asset transfers. Noting that a Colorado River stay is proper only in exceptional circumstances, the panel held that a Colorado River stay cannot issue when, as here, there was substantial doubt as to whether the state proceedings would resolve the federal action. Because Colorado River did not support a stay, neither could the district court’s docket management authority. View "ERNEST BOCK, LLC V. PAUL STEELMAN, ET AL" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence following a guilty plea to two counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2241(c), 2246(2) & 1152. He contends that the district court misapplied a sentencing enhancement for abduction and thus improperly added four levels to his sentencing range.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel wrote that whether it evaluates the plain meaning of the term “abducted” as it appears in the Guideline itself or considers “abducted” to be ambiguous and looks to the definition in the Guidelines’ commentary, it would reach the same conclusion: the victim was “abducted” when the defendant forced her from the roadside where he encountered her into a nearby cornfield to perpetrate the sexual assault. View "USA V. JOSHUA SCHEU" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ lawyers filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of copyright holders of musical compositions and ended up recovering a little over $50,000 for the class members. The lawyers then asked the court to award them $6 million in legal fees. And the district court authorized $1.7 million in legal fees—more than thirty times the amount that the class received.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs’ counsel in a copyright action and remanded. The panel held that the touchstone for determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees in a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is the benefit to the class. Here, the benefit was minimal. The panel held that the district court erred in failing to calculate the settlement’s actual benefit to the class members who submitted settlement claims, as opposed to a hypothetical $20 million cap agreed on by the parties. The panel held that district courts awarding attorneys’ fees in class actions under the Copyright Act must still generally consider the proportion between the award and the benefit to the class to ensure that the award is reasonable. The panel recognized that a fee award may exceed the monetary benefit provided to the class in certain copyright cases, such as when a copyright infringement litigation leads to substantial nonmonetary relief or provides a meaningful benefit to society, but this was not such a case. The panel instructed that, on remand, the district court should rigorously evaluate the actual benefit provided to the class and award reasonable attorneys’ fees considering that benefit. View "DAVID LOWERY, ET AL V. RHAPSODY INTERNATIONAL, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are Guam-licensed OBGYN physicians in Hawaii who wish to provide abortion services to Guam patients through telemedicine. They point out that women in Guam seeking abortions must obtain chemical abortifacients via telemedicine, given the current lack of doctors who perform abortions in Guam. The district court granted a preliminary injunction against Guam’s in-person informed-consent law.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction. Applying rational basis review, the panel concluded that the in-person informed consent requirement does not violate the Due Process Clause because it furthers Guam’s legitimate governmental interests in preservation of potential life, protection of maternal health, and promotion of the integrity of the medical profession. The panel rejected Plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge under the Due Process Clause, in which plaintiffs argued that the in-person consultation requirement undermines informed consent because of the possibility that non-medical personnel may provide the required medical disclosures. The panel held that the requirement does not undermine informed consent because it does not mandate that a non-medical professional provide the in-person medical disclosures, nor does it prevent the treating telemedicine doctor from providing medical information to the patient; it merely requires that patients receive certain information in person before receiving an abortion. Finally, the panel rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that Guam’s in-person informed-consent law violates their equal protection rights because it irrationally treats physicians who provide abortions differently than similarly situated telemedicine providers. The panel held that Guam can require an in-person consultation for abortions because the in-person requirement bears a reasonable relationship to the legitimate governmental interest of safeguarding fetal life. View "SHANDHINI RAIDOO, ET AL V. DOUGLAS B. MOYLAN, ET AL" on Justia Law