Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant LuLaRoe, a multilevel-marketing company that sells clothing to purchasers across the United States through “fashion retailers” located in all fifty states, allegedly charged sales tax to these purchasers based on the location of the retailer rather than the location of the purchaser. LuLaRoe eventually refunded all the improper sales tax it collected, but it did not pay interest on the refunded amounts. Plaintiff, an Alaska resident who paid the improperly charged sales tax to LuLaRoe, brought this class action under Alaska law on behalf of herself and other Alaskans who were improperly charged, for recovery of the interest on the now-refunded amounts collected and for recovery of statutory damages. The district court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3) and LuLaRoe appealed under Rule 23(f).   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order certifying the class of Alaska purchasers and remanded for further proceedings. The panel first rejected LuLaRoe’s argument that class certification was improper because the small amount of money currently owed to some class members was insufficient to support standing and the presence of these class members in the class made individualized issues predominant over class issues. The panel next rejected LuLaRoe’s assertion that some purchasers knew that the sales tax charge was improper but nevertheless voluntarily paid the invoice which contained the improperly assessed sales tax amount, and thus, under applicable Alaska law, no deceptive practice caused any injury for these purchasers. Finally, the panel held that LuLaRoe’s third argument, that class certification should be reversed because some fashion retailers offset the improper sales tax through individual discounts, had merit. View "KATIE VAN V. LLR, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has long monitored local telephone companies’ “access stimulation.” In 2011, the FCC issued rules to address this phenomenon, defining when carriers engage in access stimulation and restricting the rates that they could charge. After local carriers found loopholes in this regulatory system, the FCC revisited and updated these rules, issuing the Updating the Intercarrier Compensation Regime to Eliminate Access Arbitrage (“Access Arbitrage Order”), 34 FCC Rcd. 9035 (2019). Wide Voice, LLC (“Wide Voice”), rearranged its business model and call traffic path in coordination with closely related entities, HD Carrier and Free Conferencing. Wide Voice petitions for review of the FCC’s order, specifically arguing that the FCC unreasonably concluded that it violated Section 201(b) by restructuring its business operations to continue imposing charges that were otherwise prohibited.   The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The panel held that the FCC properly exercised its authority under § 201(b) to hold Wide Voice liable for circumventing its newly adopted rule in the Access Arbitrage Order when the company devised a workaround. Contrary to Wide Voice’s assertions, the FCC need not establish new rules prohibiting the evasion of its existing rules to find a Section 201(b) violation. The panel rejected Wide Voice’s contention that it restructured its business to comply with, rather than evade, the FCC’s new rules. Finally, the panel rejected Wide Voice’s contention that even if the FCC was permitted to find its conduct “unjust and unreasonable,” it did not have fair notice that its practices were unlawful, and therefore the FCC violated its right to due process. View "WIDE VOICE, LLC V. FCC, ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs represent a putative class of ticket purchasers (“Ticket Purchasers”) against Defendants Ticketmaster LLC and Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (“Defendants”). Ticket Purchasers sued Defendants in federal district court, alleging anticompetitive practices in violation of the Sherman Act. Defendants moved to compel arbitration on the basis of their websites’ terms of use (“Terms”). The court granted the motion and dismissed the case, holding that the Terms constituted a valid agreement between the parties and that the requirements for mutual assent were met.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that the terms of use were not invalid under California law for failure to identify Defendants as parties to the agreement properly. The panel concluded that it was possible for a reasonable user to identify the parties to the contract based on the terms’ repeated references to Defendants' common trade names, express references to “Live Nation Entertainment, Inc.,” and available avenues that would enable a reasonable user to identify Ticketmaster’s full legal name. The panel further held that Defendants did not fail to provide constructive notice of the terms of use. The panel concluded that it need not engage in a detailed choice-of-law analysis between California and Massachusetts law because the two states’ laws apply substantially similar rules. Finally, the panel held the district court did not err in deciding the constructive notice issue as a matter of law. View "MITCH OBERSTEIN, ET AL V. LIVE NATION ENT'M'T, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a class of children, appearing through their guardians ad litem, filed a lawsuit against Google LLC and others, alleging that Google used persistent identifiers to collect data and track their online behavior surreptitiously and without their consent in violation of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”). They pled only state law claims arising under the constitutional, statutory, and common law of California, Colorado, Indiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Tennessee, but also allege Google’s activities violate COPPA. The district court held that the “core allegations” in the third amended complaint were squarely covered, and preempted, by COPPA.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal on preemption grounds. The panel considered the question of whether COPPA preempts state law claims based on underlying conduct that also violates COPPA’s regulations. The Supreme Court has identified three different types of preemption—express, conflict, and field. First, express preemption is a question of statutory construction. The panel concluded that COPPA’s preemption clause does not bar state-law causes of action that are parallel to, or proscribe, the same conduct forbidden by, COPPA. Accordingly, express preemption does not apply to the plaintiff class’s claims. Second, even if express preemption is not applicable, preemptive intent may be inferred through conflict preemption principles. The panel held that although express and conflict preemption are analytically distinct inquiries, they effectively collapse into one when the preemption clause uses the term “inconsistent.” For the same reasons that the panel concluded there was no express preemption, the panel concluded that conflict preemption did not bar Plaintiffs’ claims. View "CARA JONES, ET AL V. GOOGLE LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

The case arose from the district court’s dismissal with prejudice of Plaintiff’s class-action claim under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), against Meta Platforms, Inc. (Meta), formerly known as Facebook, Inc. Enacted in 1991, the TCPA generally bans calls made to a telephone if the call is generated by an “automatic telephone dialing system” (commonly referred to as an “autodialer”). Plaintiff argued that Meta violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited “Birthday Announcement” text messages to consumers’ cell phones. He alleged that these Birthday Announcements were sent by Meta through an autodialer that used an RSNG to store and dial the telephone numbers of the consumers being texted. The question on appeal was whether a TCPA-defined autodialer must use an RSNG to generate the telephone numbers that are dialed.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. The panel held that Meta did not violate the TCPA because it did not use a TCPA-defined autodialer that randomly or sequentially generated the telephone numbers in question. View "COLIN BRICKMAN V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

The Consumer Financial Protection Act (CFPA) prohibits providers of “financial advisory services” from engaging in deceptive conduct. 12 U.S.C. Sections 5481(15)(A)(viii), 5536(a)(1)(B). Defendant mailed millions of solicitations to current and prospective college students, advertising a targeted program for assisting those students in applying for scholarships. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) filed an enforcement action in the district court alleging the solicitations were deceptive. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment to the CFPB.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment ruling. The panel rejected Defendant’s argument that he did not provide financial scholarships are not financial in nature merely because they do not have to be repaid. Second, the record establishes that Defendant’s advice extended beyond the topic of scholarships, covering the entire field of student financial aid. Third, Defendant did, in fact, hold himself out as an expert in finance. The panel held that Defendant provided “financial advisory services,” and the district court did not err in concluding that Defendant was a “covered person” under the CFPA.   The panel held that Defendant was incorrect that the district court failed to consider the net impression of the entirety of his solicitation materials. In addition, the district court did not err by concluding that no issue of material fact existed as to the deceptive nature of Defendant’s conduct based upon the net impression created by his entire solicitation packet. Finally, the panel held that Defendant forfeited his challenge to the district court’s calculation of the restitution and civil penalties. View "CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION V. ARMOND ARIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff provided his phone number to an insurance company on a website, he began receiving marketing texts from eFinancial. Plaintiff sued under the TCPA, claiming that eFinancial uses a “sequential number generator” to pick the order in which to call customers who had provided their phone numbers. He says that this type of number generator qualifies as an “automatic telephone dialing system” (often colloquially called an “autodialer”) under the TCPA. But eFinancial responds that it does not use an autodialer. eFinancial argues that the TCPA defines an autodialer as one that must generate telephone numbers to dial, not just any number to decide which pre-selected phone numbers to call.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that an “automatic telephone dialing system” must generate and dial random or sequential telephone numbers under the TCPA’s plain text. eFinancial thus did not use an autodialer, and its texts to Plaintiff did not implicate the TCPA. View "DAVID BORDEN V. EFINANCIAL, LLC" on Justia Law

Apple entered into a $310 million settlement with a class of individuals based on claims that Apple secretly throttled the system performance of certain model iPhones to mask battery defects. Five class objectors sought to vacate the settlement on various grounds, including 1.) that the district court provided inadequate notice of the settlement to nonnatural persons; 2.) the settlement extinguished the claims of “all former or current U.S. owners” of certain devices who downloaded iOS software before Apple disclosed potential defect, but the settlement limited recovery to the subset of owners who can attest that “they experienced” the alleged defects; and 3.) that the district court cited the wrong legal standard in examining the settlement’s fairness by improperly applying a presumption of reasonableness to the settlement rather than applying a heightened scrutiny.The Ninth Circuit held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard when reviewing the settlement’s fairness. View "IN RE: NAMED PLAINTIFFS, ET AL V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

Polaris sells off-road vehicles that have roll cages, or rollover protective structures (“ROPS”). The labels on the Polaris vehicles stated that the ROPS complied with Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards. Plaintiffs filed a class action against Polaris, claiming that the statements made on these labels were misleading, and that they relied on the statements when purchasing the vehicles.The district court granted summary judgment to Polaris. The Ninth Circuit reversed. The court agreed with the district court that Plaintiff could not bring his equitable UCL claim in federal court because he had an adequate legal remedy in his time-barred CLRA claim. However, the court held that it must still reverse the entry of summary judgment against Plaintiff because no decision was reached on the merits of the claim. Because the district court lacked equitable jurisdiction, which it recognized, it should have denied Polaris’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiff's UCL claim without prejudice for lack of equitable jurisdiction. View "PAUL GUZMAN, ET AL V. POLARIS INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

In Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp. (Sonner I), 971 F.3d 834 (9th Cir. 2020), the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal without leave to amend of Plaintiff's class action complaint. This court held that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply federal equitable principles to claims for equitable restitution brought under California law and that, under such principles, dismissal was appropriate because Plaintiff could not show that she lacked an adequate remedy at law. After Sonner I was issued, Plaintiff filed a virtually identical complaint in California state court. Premier Nutrition responded by returning to the district court and seeking a permanent injunction against the state court action. The district court denied the injunction.The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the permanent injunction regardless of Sonner I’s preclusive effect. The panel did not determine the preclusive effect of Sonner I.The Ninth Circuit held that there was a strong presumption against enjoining a state court proceeding under the relitigation exception. Premier did not point to any clearly erroneous factual findings in the district court’s order, and the panel detected none. Res judicata principles are of high importance, but they can be addressed by the state court, and do not compel resorting to the heavy artillery of a permanent injunction. View "KATHLEEN SONNER V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORPORATION" on Justia Law