Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Luis Guillermo Gonzalez-Juarez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1999. After the government initiated removal proceedings against him, Gonzalez conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal. He argued that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his two sons, who planned to accompany him to Mexico. Gonzalez relied primarily on country conditions reports about crime and violence in Mexico, and also cited his sons' lack of fluency in Spanish, their separation from their older sister, and financial concerns.The Immigration Judge (IJ) granted Gonzalez's application for cancellation of removal, finding that he had demonstrated the requisite hardship. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the IJ's decision, concluding that Gonzalez had not established that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives. The BIA was not persuaded that the general conditions of crime and violence in Mexico, which would apply to any qualifying relative, met the hardship standard. The BIA also rejected the argument that Gonzalez and his sons would be targeted for criminal violence due to their perceived wealth.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court held that the substantial evidence standard of review applies to the hardship determination in cancellation of removal cases. The court found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusions. The court noted that Gonzalez's other family members had lived in Mexico without harm and that a country conditions report that applies equally to a large proportion of removal cases does not compel the conclusion that the hardship standard is met. The court also rejected Gonzalez's argument that the BIA failed to consider the record evidence. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit denied Gonzalez's petition for review. View "GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Erika Marie Plancarte pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport an alien into the United States. The plea agreement required the government to recommend a 90-day imprisonment sentence. At the San Ysidro Port of Entry, Plancarte illegally transported a woman and her three children into the U.S., using false documents. She was arrested after admitting to the smuggling.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California received a presentence report (PSR) that contained ambiguities about the relationship between the woman and the children. Plancarte requested a non-custodial sentence, while the government adhered to the plea agreement, recommending 90 days of custody. The government also clarified the PSR's ambiguities and highlighted Plancarte's criminal history and recidivism, arguing that previous sentences had not deterred her behavior. Plancarte argued that the government breached the plea agreement by including additional commentary and referencing her criminal history.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government did not implicitly breach the plea agreement. The government’s references to Plancarte’s criminal history and its clarification of the PSR were permissible and did not undermine the plea agreement. The court found that the government’s comments were made in good faith and were consistent with advocating for the agreed-upon sentence. The court also noted that the government was not required to present mitigating evidence. Consequently, the appellate waiver in the plea agreement was enforced, and the appeal was dismissed. View "USA V. PLANCARTE" on Justia Law

Maris Oscar, a Haitian national, sought asylum in the United States, claiming persecution by the Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK) in Haiti. Oscar testified that PHTK members attacked him in 2014 after he refused to join them. He fled Haiti in November 2014 and resettled in Chile in January 2015, where he lived for six years, attended university, worked, and received health coverage. Oscar and his family were granted permanent residence in Chile, as indicated by their Chilean identification cards. Oscar reported experiencing racism in Chile but did not claim any harm from the Chilean government.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Oscar's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), citing the firm resettlement bar due to his permanent residence in Chile. The IJ found that Oscar's reports of racism did not qualify him for an exception to the firm resettlement bar. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, leading Oscar to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Oscar's petition. The court held that the Chilean government's issuance of an identification card with "Visa: PERMANENT RESIDENCE" constituted direct evidence of a firm offer of resettlement. Oscar failed to show that the firm resettlement bar did not apply, as his argument that his Chilean residence status had been revoked was insufficient. Additionally, the court found that Oscar did not experience substantial discrimination that would qualify for an exception to the firm resettlement bar, and there was no evidence that the Chilean government consciously restricted his residence. Thus, the firm resettlement bar rendered Oscar ineligible for asylum. View "OSCAR V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Gurparas Singh, a native and citizen of India, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States, claiming persecution by members of the ruling BJP party due to his involvement with the Mann political party. Singh recounted two specific incidents of persecution: one in July 2017, where BJP members threatened him while he was placing posters, and another in December 2017, where he was attacked by BJP members while returning from a blood drive. Singh entered the U.S. without valid documents in April 2018 and was charged with removability. He admitted the allegations and applied for asylum and related relief.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Singh not credible due to significant linguistic and factual similarities between his declaration and those of other asylum applicants from India, suggesting a fabricated claim. The IJ also found that Singh knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application and denied his CAT claim, concluding that the remaining evidence did not establish a likelihood of torture upon his return to India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's findings and dismissed Singh's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Singh's petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's adverse credibility determination, noting the identical language and narrative structure in Singh's declaration compared to other applicants. The court also found that the IJ followed proper procedural safeguards in making the frivolous application finding. Additionally, the court concluded that the denial of CAT protection was supported by substantial evidence, as Singh failed to provide sufficient individualized evidence of a likelihood of torture. View "SINGH V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo was sought for extradition to Mexico to face charges of intentional aggravated homicide. In January 2014, a Mexican judge issued an arrest warrant for Santoyo, alleging he shot a man twice in the head after an argument. Mexico requested his provisional arrest in November 2018, and the United States filed a complaint in August 2021. Santoyo was arrested in May 2022 and released on bail in November 2022. Mexico formally requested his extradition in July 2022, providing various supporting documents. A magistrate judge certified the extradition in February 2023, and Santoyo challenged this certification via a habeas corpus petition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Santoyo's habeas corpus petition. Santoyo argued that the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico incorporated the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause, contending that the delay between the 2014 arrest warrant and the 2022 extradition request violated his speedy trial rights. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the treaty's "lapse of time" provision referred only to statutes of limitations, not to the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the "lapse of time" language in the extradition treaty does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. The court emphasized that extradition proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and that the treaty's language refers to statutes of limitations rather than the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court also noted that the judiciary's role in extradition is limited and that issues of delay are more appropriately addressed by the Secretary of State. View "SANTOYO V. BOYDEN" on Justia Law

Edgar Murillo-Chavez, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) from Mexico, entered the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He was granted special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status in 2010 and became an LPR in 2011. In 2016, he pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm in Oregon. In 2018, he was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon and first-degree criminal mistreatment, both in Oregon.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Murillo removable for a firearms offense and for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The IJ also determined that Murillo was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he committed a CIMT within seven years of being admitted. Murillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ that his 2018 convictions were CIMTs and that he was admitted when he became an LPR in 2011. Murillo then filed a motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the BIA denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Murillo's 2016 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). The court also agreed with the BIA that Murillo was not "admitted" when he obtained SIJ status but when he became an LPR in 2011. Consequently, his 2018 conviction for first-degree criminal mistreatment, which occurred within seven years of his LPR admission, was a CIMT, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied Murillo's petitions for review. View "MURILLO-CHAVEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Ion Lapadat and his family, all of Roma ethnicity, sought asylum in the United States due to severe mistreatment in Romania. Ion testified that he was shot in the back while collecting firewood, and his family faced attempted kidnappings, threats, and violence. They also experienced pervasive discrimination, including denial of healthcare, employment, and access to public services. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found their testimony credible but denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), concluding that their experiences did not rise to the level of persecution.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the mistreatment did not constitute persecution and that the Roma are not a disfavored group in Romania. The BIA also found that Ion failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Ion then petitioned for review of the BIA's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA erred in its analysis. The court held that Ion's past experiences, including being shot and the severe assaults and threats faced by his family, collectively rose to the level of persecution. The court also determined that the BIA erred in concluding that the Roma are not a disfavored group in Romania, noting the long history of anti-Roma abuse and the Romanian government's documented persecutory conduct.The Ninth Circuit granted Ion's petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the BIA to address the remaining elements of Ion's asylum claim and to reconsider his fear of future persecution. View "Lapadat v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Romio Villagomez, a native and citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia, was convicted of felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.481(2)(b). Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him, arguing that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).An Immigration Judge determined that Villagomez’s conviction was indeed a crime of violence and ordered his removal. Villagomez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. He then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Villagomez’s conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence. The court noted that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court referenced its previous decision in United States v. Fitzgerald, which held that the attempt version of the same Nevada statute is categorically a crime of violence.Villagomez argued that the Nevada statute criminalizes mere unwanted touching and allows for conviction where substantial bodily harm occurs recklessly. The court rejected these arguments, holding that causing substantial bodily harm in Nevada necessarily requires Johnson-level force, which is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court also held that Nevada law requires intentional conduct for battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, and thus, the statute does not encompass injuries caused by reckless deployments of force.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the Board’s removability determination. The petition for review was denied. View "VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY" on Justia Law

The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Emerson Levi Godoy-Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 as a permanent resident. In 2015, he was charged and subsequently convicted under California Penal Code (CPC) § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness by force or threat. He was sentenced to 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail. Following his conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), relating to obstruction of justice.An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction under CPC § 136.1(c)(1) constituted an aggravated felony of obstruction of justice and issued a removal order. Godoy-Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the state offense categorically fell within the federal definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court analyzed whether CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is a categorical match for the generic federal offense of an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court concluded that CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is indeed a categorical match, as it involves specific intent conduct aimed at obstructing justice, and no pending investigation or proceeding is required. The court found that the elements of the underlying crimes in CPC § 136.1(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(3) do not sweep more broadly than the generic federal offense. Consequently, the court held that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction and sentence constituted an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice and denied the petition for review. View "GODOY-AGUILAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law