Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Mexican national who entered the United States unlawfully in 1992 married a U.S. citizen, and together they had three children who are U.S. citizens. In seeking to obtain lawful permanent residency, the noncitizen husband traveled to Mexico for a required consular interview. After the interview, the consular officer denied his visa application, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A)(ii) (“3A2”) and concluding there was reason to believe he was a member of a known criminal organization. The denial notice referenced a review of interview statements, law enforcement information, the immigration record, and all documents submitted. The applicant had no criminal record and disputed gang affiliation, contending that his tattoos were the basis for suspicion.The couple filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting that the visa denial was based solely on the noncitizen’s tattoos, violated their First Amendment rights, and that 3A2 was unconstitutionally vague. The district court dismissed the case, finding the noncitizen could not overcome the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, and that the U.S. citizen spouse had not plausibly alleged the absence of a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for the visa denial. The court also rejected the vagueness challenge to 3A2.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the noncitizen could not rely on his own First Amendment rights to challenge the visa denial, but the U.S. citizen spouse’s First Amendment right to receive information was implicated, triggering the narrow Mandel exception to consular nonreviewability. Nevertheless, applying the limited review allowed, the court found the government provided a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for denial, the applicants did not show bad faith, and the relevant statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "SANCHEZ GONZALEZ V. DEPARTMENT OF STATE" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from Israel entered the United States on a tourist visa, overstayed, and married a U.S. citizen (his first wife). They divorced less than two years later, and no immigration benefit was sought based on that marriage. Years later, the noncitizen married another U.S. citizen, with whom he has a child. His current wife filed a petition (Form I-130) for him to be classified as an immediate relative, a necessary step toward permanent residency. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) denied this petition, concluding the noncitizen’s prior marriage was a sham, entered solely to obtain immigration benefits.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld USCIS’s denial, finding the noncitizen’s first marriage was fraudulent. The plaintiffs then challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the marriage fraud bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c) should not apply since no immigration benefit had been sought from the first marriage, and that their procedural due process rights had been violated by the reliance on the ex-wife’s statement without cross-examination. The district court granted summary judgment to the government.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that, under the plain meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1154(c)(2), the marriage fraud bar applies when a noncitizen attempts or conspires to enter into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws, regardless of whether an immigration benefit was sought. The court also held that the plaintiffs received adequate procedural due process and that substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding of marriage fraud. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. View "HANAN V. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES" on Justia Law

A man was convicted in California of forcible rape, false imprisonment by menace or violence, and corporal injury on a cohabitant after he assaulted his girlfriend. Following his prison sentence, as a Mexican national who had entered the United States unlawfully, he was removed from the United States through an expedited process based on his conviction for rape, which was deemed an aggravated felony under federal immigration law. Days later, he illegally reentered the country and was arrested near the border.He was then charged with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. In the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, he moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his state rape conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act, and thus his removal had been improper. The district court denied his motion. He then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court assumed for the sake of argument that the defendant met the statutory requirements of exhaustion of administrative remedies and deprivation of judicial review. However, it held that he failed to show that his removal was “fundamentally unfair” under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d)(3). The court concluded that the California rape statute under which he was convicted was a categorical match to the generic federal definition of rape, which includes rape by non-physical duress. Therefore, his conviction was properly considered an aggravated felony, making his expedited removal lawful. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment. View "USA V. GONZALEZ-REYES" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen entered the United States unlawfully several times between 2014 and 2015. After being denied entry and returning to Mexico multiple times, he eventually made a claim for protection, asserting fears of harm from a vigilante group in Mexico called the Defensores of Guerrero, who he said pressured him to join them or a rival cartel. He also cited threats following police contact and discrimination based on his sexual orientation, though he admitted he had not been physically harmed due to his sexuality. He expressed concerns about the safety of relocation within Mexico and referenced crimes against his father by unidentified individuals. The individual’s parents and siblings continued to live in Mexico without incident.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, finding no nexus between the alleged harm and a protected ground, insufficient evidence of past persecution, the reasonableness of internal relocation, and lack of likelihood of torture by or with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the individual failed to establish the necessary connections and that the claimed harms did not rise to the level of persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court held that the petitioner had forfeited all arguments on the merits of his immigration claims by not raising them in his opening brief and had also failed to exhaust his procedural due process arguments before the BIA. The court denied the petition for review, ruling that none of the petitioner’s arguments warranted relief, and it would not reach the unexhausted due process claims. View "SANTANA-GONZALEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A woman born in Soviet Armenia immigrated to the United States as a child and was later convicted of grand theft in California. In 2011, she was ordered removed based on this conviction. However, because Armenia did not accept individuals born during the Soviet era, she was considered “stateless” and not deported. She lived in the United States under supervision, checking in annually with immigration authorities. In 2018, she was informed that Armenia had begun accepting such individuals, which placed her at immediate risk of removal. She promptly retained counsel, who identified grounds to vacate her conviction due to a procedural defect, and the conviction was vacated in May 2019.Following the vacatur, she filed a motion to reopen her removal proceedings, but the Immigration Judge denied it, finding she had not explained why she waited over two years after the relevant California statute became effective to seek vacatur. She then filed a second motion to reopen, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel because her counsel in the first motion failed to present facts or arguments about her diligence. The Immigration Judge denied the second motion as number-barred, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed her appeal, finding she had not demonstrated due diligence and thus was not entitled to equitable tolling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA applied the wrong standard in assessing diligence for stateless individuals. The Ninth Circuit concluded that it is reasonable for someone in her position to begin challenging removability only upon learning they are at risk of removal. The court found she acted with due diligence after learning of her removability and that the BIA abused its discretion in finding otherwise. The court granted her petition for review, vacated the BIA’s decision, and remanded for further proceedings. View "ESKILIAN V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A citizen of Mexico was the beneficiary of an approved family-sponsored immigrant visa petition filed by his mother in 1992, which was approved in 1993. He did not apply for lawful permanent resident status at that time. In 2000, he was deemed inadmissible at the United States-Mexico border, ordered removed, and was actually removed. He reentered the United States without inspection shortly thereafter. In 2017, his wife filed a new immigrant visa petition on his behalf, which was approved, and he applied for adjustment of status. During a 2018 interview regarding that application, he admitted to being illegally present and previously removed, after which he was arrested and DHS began proceedings to reinstate his prior removal order.After the Department of Homeland Security reinstated his prior removal order, the petitioner sought review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. DHS identified a procedural error in the initial reinstatement (an unsigned section), canceled the order, and began the process again. At the second reinstatement proceeding, the petitioner was advised of his rights but declined to make a statement or sign the acknowledgment form. DHS reinstated the removal order, and he again appealed to the Ninth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. The court held that it was not impermissibly retroactive to apply the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996’s reinstatement provision to the petitioner because he had not taken any affirmative steps to adjust his status before the law took effect. The court further held that, to obtain relief for a due process violation based on denial of a right to counsel in reinstatement proceedings, an alien must show prejudice, and the petitioner failed to establish such prejudice. The petition was denied. View "RUIZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A Mexican national attempted to enter the United States in 2003 using fraudulent documents and was removed under an expedited order. After re-entering the country illegally, he was discovered in 2024 and his prior removal order was reinstated. During the reinstatement proceedings, he expressed fear of returning to Mexico and received a reasonable-fear interview, but the asylum officer determined he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The immigration judge reviewed and affirmed this negative reasonable-fear determination, meaning he was not eligible for further proceedings to seek withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).After the immigration judge’s decision, the individual filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He did not challenge the original expedited removal order or the reinstated removal order, but instead sought review solely of the denial of CAT relief. The government did not argue that the petition was untimely, but the court requested additional briefing after the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. Bondi, which addressed jurisdiction over such petitions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a petition challenging only an order denying CAT relief when the petitioner did not also seek review of a final order of removal. The court concluded that, under current statutes and Supreme Court precedent, only final orders of removal are reviewable, and an order denying CAT relief does not qualify as a final order of removal nor does it merge into such an order. The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and denied the petitioner’s request to amend his petition to add a nominal challenge to the removal order, as any such challenge would be baseless and futile. View "NAVARRETE V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A noncitizen applied to the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for a U visa, which is available to victims of certain crimes who assist law enforcement. However, he acknowledged being inadmissible to the United States due to prior unlawful entries and removals, and sought a waiver of inadmissibility, which is granted at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland Security if considered to be in the public or national interest. USCIS denied both his waiver request and his U visa application. He appealed the denials within the agency, but the Administrative Appeals Office dismissed the appeal. After the agency reopened and reconsidered his applications, it again denied both.The plaintiff then filed a suit in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), challenging the denial of his waiver and U visa. He later amended his complaint to add a claim that USCIS violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process by exhibiting bias. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) precludes judicial review in district courts of discretionary waiver decisions under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(14).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s jurisdictional determination de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that the agency’s denial of a waiver is within the discretionary authority specified in the INA and thus falls under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips district court jurisdiction. The court clarified that the savings clause in § 1252(a)(2)(D) applies only to petitions for review of final orders of removal in courts of appeals, not to APA suits in district court. The court also found no colorable constitutional claim challenging agency procedures and thus lacked jurisdiction over that claim as well. View "CHAIREZ V. MAYORKAS" on Justia Law

The President issued an executive order in January 2025 suspending the entry of all refugees into the United States under the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), citing concerns about national capacity and security. The Department of State, in response, suspended and later terminated funding for both overseas and domestic refugee resettlement services, including cooperative agreements with resettlement organizations. Plaintiffs, consisting of affected refugees and resettlement agencies, challenged these actions, arguing that the suspension exceeded the President’s statutory authority and that the funding terminations violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Refugee Act.Upon review, the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted two preliminary injunctions. The first prohibited enforcement of the executive order suspending refugee admissions and related funding, and the second required the reinstatement of terminated cooperative agreements with resettlement agencies. The Government immediately appealed and sought stays of these injunctions. The district court also certified three plaintiff classes and further clarified the scope of its injunctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the President acted within his statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) in suspending refugee admissions and in pausing decisions on refugee applications, and it reversed the district court’s injunctions to the extent they blocked these actions. The court also concluded that suspending overseas refugee processing and related funding did not violate the Refugee Act or the APA. However, the court affirmed the injunction as to the termination of domestic resettlement services, holding that the Government was likely acting contrary to law and arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to provide statutorily mandated resettlement services to admitted refugees. The scope of the injunction was upheld as compliant with recent Supreme Court precedent. View "PACITO V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including individual Temporary Protected Status (TPS) beneficiaries and an organization, challenged actions taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security. These actions included vacating and terminating Venezuela’s TPS designation and partially vacating Haiti’s TPS designation. TPS provides eligible nationals of designated countries temporary protection from deportation and work authorization due to conditions such as armed conflict or environmental disaster in their home countries. The Secretary’s actions resulted in many TPS holders losing their protection and work authorization, leading to job loss, detention, deportation, and family separation.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court initially postponed the effectiveness of the Venezuela TPS vacatur and later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The district court held that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a by vacating and terminating the Venezuela TPS designation and partially vacating Haiti’s TPS designation. The court also found these actions arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and set them aside. The government appealed these rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the TPS statute does not grant the Secretary authority to vacate an existing TPS designation or to partially vacate a TPS extension. The court further held that the Secretary’s attempted vacatur and terminations were in excess of statutory authority and invalid. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that setting aside these actions under the APA was appropriate and not barred by statutory limitations on judicial review or injunctive relief. The court affirmed full vacatur of the Secretary’s actions, restoring the prior TPS designations and extensions. View "National TPS Alliance v. Noem" on Justia Law