Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The defendant, Eliel Nunez Sanchez, was charged with illegal reentry after removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Nunez, a Mexican citizen, had entered the United States illegally as a child. In 2006, he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine while armed. In 2010, he was arrested again for possession of methamphetamine for sale, leading to removal proceedings. During these proceedings, Nunez waived his right to appeal and was deported. He reentered the U.S. illegally multiple times and was deported each time based on the original removal order.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Nunez's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies because his waiver of the right to appeal was valid. Nunez then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Nunez did not meet any of the three requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) to collaterally attack the removal order. First, Nunez did not exhaust his administrative remedies, as his waiver of appeal was considered and intelligent. Second, he was not deprived of the opportunity for judicial review because his waiver was valid. Third, the entry of the removal order was not fundamentally unfair, as Nunez's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, and he was not prejudiced by the denial of voluntary departure.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Nunez's motion to dismiss the indictment. View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The petitioner, a 67-year-old native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States in 1985 without admission or parole. In removal proceedings, he conceded removability but sought several forms of relief, including asylum, withholding of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), and relief pursuant to the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). An immigration judge (IJ) denied all forms of relief, and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the removal order in 2018. The petitioner then filed a motion to reopen proceedings, which the BIA denied in 2019.The BIA upheld the IJ's decision, concluding that the petitioner had withdrawn his asylum application, was ineligible for cancellation of removal due to a conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude, and did not merit NACARA relief. The BIA also found no sufficient indicia of incompetency to mandate remand for a competency evaluation. The petitioner then sought review of both the 2018 and 2019 BIA decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court clarified its jurisdictional rules in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, concluding that it has jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law, including fact-intensive mixed questions of law. The court lacks jurisdiction over purely factual findings and discretionary determinations.The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion by not remanding the case to the IJ for a competency determination, given the extensive evidence of the petitioner's potential incompetence. The court also found that the BIA erred in its assessment of the petitioner's fear of harm due to his mental illness, concluding that the petitioner established a reasonable likelihood of future harm if institutionalized in Guatemala. The court denied the petitioner's other claims and dismissed parts of the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's opinion. View "LEMUS-ESCOBAR V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Silvana De Souza Silva, a native and citizen of Brazil, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from an Immigration Judge's (IJ) order denying her asylum relief. De Souza Silva claimed past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution due to her practice of Candomblé, an Afro-Brazilian religion. She experienced harassment, vandalism, and a death threat, which forced her to practice her religion in hiding and eventually flee to the United States.The IJ found De Souza Silva credible but denied her relief, concluding that the harm she experienced did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ reasoned that the death threat was not credible or sufficient to cause significant harm and that other incidents, such as vandalism and economic deprivation, amounted to discrimination rather than persecution. The IJ also held that De Souza Silva could safely relocate within Brazil to avoid future harm.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the cumulative effect of De Souza Silva's experiences did not constitute persecution and that she could safely relocate within Brazil. The BIA did not consider the impact of her past experiences on her ability to practice her religion freely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA and IJ erred by not considering the impact of De Souza Silva's past experiences on her religious practice. The court held that the agency's failure to consider this aspect was a legal error affecting the internal relocation analysis. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition and remanded the case for the agency to reconsider its past persecution determination and the remaining elements of De Souza Silva's asylum claim. View "DE SILVA V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Jingshan Li, a citizen of China, arrived in the U.S. in 1997 on a B-1 visa. In 1999, he was charged with assisting others to enter the U.S. illegally. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Li not credible and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision in 2002. Li's attorney filed a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit but failed to file an opening brief, leading to the dismissal of the petition for failure to prosecute in 2003. In 2017, Li, with new counsel, filed a motion to reopen with the BIA, citing ineffective assistance of his former counsel.The BIA denied Li's motion, stating that the ineffective assistance claim pertained to his case before the Ninth Circuit, a different tribunal. The BIA noted it had discretion to consider such claims but declined to do so. Li then petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision. The court noted that both BIA and circuit precedent established the BIA's authority to review ineffective assistance claims involving conduct before a different tribunal. The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA's failure to consider Li's claim or provide a reasoned explanation for its decision was arbitrary. The court granted Li's petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "LI V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Luis Guillermo Gonzalez-Juarez, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States in 1999. After the government initiated removal proceedings against him, Gonzalez conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal. He argued that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his two sons, who planned to accompany him to Mexico. Gonzalez relied primarily on country conditions reports about crime and violence in Mexico, and also cited his sons' lack of fluency in Spanish, their separation from their older sister, and financial concerns.The Immigration Judge (IJ) granted Gonzalez's application for cancellation of removal, finding that he had demonstrated the requisite hardship. However, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) reversed the IJ's decision, concluding that Gonzalez had not established that his removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives. The BIA was not persuaded that the general conditions of crime and violence in Mexico, which would apply to any qualifying relative, met the hardship standard. The BIA also rejected the argument that Gonzalez and his sons would be targeted for criminal violence due to their perceived wealth.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA's decision. The court held that the substantial evidence standard of review applies to the hardship determination in cancellation of removal cases. The court found that substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusions. The court noted that Gonzalez's other family members had lived in Mexico without harm and that a country conditions report that applies equally to a large proportion of removal cases does not compel the conclusion that the hardship standard is met. The court also rejected Gonzalez's argument that the BIA failed to consider the record evidence. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit denied Gonzalez's petition for review. View "GONZALEZ-JUAREZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Erika Marie Plancarte pleaded guilty to conspiracy to transport an alien into the United States. The plea agreement required the government to recommend a 90-day imprisonment sentence. At the San Ysidro Port of Entry, Plancarte illegally transported a woman and her three children into the U.S., using false documents. She was arrested after admitting to the smuggling.The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California received a presentence report (PSR) that contained ambiguities about the relationship between the woman and the children. Plancarte requested a non-custodial sentence, while the government adhered to the plea agreement, recommending 90 days of custody. The government also clarified the PSR's ambiguities and highlighted Plancarte's criminal history and recidivism, arguing that previous sentences had not deterred her behavior. Plancarte argued that the government breached the plea agreement by including additional commentary and referencing her criminal history.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the government did not implicitly breach the plea agreement. The government’s references to Plancarte’s criminal history and its clarification of the PSR were permissible and did not undermine the plea agreement. The court found that the government’s comments were made in good faith and were consistent with advocating for the agreed-upon sentence. The court also noted that the government was not required to present mitigating evidence. Consequently, the appellate waiver in the plea agreement was enforced, and the appeal was dismissed. View "USA V. PLANCARTE" on Justia Law

Maris Oscar, a Haitian national, sought asylum in the United States, claiming persecution by the Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK) in Haiti. Oscar testified that PHTK members attacked him in 2014 after he refused to join them. He fled Haiti in November 2014 and resettled in Chile in January 2015, where he lived for six years, attended university, worked, and received health coverage. Oscar and his family were granted permanent residence in Chile, as indicated by their Chilean identification cards. Oscar reported experiencing racism in Chile but did not claim any harm from the Chilean government.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Oscar's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), citing the firm resettlement bar due to his permanent residence in Chile. The IJ found that Oscar's reports of racism did not qualify him for an exception to the firm resettlement bar. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, leading Oscar to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Oscar's petition. The court held that the Chilean government's issuance of an identification card with "Visa: PERMANENT RESIDENCE" constituted direct evidence of a firm offer of resettlement. Oscar failed to show that the firm resettlement bar did not apply, as his argument that his Chilean residence status had been revoked was insufficient. Additionally, the court found that Oscar did not experience substantial discrimination that would qualify for an exception to the firm resettlement bar, and there was no evidence that the Chilean government consciously restricted his residence. Thus, the firm resettlement bar rendered Oscar ineligible for asylum. View "OSCAR V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Gurparas Singh, a native and citizen of India, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States, claiming persecution by members of the ruling BJP party due to his involvement with the Mann political party. Singh recounted two specific incidents of persecution: one in July 2017, where BJP members threatened him while he was placing posters, and another in December 2017, where he was attacked by BJP members while returning from a blood drive. Singh entered the U.S. without valid documents in April 2018 and was charged with removability. He admitted the allegations and applied for asylum and related relief.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Singh not credible due to significant linguistic and factual similarities between his declaration and those of other asylum applicants from India, suggesting a fabricated claim. The IJ also found that Singh knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application and denied his CAT claim, concluding that the remaining evidence did not establish a likelihood of torture upon his return to India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's findings and dismissed Singh's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Singh's petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's adverse credibility determination, noting the identical language and narrative structure in Singh's declaration compared to other applicants. The court also found that the IJ followed proper procedural safeguards in making the frivolous application finding. Additionally, the court concluded that the denial of CAT protection was supported by substantial evidence, as Singh failed to provide sufficient individualized evidence of a likelihood of torture. View "SINGH V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo was sought for extradition to Mexico to face charges of intentional aggravated homicide. In January 2014, a Mexican judge issued an arrest warrant for Santoyo, alleging he shot a man twice in the head after an argument. Mexico requested his provisional arrest in November 2018, and the United States filed a complaint in August 2021. Santoyo was arrested in May 2022 and released on bail in November 2022. Mexico formally requested his extradition in July 2022, providing various supporting documents. A magistrate judge certified the extradition in February 2023, and Santoyo challenged this certification via a habeas corpus petition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Santoyo's habeas corpus petition. Santoyo argued that the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico incorporated the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause, contending that the delay between the 2014 arrest warrant and the 2022 extradition request violated his speedy trial rights. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the treaty's "lapse of time" provision referred only to statutes of limitations, not to the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the "lapse of time" language in the extradition treaty does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. The court emphasized that extradition proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and that the treaty's language refers to statutes of limitations rather than the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court also noted that the judiciary's role in extradition is limited and that issues of delay are more appropriately addressed by the Secretary of State. View "SANTOYO V. BOYDEN" on Justia Law

Edgar Murillo-Chavez, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) from Mexico, entered the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He was granted special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status in 2010 and became an LPR in 2011. In 2016, he pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm in Oregon. In 2018, he was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon and first-degree criminal mistreatment, both in Oregon.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Murillo removable for a firearms offense and for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The IJ also determined that Murillo was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he committed a CIMT within seven years of being admitted. Murillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ that his 2018 convictions were CIMTs and that he was admitted when he became an LPR in 2011. Murillo then filed a motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the BIA denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Murillo's 2016 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). The court also agreed with the BIA that Murillo was not "admitted" when he obtained SIJ status but when he became an LPR in 2011. Consequently, his 2018 conviction for first-degree criminal mistreatment, which occurred within seven years of his LPR admission, was a CIMT, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied Murillo's petitions for review. View "MURILLO-CHAVEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law