Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Immigration Law
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Gurparas Singh, a native and citizen of India, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States, claiming persecution by members of the ruling BJP party due to his involvement with the Mann political party. Singh recounted two specific incidents of persecution: one in July 2017, where BJP members threatened him while he was placing posters, and another in December 2017, where he was attacked by BJP members while returning from a blood drive. Singh entered the U.S. without valid documents in April 2018 and was charged with removability. He admitted the allegations and applied for asylum and related relief.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Singh not credible due to significant linguistic and factual similarities between his declaration and those of other asylum applicants from India, suggesting a fabricated claim. The IJ also found that Singh knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application and denied his CAT claim, concluding that the remaining evidence did not establish a likelihood of torture upon his return to India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's findings and dismissed Singh's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Singh's petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's adverse credibility determination, noting the identical language and narrative structure in Singh's declaration compared to other applicants. The court also found that the IJ followed proper procedural safeguards in making the frivolous application finding. Additionally, the court concluded that the denial of CAT protection was supported by substantial evidence, as Singh failed to provide sufficient individualized evidence of a likelihood of torture. View "SINGH V. BONDI" on Justia Law

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Jose Trinidad Martinez Santoyo was sought for extradition to Mexico to face charges of intentional aggravated homicide. In January 2014, a Mexican judge issued an arrest warrant for Santoyo, alleging he shot a man twice in the head after an argument. Mexico requested his provisional arrest in November 2018, and the United States filed a complaint in August 2021. Santoyo was arrested in May 2022 and released on bail in November 2022. Mexico formally requested his extradition in July 2022, providing various supporting documents. A magistrate judge certified the extradition in February 2023, and Santoyo challenged this certification via a habeas corpus petition.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Santoyo's habeas corpus petition. Santoyo argued that the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico incorporated the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause, contending that the delay between the 2014 arrest warrant and the 2022 extradition request violated his speedy trial rights. The district court rejected this argument, holding that the treaty's "lapse of time" provision referred only to statutes of limitations, not to the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial protections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the "lapse of time" language in the extradition treaty does not incorporate the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause. The court emphasized that extradition proceedings are not criminal prosecutions and that the treaty's language refers to statutes of limitations rather than the constitutional right to a speedy trial. The court also noted that the judiciary's role in extradition is limited and that issues of delay are more appropriately addressed by the Secretary of State. View "SANTOYO V. BOYDEN" on Justia Law

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Edgar Murillo-Chavez, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) from Mexico, entered the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He was granted special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status in 2010 and became an LPR in 2011. In 2016, he pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm in Oregon. In 2018, he was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon and first-degree criminal mistreatment, both in Oregon.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Murillo removable for a firearms offense and for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The IJ also determined that Murillo was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he committed a CIMT within seven years of being admitted. Murillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ that his 2018 convictions were CIMTs and that he was admitted when he became an LPR in 2011. Murillo then filed a motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the BIA denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Murillo's 2016 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). The court also agreed with the BIA that Murillo was not "admitted" when he obtained SIJ status but when he became an LPR in 2011. Consequently, his 2018 conviction for first-degree criminal mistreatment, which occurred within seven years of his LPR admission, was a CIMT, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied Murillo's petitions for review. View "MURILLO-CHAVEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

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Ion Lapadat and his family, all of Roma ethnicity, sought asylum in the United States due to severe mistreatment in Romania. Ion testified that he was shot in the back while collecting firewood, and his family faced attempted kidnappings, threats, and violence. They also experienced pervasive discrimination, including denial of healthcare, employment, and access to public services. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found their testimony credible but denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), concluding that their experiences did not rise to the level of persecution.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the mistreatment did not constitute persecution and that the Roma are not a disfavored group in Romania. The BIA also found that Ion failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Ion then petitioned for review of the BIA's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA erred in its analysis. The court held that Ion's past experiences, including being shot and the severe assaults and threats faced by his family, collectively rose to the level of persecution. The court also determined that the BIA erred in concluding that the Roma are not a disfavored group in Romania, noting the long history of anti-Roma abuse and the Romanian government's documented persecutory conduct.The Ninth Circuit granted Ion's petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the BIA to address the remaining elements of Ion's asylum claim and to reconsider his fear of future persecution. View "Lapadat v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Romio Villagomez, a native and citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia, was convicted of felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.481(2)(b). Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him, arguing that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).An Immigration Judge determined that Villagomez’s conviction was indeed a crime of violence and ordered his removal. Villagomez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. He then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Villagomez’s conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence. The court noted that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court referenced its previous decision in United States v. Fitzgerald, which held that the attempt version of the same Nevada statute is categorically a crime of violence.Villagomez argued that the Nevada statute criminalizes mere unwanted touching and allows for conviction where substantial bodily harm occurs recklessly. The court rejected these arguments, holding that causing substantial bodily harm in Nevada necessarily requires Johnson-level force, which is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court also held that Nevada law requires intentional conduct for battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, and thus, the statute does not encompass injuries caused by reckless deployments of force.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the Board’s removability determination. The petition for review was denied. View "VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY" on Justia Law

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The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law

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The petitioner, Emerson Levi Godoy-Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 as a permanent resident. In 2015, he was charged and subsequently convicted under California Penal Code (CPC) § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness by force or threat. He was sentenced to 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail. Following his conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), relating to obstruction of justice.An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction under CPC § 136.1(c)(1) constituted an aggravated felony of obstruction of justice and issued a removal order. Godoy-Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the state offense categorically fell within the federal definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court analyzed whether CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is a categorical match for the generic federal offense of an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court concluded that CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is indeed a categorical match, as it involves specific intent conduct aimed at obstructing justice, and no pending investigation or proceeding is required. The court found that the elements of the underlying crimes in CPC § 136.1(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(3) do not sweep more broadly than the generic federal offense. Consequently, the court held that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction and sentence constituted an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice and denied the petition for review. View "GODOY-AGUILAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Lucila Magana-Magana, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States unlawfully in 1995. She faced a series of abusive relationships, including with Rafael Camacho and later Clyde Wakefield, whom she married in 2017. Wakefield's abuse led to their separation and eventual divorce. In 2007, Magana-Magana was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol, and the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings. She applied for cancellation of removal, citing hardship to her U.S. citizen children, but her request was denied by an immigration judge (IJ) and later by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Her appeal to the Ninth Circuit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.In January 2022, Magana-Magana filed a motion with the BIA to reopen her removal proceedings, citing new evidence of abuse by Wakefield and her application for benefits under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The BIA denied her motion, stating it was untimely and that she had not demonstrated "extraordinary circumstances" to waive the one-year filing deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded it had jurisdiction to review the BIA's determination of "extraordinary circumstances" under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(iv)(III), as it involved applying a legal standard to undisputed facts. The court found that the BIA did not abuse its discretion in determining that the abuse suffered by Magana-Magana did not constitute "extraordinary circumstances" and that there was no basis to conclude that such circumstances caused the delay in filing her motion. The court also rejected her other arguments, including her unexhausted equitable-tolling claim and the BIA's discretionary decision not to reopen the case sua sponte. The petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "MAGANA-MAGANA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Ranjit Singh, a native and citizen of India, arrived in the United States without documentation in May 2013 and sought asylum, claiming persecution due to his political opinions and association with the Mann Party. An immigration judge (IJ) found inconsistencies in Singh's testimony regarding his political affiliations and the circumstances of his father's death, leading to an adverse credibility determination. Consequently, the IJ denied Singh's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, and the Ninth Circuit denied Singh's petition for review.In July 2021, Singh filed a motion to reopen his case, citing new fears of persecution due to India's passage of agricultural reform laws. He claimed eligibility for relief based on his religion as a Sikh, his membership in a particular social group of farmers, and his political opinions opposing the new laws. Singh submitted new evidence, including a sworn statement detailing threats and assaults against his family by the police and members of the BJP Party, medical records, photos of protests, land ownership papers, and news articles about the persecution of farmers and Sikhs.The BIA denied Singh's motion to reopen, concluding that the new evidence was immaterial due to the prior adverse credibility determination. The BIA found that Singh's new affidavit and documentary evidence did not sufficiently establish an individualized risk of persecution or torture.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA improperly relied on the prior adverse credibility determination to discredit Singh's new evidence. The court held that the BIA must credit evidence supporting a motion to reopen unless the facts asserted are inherently unbelievable. The Ninth Circuit granted Singh's petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the BIA to address Singh's new factual assertions independently of the prior adverse credibility finding. View "SINGH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Vitaliy Chmukh, a native and citizen of Ukraine, came to the United States as a refugee in 2001. In 2017, he was involved in using a stolen vehicle to steal packages from porches, leading to his arrest. He pleaded guilty to possession of a stolen vehicle under RCW § 9A.56.068 and possession of heroin under RCW § 69.50.4013. He was sentenced to 43 months for the stolen vehicle charge and 24 months for the controlled substance charge, serving 38 months in total.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Chmukh with removability based on these convictions, alleging that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) and that the controlled substance conviction violated the Controlled Substances Act. An immigration judge (IJ) found him removable and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that the stolen vehicle conviction was an aggravated felony and a particularly serious crime, making him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Chmukh’s conviction for possession of a stolen vehicle was an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) because it matched the generic federal offense of possession of stolen property, requiring possession, actual knowledge that the property was stolen, and intent to deprive the owner of the property. The court also found that the conviction was a particularly serious crime, barring withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B). The court rejected Chmukh’s arguments that the statute was overbroad and that the agency erred in its analysis. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit denied Chmukh’s petition for review. View "CHMUKH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law