Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Union filed suit against Aviation Safeguards for violations of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151–165. The district court granted Aviation Safeguards’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Union’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The court held that equitable tolling principles apply to the Union’s unlawful interference and coercion claim; remanded and directed the district court to grant summary judgment for the Union on its claim for unlawful interference and coercion under RLA 152, Third and Fourth; held that the district court erred in finding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Union’s status quo claim under RLA 152, Seventh, 155, and 156; remanded this claim for the limited purpose of determining whether this claim is timely and, if the claim is timely, the court directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Union on its status quo claim; held that Aviation Safeguards unlawfully refused to mediate; and remanded and directed the district court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Union on its failure to mediate claim under RLA 152. View "Herrera v. Command Security" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former FWS employee, filed suit contending that she was discriminated and retaliated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and retaliated against in violation of the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), 5 U.S.C. 1201 et seq. The district court dismissed the WPA claim for lack of jurisdiction based on plaintiffs failure to present the claim to the MSPB. The court held that the statutory scheme governing the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA), Pub. L. No. 95-4545, 92 Stat. 1111, and the WPA did not authorize plaintiff to file her WPA claim in district court without first presenting it to the MSPB. The court also held that, although a federal district court can exercise federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331, that general grant of jurisdiction does not apply where it is fairly discernible that Congress intended a statutory review scheme to provide the exclusive avenue to judicial review. Therefore, the scheme precluded the district court from exercising original jurisdiction over plaintiff's WPA claim. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to remand to the MSPB. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Kerr v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Petitioner seeks review of the Board's decision holding that petitioner could not receive concurrent payments for total disability and permanent partial disability under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. 901–50. In this case, petitioner seeks concurrent compensation for a “scheduled” injury (hearing loss) under 33 U.S.C. 908(c)(13) and total disability caused by his back injury. Stevedoring Servs. of Am. v. Price allows concurrent awards for certain time-delayed injuries. The court held that, where the only evidence of hearing loss is a post-retirement audiogram, the Bath Iron Works Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs rule applies when determining the timing of disabilities under Price. Here, petitioner's last day of exposure to excessive noise was the same day as his back injury and Price does not apply. Under wage-compensation principles, concurrent payments for total disability and scheduled permanent partial disability are generally unavailable. Therefore, the Price exception does not apply because plaintiff's hearing loss did not precede his back injury. The court rejected petitioner's claim that he should at least be provided a decreased award capped at two-thirds of his wage under ITO Corp. of Baltimore v. Green. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Fenske v. Service Emp. Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, RSA, alleging retaliatory discharge claims under both state law and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. A jury awarded him lump-sum damages on his state law claims, and the district court then entered judgment in his favor on his ERISA claim. Even though, at plaintiff's request, the jury had been instructed to include front pay in its damages award, the district court granted plaintiff additional equitable remedies consisting of reinstatement as well as front pay until reinstatement occurred. RSA appeals these equitable remedies. Given the way in which the jury was instructed and the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that the jury’s verdict encompassed an implicit factual determination as to the entire amount of front pay to which plaintiff was entitled on account of his retaliatory discharge. Therefore, the court held that the district court’s grant of an additional front pay remedy for the same harm disregarded that determination in violation of the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The court also held that, although the reinstatement remedy does not necessarily conflict with factual findings implicit in the jury’s verdict, it is nevertheless improper because plaintiff waived that relief when he elected to seek the duplicative front pay remedy from the jury. Accordingly, the court reversed the equitable awards. View "Teutscher v. Woodson" on Justia Law

After BNSF suspended an employee, BMWED filed a complaint against BNSF alleging that BNSF's disciplinary actions interfered with and subverted the Railway Labor Act's (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 151-188, grievance and arbitration processes, and sought a declaration that BNSF’s actions violated the RLA. BNSF subsequently filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin BMWED from proceeding with a threatened strike. The district court ruled in favor of BNSF, concluding that the dispute was minor and subject to mandatory arbitration, and enjoining the threatened strike. BMWED filed an interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the subsequent entry of the final judgment in the case mooted the question of the procedural propriety of the preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the district court properly applied the ConRail test (Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives. Ass’n ) and properly concluded that the parties' dispute is a minor one. The court rejected BMWED's attempts to sidestep the ConRail framework by claiming that the distinction between minor and major disputes does not apply to the case. Rather, the court concluded that this is a dispute that fits squarely within the major/minor framework from the RLA and ConRail. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Bhd. of Maint. of Way v. BNSF" on Justia Law

Hotels appealed the denial of their motion to preliminarily enjoin the City from enforcing the Citywide Hotel Worker Minimum Wage Ordinance. The district court denied Hotels’ motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the Hotels’ motion for a preliminary injunction to stop enforcement of the City’s Wage Ordinance, because the Hotels failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court has consistently held that minimum labor standards do not implicate Machinists preemption, and the Wage Ordinance is no different. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "American Hotel and Lodging Ass'n v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Morris and McDaniel filed suit against Ernst & Young, alleging that the company misclassified Morris and similarly situated employees and denied overtime wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and California laws. Ernst & Young subsequently moved to compel arbitration under the agreements signed by Morris and McDaniel. The district court ordered arbitration and dismissed the case. Morris and McDaniel argue that their employment agreements, where they signed a "concerted action waiver" with the company, violate federal labor laws and cannot be enforced. Plaintiffs claim that the “separate proceedings” clause in the agreement contravenes three federal statutes: the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et. seq., the Norris LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. 101 et seq., and the FLSA. The court agreed with the Board's interpretation of section 7 and section 8 of the NLRA that an employer violates the NLRA when it requires employees covered by the Act, as a condition of their employment, to sign an agreement that precludes them from filing joint, class, or collective claims addressing their wages, hours, or other working conditions against the employer in any forum, arbitral or judicial. In this case, the terms of the concerted action waiver are unenforceable. The “separate proceedings” clause prevents concerted activity by employees in arbitration proceedings, and the requirement that employees only use arbitration prevents the initiation of concerted legal action anywhere else. The court also concluded that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., does not dictate a contrary result. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for the district court to determine whether the “separate proceedings” clause was severable from the contract. View "Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an employee of the SSA, seeks review of a Board order dismissing his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Board did not err in dismissing petitioner's IRA appeal because petitioner has not made a non-frivolous allegation under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), 5 U.S.C. 2302(b)(8)(A). Petitioner was employed by the SSA as a Hearing Office Director. Faced with disciplinary proceedings, petitioner filed an IRA with the Board, alleging that he engaged in protected whistleblowing activity under the WPA for which he could not be disciplined. The court concluded that the standard for determining whether a petitioner has made a non-frivolous disclosure is analogous to the standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss. In this case, disclosures 1–2 are not protected disclosures, because an agency ruling or adjudication, even if erroneous, is not a violation of the law or gross mismanagement under the WPA; disclosures 3–5 are not protected disclosures, because communications concerning policy decisions are explicitly excluded from protection under the WPA; and there is no evidence that the SSA took any personnel action against petitioner as a result of disclosures 3–5. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Daniels v. MSPB" on Justia Law

The three cases in this consolidated appeal involve employees represented by labor unions who seek remedies under state law against their employers. The cases were initially filed in state court, but then removed to federal court on the basis of preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. 185(a). In all the cases, the district court denied a motion to remand and held the state law claims preempted. At issue on appeal is section 301 preemption. The court articulated a two-step inquiry to analyze section 301 preemption of state law claims: first, a court must determine whether the asserted cause of action involves a right conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); and second, whether the right is substantially dependent on analysis of a CBA. Where there is such substantial dependence, the state law claim is preempted by section 301. If not, the claim can proceed under state law. In Kobold, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Good Samaritan. In Barr, the court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to RISG as to Barr’s money had and received claim, but reversed as to plaintiffs’ Or. Rev. Stat. 652.610(4) and breach of fiduciary duty claims, and remanded to the district court to decide whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the section 652.610(4) and breach of fiduciary duty claims. In Allen, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of Allen’s motion to remand as well as its grant of summary judgment to NWP. View "Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg'l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the City for retaliation, alleging that he was terminated for planning to testify against the City in a lawsuit relating to age discrimination. Plaintiff alleged that his termination violated both the First Amendment and the retaliation provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 623(d). The court rejected the City's argument that plaintiff's speech was not speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern and so fell outside the First Amendment's protections. In this case, plaintiff's sworn statement and imminent testimony were outside the scope of his ordinary job duties, which means that he was engaged in speech as a citizen for First Amendment purposes. The court also concluded that the retaliation provision of the ADEA does not preclude a plaintiff such as the one in this case from bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Given the substantial difference between the level of scrutiny afforded age discrimination equal protection claims and First Amendment retaliation claims, the court cannot assume that Congress intended the ADEA to affect the availability of section 1983 claims in the same manner in both subject areas. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stilwell v. City of Williams" on Justia Law