Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner testified that she was afraid to return to Guatemala because a woman had attempted to rob her after she withdrew money from a bank. The woman told Petitioner that she targeted her because Petitioner had family in the United States and a lot of money. The woman also threatened that Petitioner’s son would “pay for it” due to Petitioner’s refusal to give her the money. Petitioner and her son asserted that she had suffered past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her political opinion of refusing to submit to violence by criminal groups or gangs and their claimed membership in three particular social groups: “Guatemalan families that lack an immediate family male protector,” “Guatemalan women,” and “immediate family members of Petitioner.”   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner and her son’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of their appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of asylum and related relief. The panel held that Petitioner failed to show that the agency erred in concluding that her proposed social group comprised of “Guatemalan families that lack an immediate family male protector” was not cognizable. The panel also concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner had not expressed a political opinion. The panel explained that Petitioner’s refusal to give money to the threatening robber was not evidence of a “conscious and deliberate” decision that would naturally result in attributing a political position to her and that she instead simply reacted to being robbed. View "DORIS RODRIGUEZ-ZUNIGA, ET AL V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against The Gap, Inc. and its directors “derivatively on behalf of Gap.” Plaintiff’s action alleged that Gap violated Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act) and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 14a-9 by making false or misleading statements to shareholders about its commitment to diversity. Gap’s bylaws contain a forum-selection clause stating that the Delaware Court of Chancery “shall be the sole and exclusive forum for . . . any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the Corporation.” Lee nevertheless brought her putative derivative action in a California district court. The district court granted Gap’s motion to dismiss Lee’s complaint on forum nonconveniens ground.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The en banc court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that her right to bring a derivative Section 14(a) action is stymied by Gap’s forum-selection clause, which alone amounts to Gap “waiving compliance with a provision of [the Exchange Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder.” The en banc court explained that the Supreme Court made clear in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), that Section 29(a) forbids only the waiver of substantive obligations imposed by the Exchange Act, not the waiver of a particular procedure for enforcing such duties. McMahon also disposes of Plaintiff’s argument that Gap’s forum-selection clause is void under Section 29(a) because it waives compliance with Section 27(a) of the Exchange Act, which gives federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over Section 14(a) claims. View "NOELLE LEE V. ROBERT FISHER, ET AL" on Justia Law

Several organizations sought to intervene as defendants in a lawsuit against the Bureau of Land Management challenging the grant of two rights-of-way. The district court denied intervention, and the proposed intervenors filed this appeal. While the appeal was pending, the district court held that the decision to grant the rights-of-way was arbitrary and capricious, vacated it, and remanded the matter to the agency.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and held that the district court’s ruling mooted the intervention dispute. Generally, if the underlying litigation is complete, an appeal of a denial of intervention is moot and must be dismissed. The panel held that an intervention dispute would remain alive if this court could grant effectual relief or if there were some other way for the proposed intervenors to obtain their desired relief. Here, the district court’s proceedings are complete. No party has filed an appeal of the district court’s merits order, and under Alsea Valley Alliance v. Department of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004), the court would not have jurisdiction over such an appeal brought by Appellants even if they were granted intervention. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, ET AL V. BLM, ET AL" on Justia Law

Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order upholding the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He also challenged the BIA’s determination that defects in the Notice to Appear (“NTA”) did not require termination of his proceedings and that the BIA lacked authority to administratively close his case.   The Ninth Circuit filed: 1) an order withdrawing the opinion filed March 17, 2023, and reported at 62 F.4th 1223 (9th Cir. 2023), replacing that opinion with a concurrently filed amended opinion and, with these amendments, denying the government’s motion to amend; and 2) an amended opinion denying in part and granting in part Petitioner’s petition for review. In the amended opinion, the panel: (1) denied the petition as to Petitioner’s unexhausted argument that the omission of required time and place information in his NTA amounted to a claim-processing error; (2) remanded Petitioner’s administrative closure claim for further consideration in light of intervening precedent; and (3) remanded Petitioner’s asylum and withholding claims because the BIA erroneously reviewed the immigration judge’s nexus determination for clear error, rather than de novo. The panel concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish the requisite government involvement or government acquiescence to any torture. View "JOSUE UMANA-ESCOBAR V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

In an action brought by the Cassirer family under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, seeking the return of a Pissarro painting stolen by the Nazis and now in the possession of Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Foundation (TBC), an entity created and controlled by the Kingdom of Spain, the Ninth Circuit certified to the California Supreme Court the following question concerning the third step in California’s governmental interest choice-of-law test: Whether, under a comparative impairment analysis, California’s or Spain’s interest is more impaired if California’s rule that a person may not acquire title to a stolen item of personal property (because a thief cannot pass good title, and California has not adopted the doctrine of adverse possession for personal property), were subordinated to Spain’s rule that a person may obtain title to stolen property by adverse possession.   Applying the first step of California’s governmental interest test, the panel concluded that the issue in question was a question of personal property law: whether TBC or the Cassirers own the painting; and the relevant law of the two jurisdictions of Spain and California was different. Applying the second step of the test, the panel concluded that a true conflict existed between Spanish and California law, meaning that each jurisdiction had a legitimate interest in the application of its law and policy. The third step of the test required application of the law of the jurisdiction whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied. View "DAVID CASSIRER, ET AL V. THYSSEN-BORNEMISZA COLLECTION" on Justia Law

The Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (“FSHCAA”) provides that health centers receiving funding under Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act (“PHSA”) may be deemed Public Health Service (“PHS”) employees. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants violated their duty to report a court-ordered Lane County Mental Health patient’s refusal to comply with the terms of his probation. Plaintiffs alleged they were injured as a result of Defendants’ failure to report a patient’s repeated failures to comply with his mental health treatment plan. Defendants contended that they were entitled to Section 233 immunity. The district court held that Section 233 immunity did not apply to Defendants and remanded to state court.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order remanding to state court Plaintiffs’ action alleging negligence and wrongful death claims against federally funded community health centers and their employees (“Defendants”), and remanded to the district court to enter an order substituting the United States as the defendant and deeming the action as one brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The panel first addressed whether there was jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. Ordinarily, a remand order is not reviewable on appeal, except for cases removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1442. The panel agreed with Defendants that Section 233 immunity did not turn on who brings the claim, but rather on whether the conduct giving rose to the claim arose out of the Defendants’ performance of “medical, surgical, dental or related functions.” View "SAM FRIEDENBERG, ET AL V. LANE COUNTY, ET AL" on Justia Law

Relying on the vocational expert (“VE”)’s testimony, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, and, therefore, Plaintiff was not disabled. Plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to the Appeals Council asking it to review the ALJ’s finding that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. The Appeals Council made the attorney’s letter and a six-page attachment part of the record and denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s disability determination because it “found no reason under [the] rules to review the Administrative Law Judge’s decision.” On appeal, Plaintiff challenged only the ALJ’s conclusion that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that a person with Plaintiff’s limitations, age, education, and experience could perform.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision upholding the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial. The panel held that to determine whether the ALJ had a duty to address a conflict in job-number evidence (and failed to discharge that duty), it considers on a case-by-case “meritless or immaterial” or has “significant probative value.” Because Plaintiff did not present his job-number evidence to the ALJ during or after the hearing, the ALJ did not have any occasion to address the purported inconsistency between the VE’s estimates and Plaintiff’s contrary estimates. The panel held that the letter by Plaintiff’s counsel and the six pages of printouts together provided no basis to conclude that these results qualified as significant and probative evidence. View "JAMES WISCHMANN V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the current owner of environmentally contaminated real property, brought CERCLA cost recovery claims against the Estates of Norma and Edgar Beard and Etch-Tek, Inc. Mayhew Center, LLC, had purchased the property from the Beards. Walnut Creek Manor, LLC, owner and operator of a retirement community adjacent to the property, sued Mayhew. The district court concluded that Mayhew’s property was the source of the tetrachloroethylene, or PCE, found on Walnut Creek Manor’s site and held Mayhew liable under CERCLA and the California Hazardous Substance Account Act for any future response costs. Mayhew sued Norma Beard, asserting cost recovery and contribution claims under CERCLA and other claims seeking to hold her liable for the judgment against it in the Walnut Creek Manor action and the contamination on both properties. The district court consolidated the two actions, and the parties settled. Mayhew defaulted on its mortgage, and the property was placed in a state court receivership. The district court concluded that the claims against the Beard Estates and Etch-Tek were barred by claim preclusion.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, as barred by claim preclusion, of claims brought under the CERCLA and remanded for further proceedings. The panel concluded that the Mayhew/Beard action ended in a final judgment on the merits. As to the identity of claims, however, the panel concluded that claim preclusion did not apply. Mayhew’s CERCLA claim, which sought apportionment of the liability stemming from the Walnut Creek Manor action, was distinct from GP Vincent’s CERCLA claim, which sought reimbursement for costs incurred in connection with the remediation of GP Vincent’s property’s own contamination. View "GP VINCENT II V. THE ESTATE OF EDGAR BEARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

Rosemont Copper Company (Rosemont) challenged the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (FWS) designation of certain areas in southern Arizona as critical habitat for jaguar under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Rosemont sought to develop a copper mine and related processing facilities in the area. The Center for Biological Diversity (Center) sued after the FWS concluded that Rosemont’s proposed mine project would not destroy or adversely modify the designated critical habitat. Rosemont intervened and filed crossclaims against the FWS. The district court concluded that the FWS erred in designating occupied critical habitat because the record did not establish that jaguar occupied this area when this species was listed as endangered. But it upheld the FWS’s designation of this same area and an adjacent area as unoccupied critical habitat. The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of the Center.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the FWS, vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Center, remanded with instructions for the district court to vacate the FWS’s critical-habitat designations, and remanded to the agency for further proceedings. The panel held that because the FSW did not comply with Section 424.12(e) its designation of Unit 3 and Subunit 4b as unoccupied critical habitat was arbitrary and capricious. The panel concluded that the FWS did not provide a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made, or articulate a satisfactory explanation to justify its designations of Unit 3 and Subunit 4b as unoccupied critical habitat. View "CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. USFWS, ET AL" on Justia Law

The United States Forest Service designated several thousand acres of national forest for various treatments, including commercial logging, to reduce the risk of wildfires and disease. The Forest Service invoked a categorical exclusion from National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review for projects in the wildland-urban interface. In Hanna Flats I, the district court granted summary judgment for Alliance for the Wild Rockies based on the reasoning that the record did not show that the Project fell within the statutory definition of the wildland-urban interface. Subsequently, the Forest Service issued a Supplement to the Decision Memo, further justifying the categorical exclusion. In Hanna Flats II, the district court issued a preliminary injunction based on the reasoning that the Forest Service could not invoke the categorical exclusion.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment in Hanna Flats I, and vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction in Hanna Flats II. The panel held that in Hanna Flats I, the district court erred in finding that Alliance’s public comments adequately put the Forest Service on notice of its eventual claim. The panel concluded that it had appellate jurisdiction. The panel held that the Forest Service sufficiently preserved its notice argument, even though it framed notice as an exhaustion requirement below and as a waiver issue on appeal. Second, the panel held that Alliance’s comments did not put the Forest Service on notice of the wildland-urban interface issue. The panel held that there was no reason to conclude that it should exercise its equitable discretion to leave an injunction in place that was wrongly granted. View "ALLIANCE FOR THE WILD ROCKIES V. CARL PETRICK, ET AL" on Justia Law