Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from disputes over the estate of the late Texas oil magnate and billionaire J. Howard Marshall. J. Howard died in 1995, leaving nearly all his assets to his son, Pierce, but excluding his wife, Anna Nicole Smith (Vickie), and his other son, Howard, from receiving any part of his fortune. Howard and his Wife eventually filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and their case was assigned to Judge Bufford, who had previously presided over Vickie's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. Judge Bufford published three separate opinions: (1) denying Pierce's motion for reassignment or recusal; (2) confirming the Plan and denying Pierce's motion to dismiss with respect to his constitutional arguments; and (3) confirming the Plan and denying Pierce's motion to dismiss with respect to his statutory arguments. Elaine, Pierce's widow, now appeals the district court's decision, contending that the district court erred in affirming the bankruptcy court's orders. The court addressed the various issues on appeal related to the motion for recusal or reassignment, constitutional issues, and non-constitutional issues, and ultimately affirmed the district court's decision. View "In the Matter of: Marshall" on Justia Law

Arizona House Bill 2036 (H.B. 2036), enacted in April 2012, forbids, except in a medical emergency, abortion of a fetus determined to be of a gestational age of at least twenty weeks. Arizona law separately prohibited abortions after fetal viability unless necessary to preserve the pregnant woman's life or health. The challenged provision at issue, Section 7 of H.B. 2036, extended the abortion ban earlier in pregnancy, to the period between twenty weeks gestation and fetal viability. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, the court concluded that Arizona could not deprive a woman of the choice to terminate her pregnancy at any point prior to viability. Section 7 effects such a deprivation, by prohibiting abortion from twenty weeks gestational age through fetal viability. The twenty-week law was therefore unconstitutional under an unbroken stream of Supreme Court authority, beginning with Roe v. Wade and ending with Gonzales v. Carhart. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of declaratory and injunctive relief. View "Isaacson v. Horne" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action under 8 U.S.C. 1503(a) seeking a declaratory judgment that he is a citizen of the United States. Plaintiff was born in the Philippine Islands and his father was a U.S. citizen who had lived his entire life in the Philippines. Plaintiff argued that, as a child born out of wedlock, he was covered by a special provision of the Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, section 201(e), that made section 201(e) applicable retroactively to children born out of wedlock before the Act's effective date. The court concluded that the 1940 Act was not the law in effect at the time of plaintiff's birth in 1931, so he must establish that the Act applied retroactively to individuals before its effective date. The court did not think that the provisions of the Act on which defendant relied reflected a legislative intention that they should apply retroactively. Further, plaintiff conceded that he could not meet the condition precedent to acquiring citizenship, that his paternity have been established by legitimation or adjudication during minority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment dismissal of his action. View "Friend v. Holder" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's decision upholding the IJ's pretermission of her adjustment of status application. The BIA pretermitted petitioner's application on the ground that she did not satisfy the definition of "child" under 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E) because she was not adopted before her 16th birthday. The court held that the BIA's blanket rule against recognizing state courts' nunc pro tunc adoption decrees constituted an impermissible construction of section 1101(b)(1)(E) under Chevron because it gave little or no weight to the federal policy of keeping families together, failed to afford deference to valid state court judgments in an area of the law that was primarily a matter of state concern, and addressed the possibility of immigration fraud through a sweeping, blanket rule rather than considering the validity of nunc pro tunc adoption decrees on a case-by-case basis. The court also held that the BIA's determination that petitioner engaged in marriage fraud violated her rights to due process of law. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review. View "Amponsah v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioner sought innocent spouse relief, claiming that she did not understand the nature of her husband's business and claiming ignorance of his fraudulent actions regarding his tax liabilities. At issue was how the Tax Court should review appeals for equitable innocent spouse relief from joint and several liability for unpaid taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6015(f). The court joined the Eleventh Circuit and held that the Tax Court properly considered new evidence outside the administrative record. The court also concluded that the Tax Court correctly applied a de novo standard of review in determining the taxpayer's eligibility for equitable relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Tax Court's judgment. View "Wilson v. CIR" on Justia Law

In this appeal involving parental rights, the court previously published an opinion on a related issue in Mueller v. Auker and that opinion has the facts giving rise to this case. Here, the court held that Detective Rogers, along with Officers Snyder and Green, were entitled to qualified immunity from this lawsuit; the officers were entitled to qualified immunity with regard to the Fourth Amendment claim; the district court did not err or abuse its discretion in admitting the proffered testimony of Dr. Peter Rosen pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 702 or in denying the Muellers' motion on this issue for a new trial; and the district court did not err in dismissing the Muellers' 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against St. Luke's without leave to amend, because it was clear that amendment would be futile. The court addressed the remaining challenges and subsequently affirmed the judgment. View "Mueller, et al v. City of Boise, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of foster children, appealed the dismissal of their complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of their substantive and due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and violations of their statutory rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (CWA), 42 U.S.C. 670 et seq.; the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. 5101 et seq.; and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1431 et seq. The complaint alleged that the county's foster care system was plagued by systemic failures that resulted in violations of the rights guaranteed to foster children by federal statutes and the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court reversed the dismissal of Counts One, Two, Three, Eight, and Eleven; affirmed the dismissal of Counts Nine and Ten; and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should allow plaintiffs leave to amend their substantive due process claims, and plaintiffs could seek further leave to amend if they wished to add a claim under the IDEA's express cause of action.

This appeal grew out of an adversary proceeding in debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint against debtor and her husband, claiming that certain money and property belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate. The trustee sought turnover to the bankruptcy estate of certain proceedings from the sale of the couple's homestead, a rental property held in the husband's name, and income earned from the rental property. The bankruptcy court rejected all of the trustee's claims and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The court concluded that the proceeds of the homestead sale belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate but that the rental property held in the husband's name and the income did not. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

This appeal arose when the People of California adopted Proposition 8, which amended the state constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry. At issue was whether this amendment violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court declined to address the more general questions presented to it concerning the rights of same-sex couples to marry. The court concluded that, through the proponents of ballot measures, the People of California must be allowed to defend in federal courts, including on appeal, the validity of their use of the initiative power. Accordingly, the proponents possessed Article III standing to prosecute this appeal from the district court's judgment invalidating Proposition 8. However, the court concluded that the People could not employ the initiative power to single out a disfavored group for unequal treatment and strip them, without a legitimate justification, of a right as important as the right to marry. By using their initiative power to target a minority group and withdraw a right that it possessed, without legitimate reasons for doing so, the People violated the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, the court held that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional on this ground and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion by the official sponsors of Proposition 8 to vacate the judgment entered by former Chief Judge Walker, on the basis of his purported interest in being allowed to marry his same-sex partner.

Appellant filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that AHCCCS had no right to recover from her father's annuity at all or, alternatively, had no right to recover for any costs incurred for the care of her mother received after her father's death. Appellant subsequently appealed the district court's judgment granting summary judgment to AHCCCS. The court held that the 2006 amendment to 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(1)(F)(i) created a right in the State to recover as a remainder beneficiary against a community spouses' annuity for an institutionalized spouse's medical costs. The court further held that the State's recovery was not limited to the amount it paid for the institutionalized spouse's medical costs as of the date of the community spouse's death. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment, concluding that AHCCCS could be reimbursed as the primary remainder beneficiary from the father's annuity for the cost of the medical assistance it paid on the mother's behalf after the father's death.