Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that Defendants, prison officials, were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, when despite his numerous complaints over a period of years and a visibly deteriorating condition, they ignored his enlarged prostate. After the district court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, he was left with two claims of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The remaining officials claimed that they were entitled to qualified immunity and moved for summary judgment. The district court disagreed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order denying qualified immunity to prison officials. The Ninth Circuit determined that only examination of the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis was necessary—whether the right was clearly established at the time of the violation—because doing so would not hamper the development of precedent and both parties expressly acknowledged that this case turned on the second prong. The court reasoned it was clearly established at the time of Plaintiff’s treatment that prison officials violated the constitution when they choose a medically unacceptable course of treatment for the circumstances and a reasonable jury could find that the prison officials did just that. View "LEWIS STEWART V. ROMEO ARANAS" on Justia Law

The California Department of Transportation (“Caltrans”) coordinates and works with other government services before clearing homeless encampments. When Caltrans planned to clear high-risk encampments along the freeway, Plaintiff campers sought an injunction. The district court required Caltrans to give Plaintiffs six months to relocate and find housing before clearing the encampments.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order finding "there is no serious question" that the ADA requires such a lengthy delay. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion when evaluating the harm the injunction caused to Caltrans and the attendant public safety concerns, and thus erred in balancing the equities.   Caltrans argued that clearing the encampments involves no ADA obligation because its properties are not open to the public. The ADA requires “only ‘reasonable modifications' that would not fundamentally alter the nature of the service provided.” Here, the court found that a six-month delay is a fundamental alteration of Caltrans’s programs, which provide for expedient clearing of level 1 encampments and include, when possible, 72 hours’ notice and coordination with local partners.   The court also held that the district court erred by incorrectly mitigating the hardships caused by the injunction. When evaluating the balance of equities, the district court noted that Plaintiffs’ potential injury was “exacerbated by the public health concerns of disbanding homeless encampments during the COVID-19 pandemic.” View "WHERE DO WE GO BERKELEY V. CALTRANS" on Justia Law

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) published the Kenai Rule, codifying its ban on baiting Kenai Refuge brown bears and its closing of the Skilak Wildlife Recreation Area (“Skilak WRA”) to certain animals.The court held that the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) preserved the federal government’s plenary power over public lands in Alaska. The court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Service exceeded its statutory authority in enacting the Kenai Rule. The court held that while the Alaska Statehood Act transferred the administration of wildlife from Congress to the State, the transfer did not include lands withdrawn or set apart as refuges or reservations for the protection of wildlife, like the Kenai Refuge. Next, the court held that Plaintiff’s assertion that the Service could preempt the State’s hunting regulations on federal lands in Alaska was unsupported by the law.Further, the court rejected Safari Club’s contention that the Skilak WRA aspect of the Kenai Rule violated the National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 (“Improvement Act”). The court held that The Improvement Act did not require the Service to allow all State-sanctioned hunting throughout the Kenai Refuge. Moreover, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ arguments that the Service violated the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) by acting arbitrarily and capriciously in issuing the Kenai Rule. Finally, the court rejected Plaintiffs’ two-part National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) argument. The panel concluded that there was no basis for reversal. View "SAFARI CLUB INTERNATIONAL V. DEBRA HAALAND" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to medical providers at Orange County Jail in 1983 claims alleging that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of Plaintiff, a detainee who died from a ruptured aortic dissection.The court stated to defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must show that a reasonable official would have understood that their actions presented an unconstitutional substantial risk of harm to Plaintiff. Defendant, the on-call physician at the time, could not have reasonably believed that he could provide constitutionally adequate care without even examining a patient with Plaintiff’s symptoms. Therefore, the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity to this Defendant.The court further held that the first nurse to see Plaintiff had access to facts from which an inference could be drawn that Plaintiff was at serious risk. The court held that the district court was correct in denying summary judgment on qualified immunity to Defendant.The court also held that the second nurse to see Plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity. Reasoning that a jury could not reasonably conclude that this Defendant was deliberately indifferent. Finally, the court held that the third nurse to see Plaintiff was not entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable person in Defendant’s position would have inferred that Plaintiff was at serious risk if not hospitalized. View "PATRICK RUSSELL V. JOCELYN LUMITAP" on Justia Law

Appellee, Signal Peak Energy, sought to expand its mining operations, resulting in the expected emission of 190 million tons of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”). The Department of the Interior (“Interior”) published an environmental assessment (“EA”) which explained that the amount of GHGs emitted would amount to .44 percent of the total GHGs emitted each year globally. A group of environmental groups challenged the Interior's approval of the proposed expansion.The Ninth Circuit first noted that the parties’ dispute was not moot. The panel further held that Interior violated the National Environmental Policy Act by failing to provide a convincing statement for why the project’s impacts were insignificant. Moreover, the panel was unpersuaded that Interior was required to use the social cost of carbon metric to quantify the harm. Further, the panel found that it was less clear whether the agency had any other available metric to evaluate the project's impact. The panel remanded to the district court to decide whether an environmental impact statement was required. View "350 MONTANA V. DEBRA HAALAND" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought against tobacco companies, alleging that the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) preempts the County of Los Angeles's ban on the sale of all flavored tobacco products. The panel explained that the TCA's unique tripartite preemption structure governs its analysis of these issues. The TCA's text, framework, and historical context reveal that it carefully balances federal and local power by carving out the federal government's sole authority to establish the standards for tobacco products, while preserving state, local, and tribal authority to regulate or ban altogether sales of some or all tobacco products.The panel held that the TCA does not expressly preempt the County's sales ban. In this case, the preemption clause does not cover the County's sales ban, and in the alternative, the savings clause saves the County's sales ban from preemption. Furthermore, given that Congress explicitly preserved local authority to enact the very type of sales ban at issue here, the panel concluded that the TCA does not impliedly preempt the sales ban. View "R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The SmileDirect parties developed an online service model for patients to access certain orthodontic services; they allege the defendants (members and employees of the California Dental Board) conspired to harass them with unfounded investigations and an intimidation campaign, to drive them out of the market. The district court dismissed the suit. The Ninth Circuit reversed with respect to certain Sherman Act antitrust claims. The SmileDirect parties sufficiently pled Article III standing; they alleged an injury in fact that was fairly traceable to defendants’ challenged conduct and was judicially redressable. They sufficiently alleged anticompetitive concerted action, or an agreement to restrain trade. The court rejected an argument that regulatory board members and employees cannot form an anticompetitive conspiracy when acting within their regulatory authority.The court affirmed the dismissal of a claim under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits states from discriminating against interstate commerce, and of a "disparate treatment" Equal Protection Clause claim. To plead a class-of-one equal protection claim, plaintiffs must allege that they have been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. A class-of-one plaintiff must be similarly situated to the proposed comparator in all material respects. Rather than claiming that they stood on the same footing as others, the SmileDirect parties argued their uniqueness. View "Sulitzer v. Tippins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a Syrian national living in California as a legal permanent resident and is now a U.S. citizen. She is not and has never been a Kuwaiti national. In 2014, Plaintiff entered into a written employment contract with the Consulate to work as a secretary. Plaintiff alleges that the Consulate created a hostile work environment by harassing, discriminating, and retaliating against her on the basis of her gender, religion, and Syrian national origin, violated various wage and hour laws, and breached her employment contract. Claiming that she was constructively terminated from her employment, she filed suit.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Consulate’s motion to dismiss. The commercial activity exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2), applied. The employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel is governmental and the employment of other personnel is commercial unless the foreign state shows that the employee’s duties included “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” The district court properly exercised its discretion in finding that Plaintiff, who was employed as an administrative assistant, was not a civil servant and that her duties did not include “powers peculiar to sovereigns.” View "Mohammad v. General Consulate of the State of Kuwait in Los Angeles" on Justia Law

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) awarded “incentive adders,” upward adjustments to utilities’ rate of return on equity, to three California-based public utilities. FERC regulations allow for incentive adders to induce voluntary membership in independent system operators. The Ninth Circuit previously concluded that FERC improperly awarded incentive adders to PG&E without considering the California Public Utilities Commission’s (CPUC) assertion that PG&E’s membership in the California independent system operator (CAISO) is mandated. The court directed FERC to “inquire into PG&E’s specific circumstances, i.e., whether it could unilaterally leave the C[AISO].” On remand, FERC concluded that membership in CAISO is voluntary.The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision, holding that its previous decision did not resolve whether California law prevented the utilities from leaving CAISO without approval. FERC did not deviate from the mandate on remand. There was no error in FERC’s conclusion that membership in CAISO was voluntary despite a contrary suggestion in a CPUC 1998 Decision. FERC was not required to apply the Erie doctrine and defer to California’s interpretation. The incentive adder and its requirements arose from federal law. The California Supreme Court has not decided whether membership in CAISO is voluntary; no California Code provision mandates CAISO membership, and no case law discusses whether CAISO members must remain such. California courts would not defer to the CPUC’s 1998 Decision because it was inconsistent with the statute. View "California Public Utilities Commission v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission" on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment setting aside a land-exchange agreement between the Secretary of the Interior and King Cove, an Alaska Native village corporation. King Cove seeks to use the land it will obtain in the exchange to build a road through the Izembek National Wildlife Refuge to allow access to the city of Cold Bay.The panel explained that one of the purposes of the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) is to address the economic and social needs of Alaskans. The panel concluded that the Secretary appropriately weighed those needs against the other statutory purposes in deciding whether to enter the land-exchange agreement. The panel disagreed with the district court's conclusion that the Secretary violated the Administrative Procedure Act by departing from his predecessor's position on the land exchange without adequate explanation. Rather, the panel concluded that the Secretary acknowledged the competing policy considerations and that the prior findings that keeping the area roadless would best protect the habitat and wildlife of the Izembek Refuge. Finally, the panel concluded that the land-exchange agreement is not subject to the special procedures that ANILCA requires for the approval of transportation systems. The panel agreed with the government that the Secretary need not follow the process because 16 U.S.C. 3192(h), the land-exchange provision that he invoked, was not an "applicable law" for purposes of Title XI of ANILCA. View "Friends of Alaska National Wildlife Refuges v. Haaland" on Justia Law