Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Children’s Health Defense (CHD), a nonprofit organization, alleged that Meta Platforms, Inc. (Meta) censored its Facebook posts about vaccine safety and efficacy. CHD claimed that Meta’s actions were directed by the federal government, violating the First and Fifth Amendments. CHD also asserted violations of the Lanham Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Meta, Mark Zuckerberg, the Poynter Institute, and Science Feedback were named as defendants.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed CHD’s complaint. The court found that CHD failed to establish that Meta’s actions constituted state action, a necessary element for First Amendment claims. The court also dismissed the Lanham Act claim, ruling that Meta’s fact-checking labels did not constitute commercial advertising. Additionally, the court rejected the RICO claim, stating that CHD did not adequately allege a fraudulent scheme to obtain money or property.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that CHD did not meet the requirements to treat Meta as a state actor. The court found that Meta’s content moderation policies were independently developed and not compelled by federal law. CHD’s allegations of government coercion and joint action were deemed insufficient. The court also upheld the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, concluding that Meta’s fact-checking labels were not commercial speech. The RICO claim was dismissed due to a lack of proximate cause between the alleged fraud and CHD’s injury.Judge Collins partially dissented, arguing that CHD could plausibly allege a First Amendment claim for injunctive relief against Meta. However, he agreed with the dismissal of the other claims. The Ninth Circuit’s decision affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Meta. View "Children's Health Defense v. Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

Charles Clements was convicted by a California state jury of two counts of aggravated kidnapping, three counts of second-degree robbery, and related enhancements. His convictions were based in part on the testimony of a jailhouse informant, Donald Boeker, who claimed Clements had solicited him to murder a key witness. Boeker testified that he received no benefits for his cooperation and that his motives were altruistic. However, it was later revealed that Boeker did receive parole consideration for his testimony, which the prosecution knew or should have known.Clements appealed the denial of his federal habeas corpus petition, which was filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The district court had denied his claims, including one under Napue v. Illinois, which asserts that the prosecution knowingly used false testimony. The district court reviewed the Napue claim de novo but ultimately denied it, finding no reasonable likelihood that Boeker’s false testimony affected the jury’s judgment.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of Clements’s Napue claim, holding that the prosecution violated Napue by allowing Boeker to falsely testify about not receiving any benefits for his cooperation. The court found that Boeker’s testimony was highly probative of Clements’s consciousness of guilt and identity on the aggravated kidnapping counts. The court concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the jury’s judgment. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to grant Clements’s habeas petition with respect to the aggravated kidnapping charges. The court did not address Clements’s Brady claim or his request for an evidentiary hearing, as the relief sought was already granted under the Napue claim. The court also affirmed the denial of Clements’s Massiah and prosecutorial misconduct claims, finding that the state court’s determinations were not objectively unreasonable. View "Clements v. Madden" on Justia Law

The defendant, Rosendo Valdivias-Soto, was indicted for illegally reentering the United States after being previously removed. During his removal proceedings, Valdivias, who only speaks Spanish and has cognitive impairments, was misinformed about his right to counsel due to translation errors. The interpreter repeatedly used the Spanish word for "hire," suggesting that Valdivias could only have an attorney if he could pay for one, which led him to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Additionally, the immigration judge (IJ) incorrectly advised him that he was ineligible for any relief due to his aggravated felony conviction, which affected his waiver of the right to appeal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, finding that the removal order was invalid due to due process violations. The court held that Valdivias did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel or his right to appeal because of the translation errors and the IJ's incorrect advice. The court also found that Valdivias was prejudiced by these errors, as he could have plausibly obtained a U-visa and avoided deportation if he had been properly informed and represented.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Valdivias's removal proceedings were fundamentally unfair due to the due process violations stemming from the translation errors and the IJ's misstatements. The court also held that Valdivias satisfied the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies because the erroneous advice and translation errors rendered administrative review unavailable. Finally, the court concluded that Valdivias was improperly deprived of the opportunity for judicial review due to the invalid waiver of his right to appeal. Therefore, the dismissal of the indictment was affirmed. View "United States v. Valdivias-Soto" on Justia Law

Heraclio Osorio-Arellanes was involved in a firefight with U.S. Customs and Border Patrol agents in Arizona, resulting in the death of Agent Brian Terry. Osorio fled to Mexico, where he was later arrested and interrogated by U.S. officials in a Mexico City prison. During this interrogation, he confessed to key elements of the government's case on the advice of a Mexican attorney, Juan Salvador Pimentel. Osorio's confession was later used against him in court.The District Court for the District of Arizona initially suppressed Osorio's confession on Sixth Amendment grounds but later reversed this decision following a government motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the confession was admitted at trial, leading to Osorio's conviction on multiple charges, including first- and second-degree murder, conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery, and assault on a federal officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Pimentel's advice during the interrogation was deficient and prejudicial under the framework established in Strickland v. Washington. Specifically, Pimentel erroneously advised Osorio that robbing drug smugglers was not a crime, leading Osorio to confess. The court held that this advice was legally unjustifiable and that there was a reasonable probability that, absent this advice, Osorio would not have been convicted.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order reconsidering the suppression of Osorio's confession, vacated his convictions and sentences, and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address Osorio's Fifth Amendment claim, as the Sixth Amendment claim was sufficient to decide the case. The dissenting judge would have affirmed the conviction and required Osorio to pursue his ineffective assistance of counsel claim through a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion in the district court. View "United States v. Osorio-Arellanes" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-investors brought a securities fraud class action against Atieva, Inc., d/b/a Lucid Motors, and its CEO, Peter Rawlinson. They alleged that Rawlinson made misrepresentations about Lucid's production capabilities, which affected the stock price of Churchill Capital Corp. IV (CCIV), a special purpose acquisition company (SPAC) in which the plaintiffs were shareholders. These misrepresentations were made before Lucid was acquired by CCIV. Plaintiffs purchased CCIV stock based on these statements but did not own any Lucid stock, as Lucid was privately held at the time.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially held that the plaintiffs had statutory standing but dismissed the action for failure to allege a material misrepresentation. The court allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaint, but ultimately denied the amendments as futile and dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that the plaintiffs had not plausibly alleged materiality.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal on an alternative ground. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, following the Birnbaum Rule, which limits standing to purchasers or sellers of the stock in question. The court agreed with the Second Circuit's precedent in Menora Mivtachim Ins. Ltd. v. Frutarom Indus. Ltd., holding that purchasers of a security of an acquiring company (CCIV) do not have standing to sue the target company (Lucid) for alleged misstatements made prior to the merger. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing. View "MAX ROYAL LLC V. ATIEVA, INC." on Justia Law

La Dell Grizzell, acting on behalf of her minor children, sued San Elijo Elementary School and the San Marcos Unified School District, alleging that the school violated her children's federal and state civil rights. The complaint included claims of racial discrimination and other civil rights violations, such as racial epithets, physical assaults, and discriminatory disciplinary measures. Grizzell sought to proceed without legal representation.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the case without prejudice, citing the "counsel mandate," which precludes nonlawyer parents from representing their children pro se. The court emphasized that regardless of the merits of the case, Grizzell could not represent her children without an attorney. The district court instructed that the minor plaintiffs could only proceed through a licensed attorney.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that it was bound by its precedent in Johns v. County of San Diego, which prohibits nonattorney parents from representing their children in court. Despite Grizzell's arguments that this rule impedes access to justice for children from low-income families, the panel concluded that it could not deviate from established precedent. The court acknowledged the serious implications of the counsel mandate but affirmed the dismissal without prejudice, indicating that only en banc review could potentially alter the rule. View "GRIZZELL V. SAN ELIJO ELEMENTARY SCHOOL" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Indian nationals residing in the U.S. on nonimmigrant work visas and their children, sought to adjust their status to permanent residents. They challenged policies by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of State (DOS) that determine the eligibility of derivative beneficiaries, claiming these policies violate the Equal Protection Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim, allowing them to amend their complaint. Instead of amending, the plaintiffs appealed. During the appeal, the Supreme Court decided Patel v. Garland, which held that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review factual findings in discretionary-relief proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. The government argued that this ruling meant the courts also lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded the case, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction over most of the plaintiffs' claims because they were not ripe. The Ninth Circuit concluded that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) does not strip federal district courts of jurisdiction to hear collateral challenges to generally applicable policies and procedures. However, the claims were not ripe because the plaintiffs had not applied for adjustment of status, and USCIS had not denied their applications based on the challenged policies. For the one plaintiff who did apply and was denied, the court held that her claims must be channeled through a petition for review from a final order of removal, as per §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and (D). The Ninth Circuit's interpretation aligns with other circuits, maintaining that general policy challenges are not precluded by § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). View "NAGENDRA NAKKA V. USCIS" on Justia Law

The case involves a consumer class action against Premier Nutrition Corporation, which marketed Joint Juice, a dietary supplement drink, as effective for relieving joint pain. Mary Beth Montera, representing a class of New York consumers, alleged that Premier's advertising was deceptive and violated New York General Business Law (GBL) §§ 349 and 350. These laws require proof that the defendant engaged in consumer-oriented conduct that was materially misleading and caused injury to the plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California certified the class and the case proceeded to trial. Montera presented evidence, including studies showing that Joint Juice's key ingredients, glucosamine and chondroitin, were ineffective for joint health. Premier countered with industry-funded studies supporting the product's efficacy. The jury found Premier's statements deceptive and awarded statutory damages based on the number of units sold in New York during the class period. Premier's post-trial motions to decertify the class and for judgment as a matter of law were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings on class certification, liability under GBL §§ 349 and 350, and the initial calculation of statutory damages. The court rejected Premier's arguments that its statements were not materially misleading and that Montera's injury was not cognizable under New York law. The court also upheld the jury's finding that the class members' injuries were caused by Premier's misrepresentations.However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's award of prejudgment interest, ruling that statutory damages under GBL §§ 349 and 350 are not compensatory and thus do not warrant prejudgment interest. The court also remanded the case for the district court to reconsider the statutory damages award in light of the factors identified in Wakefield v. ViSalus, Inc., which addresses the substantive due process limits on aggregate statutory damages. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated and remanded in part. View "MONTERA V. PREMIER NUTRITION CORPORATION" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Susan and Moses Libitzky, filed their 2011 tax return late in January 2016 and sought a refund for an overpayment of $692,690 in taxes from previous years. They had made substantial tax payments and received extensions but failed to file their returns on time due to their accountant's negligence. The IRS denied their refund request, asserting it was not filed within the statutory limitation period. The Libitzkys argued that their informal communications with the IRS in 2015 should count as an informal claim for a refund, which would stop the running of the statute of limitations.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the Libitzkys' lawsuit, finding that their communications with the IRS did not amount to an informal claim for a refund. The court assumed a three-year limitation period applied but did not directly address whether a formal claim had been made in January 2016.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal but on different grounds. The Ninth Circuit held that the Libitzkys' formal refund claim, filed in January 2016, was timely under 26 U.S.C. § 6511(a) because it was made within three years of filing the return. However, the refund amount was limited by the look-back period under § 6511(b)(2), which restricts recovery to taxes paid within three years plus any extension before the refund claim was filed. Since the overpayment was deemed made in April 2012, outside the look-back period, the Libitzkys could not recover their overpayment. The court also held that the informal claim doctrine did not apply because the informal claim was untimely, as it was made before the 2011 return was filed, and thus the two-year limitation period applied. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "LIBITZKY V. USA" on Justia Law

Sandeep Kumar, a native of India and member of the Mann Party, faced threats and physical harm from members of the opposing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). After joining the Mann Party, Kumar was threatened and beaten by BJP members, resulting in a two-day hospital stay. He attempted to report the incidents to the police, but was ignored and threatened by a senior officer. Fearing for his life, Kumar fled to the United States. His family continued to face harassment from BJP members after his departure.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Kumar's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that the threats and physical harm Kumar experienced did not cumulatively constitute persecution. The BIA relied on the precedent set in Sharma v. Garland, which found that threats alone do not amount to persecution unless they cause significant suffering or harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the BIA erred in its reliance on Sharma. The court noted that unlike in Sharma, Kumar experienced specific threats connected to physical harm. The court concluded that the cumulative effect of the threats and physical harm Kumar suffered rose to the level of persecution, especially in the context of India's political and social turmoil. The court remanded the case to the BIA to complete its past-persecution analysis and reconsider Kumar's claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT protection. The court emphasized that the BIA should consider the credible death threats and physical harm Kumar experienced in tandem. View "KUMAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law